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Regarding the Arab region, GDP per capita virtually stagnated for more than 
20 years from 1980. During the same period, GDP per capita in the world’s 
highly industrialized states further increased and the gap between the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) and the highly developed countries widened. 
However, the differences between Arab countries and the Western states exist 
not only economically. The countries also differ regarding their political, legal, 
and social systems. This work explains the differences in development on the 
basis of institutional economics. In addition to a general theoretical part, an 
empirical analysis demonstrates the effects of institutions on income, and a 
historical case study explains the divergent development paths of the Arab 
region and selected advanced economies.
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In 2007, Germany realized a GDP per capita of USD 25,106, the United States 
of USD 38,063, and Norway of USD 42,065. However, Egypt’s GDP per capita 
in 2007 amounted to USD 1697 and Yemen’s merely USD 561. By contrast, the 
United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) GDP per capita accounted for USD 26,071.1 The 
relative numbers differed little in 1990, with Norway realizing the second high-
est GDP per capita behind the US. But why do some economies perform so 
much worse than others? Why are the per capita incomes and, therefore, living 
standards so much lower in some countries and why does the situation persist? 
Hence, why have many underdeveloped and less developed countries been un-
able to significantly improve their economic performances over recent decades? 
Regarding the Arab region, GDP per capita virtually stagnated for more than 
20 years from 1980. During the same period, GDP per capita in the world’s 
highly industrialized states further increased and the gap between the MENA 
region and highly developed countries widened. 2
However, the differences between Arab countries and highly developed 
Western states exist not only economically. The countries also differ regarding 
their political, legal, and social systems and, of course, regarding their histories. 
In recent decades, and especially since 9/11/2001, the MENA region has 
moved into the public spotlight, not only because of its economic development, 
but also because of its domestic and external conflicts, oil richness, Islamic fun-
damentalism, and terrorism as well as cultural and religious differences. 
Since the MENA region and highly developed Western states differ in so 
many variables, could it be the case that they are all linked? Can these different 
economic performances be traced back to varying political, legal, social, cul-
tural, and historical paths? 
Convergence in the neoclassical model 
According to the neoclassical growth model, differences in growth performances 
can be explained by the fact that the observed economies are situated at different 
places on the model’s growth path. In the long run, however, all countries will 
                                                
1 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars. Data accessed July 2, 2009, from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators Online (WDI) database. 
2 MENA (Middle East and North Africa): Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, 
West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen, according to the World Bank’s WDI definition. 
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realize the equilibrium growth rate – that is to say the growth rate of technologi-
cal progress.3
This argument is based on the assumption of diminishing returns to scale. 
Accordingly, less developed countries exhibit a relatively low capital stock. 
Therefore, every additional unit of capital causes relatively high returns. The 
more capital is accumulated the more the returns per unit of capital decrease. 
Therefore, less developed countries realize higher returns to scale and thereby 
higher growth rates. The more capital a country accumulates, that is to say the 
more developed it is, the lower the growth rates are. This process continues until 
a country has reached the equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium, the per capita 
growth rate constantly corresponds to the rate of technological progress (or is 
equal to zero depending on model assumptions). Hence, the growth rates of all 
observed countries converge to the rate of technological progress. 
There are concepts of convergence that can be differentiated. -convergence 
indicates that the growth rate is negatively correlated with the level of per capita 
income. Hence, poor countries will realize higher growth rates and, therefore, 
grow faster than rich countries. -convergence says that the disparities between 
income levels will decrease. That is to say, in equilibrium all countries will real-
ize the same level of per capita income. 
Furthermore, we can differentiate between conditional and absolute conver-
gence. Here, the distinguishing characteristic is the steady state. If it is assumed 
that all observed economies realize the same preferences and production func-
tions then the countries will move on the same steady state growth path and will 
at least be situated in the same steady state. That is to say, poor countries grow 
faster than rich ones and, therefore, realize higher growth rates. However, in-
come disparities decrease and all observed economies will realize at least the 
same growth rates (zero or the rate of technological progress) and the same level 
of per capita income, since they all converge to the same steady state. 
Conditional convergence emanates from varying preferences and production 
functions. Hence, decreasing returns to scale are assumed to hold for all ob-
served economies, but the countries differ regarding their saving rates and popu-
lation growth rates. Therefore, the economies move on different growth paths 
and will end up in different steady states. That is to say, poor countries will 
grow faster than rich ones, since decreasing returns to scale are assumed. But 
income levels will differ in equilibrium, since every economy realizes its unique 
steady state (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Hagemann, Erber & Seiter, 1998; 
Reichart, 2005). 
                                                
3 If the model includes technological progress. In the case without technological progress, the 
equilibrium per capita growth rate is zero. 
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However, empirical evidence shows that growth rates and income levels do 
not converge on a global level. That is to say, convergence can be observed 
within certain groups of countries, so-called convergence clubs. These groups 
consist of relatively similar countries regarding their levels of factor accumula-
tion and technology. Differences in growth rates and living standards indeed de-
crease within these groups, for example the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
However, especially between poor and rich countries, convergence cannot 
be observed. But convergence theory insists that underdeveloped countries 
should realize higher growth rates and, therefore, close the gap in income levels 
and growth rates. Nevertheless, these two groups, underdeveloped and highly 
developed countries, drift further apart except for some exclusions.4
Why countries realize different growth rates and why poor countries should 
theoretically realize higher growth rates than rich countries was examined by 
Abramovitz (1986). Accordingly, poor countries have the potential to catch up. 
That is to say, because of their low levels of factor accumulation, underdevel-
oped countries are, assuming decreasing returns, able to realize higher growth 
rates per unit of capital than rich countries can. So far, the theory follows the 
neoclassical model. Poor countries benefit from the fact that they can adopt rich 
countries’ technologies. That is to say, underdeveloped countries do not have to 
innovate by themselves but they can inherit technologies and ideas from highly 
developed countries. Poor economies can catch up by adapting such technolo-
gies. If these countries use their potential, adopt technologies, and thereby real-
ize high growth rates, they are able to catch up to developed economies and 
thereby implement similar growth rates and income levels. However, if a former 
underdeveloped country is able to not only adopt technologies but also innovate 
and increase the pace of technological progress, it might even be able to forge 
ahead and overhaul the highly developed countries. By contrast, if an underde-
veloped country is not able to use its potential to adapt the technologies of 
highly developed economies, it might not be able to close the gap and instead 
fall further behind regarding growth rates and income levels. 
Abramovitz’s theory explains why some countries are not able to catch up. 
Accordingly, the potential to catch up depends on a country’s ability to adopt 
technology. Hence, when a country is not able to adopt the leading countries’ 
technologies, it cannot use its potential. Then, the gap between the poor coun-
tries and highly developed countries might even widen. In this case, divergence 
instead of convergence is observed. 
                                                
4 See, for example, Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992); Baumol (1986); Ben-David (2000); Caselli, 
Esquivel & Lefort (1996); de la Fuente (2002); Islam (2003); Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992); 
Quah (1996); Sala-i-Martin (1996); Temple (1999). 
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Hence, certain factors must determine an economy’s ability to adopt tech-
nologies. Abramovitz introduced the term ‘social capability’, which is the deci-
sive determinant of a country to catch up or fall behind. Social capability incor-
porates growth-relevant factors that are not included in a usual production func-
tion. Thus, apart from capital and labor, a country’s growth performance might 
also depend on the historical, cultural, religious, political, and legal particulari-
ties that influence economic variables and a country’s ability to adopt technolo-
gies. For example, certain religious or moral convictions might inhibit techno-
logical progress, human capital accumulation, and restrict the labor force. Cer-
tain norms might exclude particular parts of the population from the labor mar-
ket or restrict research and development and education from applying certain 
methods, assumptions, theories, and so on. Social capability also influences the 
form of society, for example whether it is patriarchic and conservative or indi-
vidualistic and modern.5 Furthermore political, bureaucratic, financial, and legal 
structures are incorporated. Therefore, social capability is a so-called catch-all 
variable that cannot be clearly defined. It includes all the factors considered 
growth relevant but which are not directly included in the neoclassical produc-
tion function. This broad definition makes it difficult to incorporate social capa-
bility in scientific work, whether theoretical or empirical.  
Institutions 
The concept of social capability is close to the concept of institutions. Institu-
tions are rules that regulate human interactions. These rules can be informal and 
solely exist in human minds, for example certain codes of behavior. However, 
the rules can also be formally written down, for example laws and regulations. 
In any case, they regulate social interaction. This is possible since institutions 
allow the individual to establish expectations regarding other individuals’ be-
haviors. Hence, people of the same culture act according to the same codes of 
conduct and, therefore, all individuals of the observed population know how the 
others will react. Similarly, people being subordinated to the same jurisdiction 
will behave accordingly; therefore, they can predict others’ behaviors. 
Institutions can be examined on a micro- or macro-level. In the micro view, 
the single individual’s actions are of interest and it is investigated why an agent 
acts in a certain way. Since institutions regulate human behavior, they must play 
a role regarding the determination of an agent’s actions. 
However, institutions are also decisive from a macro point of view. Since a 
society’s morals, values, norms, and so on are considered to influence societal 
                                                
5 See, for example, Adelman & Taft Morris (1967); Hall & Jones (1999); Temple & Johnson 
(1998). 
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organization, these factors are suspected of influencing economic development. 
The same holds for formal rules such as the political or legal system. Countries 
realizing significant differences in economic development often differ regarding 
their societal, political, and legal structures, too. Therefore, these ‘macro’ insti-
tutions, which are also rules regulating human interactions, might impact eco-
nomic development. 
Hence, institutions are obtained on a micro-level where they determine indi-
viduals’ behaviors, but they also exist on a macro-level where their influence on 
economic growth becomes apparent. Therefore, comprehensive institutional 
analysis has to incorporate the micro view and thereby the single individual as 
well as the macro view, which analyzes the impact of institutional systems on 
economic development. 
History matters 
History plays a decisive role in questioning the emergence and development of 
institutions themselves (Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005; North, 1990; North 
2005; North & Thomas, 1973). A country’s development path can suddenly 
change direction due to a historical accident. However, historical changes can 
also pass subliminally and not become obvious until a certain period of time. 
Nevertheless, historical accidents cause institutions to adapt and they result in an 
irrevocable alteration of an economy’s development path. Hence, institutions 
clearly are path-dependent and usually neither their emergence nor later changes 
can be ascribed to conscious decisions. Once the path-dependent institutions re-
sulting from historical accidents become ‘locked in’ change is almost impossi-
ble. 
The importance of history in institutional development makes institutional 
analysis difficult. History is not a tangible variable that can be incorporated in 
theoretical and empirical models. The necessity to include history as a determin-
ing factor creates the need to deviate from standard economic analysis based on 
certain mathematical and empirical models. As good as these models are to ex-
amine particular issues they cannot incorporate historical incidents that acciden-
tally appeared in a certain place at a certain point in time. Therefore, institu-
tional analysis necessitates a comparative institutional analysis (Aoki, 2001). 
That is to say, institutional analysis must always be accompanied by historical 
research on the particular region. Otherwise the decisive institutional incidents 
cannot be detected.6
                                                
6 See, for example, Aoki (2001); Greif (1994); Hedlund (2001, 2005); Lipsey, Carlaw & 
Bekar (2005). 
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Closely linked to history but less acknowledged as a growth-relevant factor is 
culture. However, culture in economic analysis seems to be gaining a growing 
audience even though its role is critically discussed.7 In particular, mainstream 
economics that emanate from the assumption of the pure homo economicus do 
not ascribe a crucial role to culture. This is the case since humans are supposed 
to be rational and react to material incentives that ultimately overlie all other 
stimuli. Hence, even non-Western, non-individualistic, and maybe less materi-
ally focused societies pursue the same goal and realize the same utility func-
tions. That is to say, despite different histories, beliefs, worldviews, morals, and 
thereby cultures all people are supposed to rationally maximize their material 
incomes. This argumentation is right from a pure theoretical viewpoint. That is 
to say, according to the assumptions the particular models make, they are right. 
Therefore, the application of these models is justified for the examination of cer-
tain economic issues. In any case, models that exclude cultural components 
might not be useful to explain long-term growth differences. It cannot be denied 
that in certain cases differences in economic growth performances correspond to 
cultural borders (Landes, 1998; Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005; Olson, 1982; 
Pomeranz, 2001). 
However, cultural determinism is not helpful either. Differences in devel-
opment levels cannot be solely traced back to different cultures. They are rather 
initiated by a mixture of factors that varies from region to region. Nevertheless, 
culture is one component that needs to be taken seriously. This is the case since 
culture is highly correlated with history, which definitely is a determining force 
of economic development. Furthermore, culture determines human behavior. 
Since human behavior is what determines the economy, culture should affect 
economic outcomes. 
However, to detect whether culture is a growth-relevant factor or not a more 
precise definition is necessary. The fact that culture is often not further defined 
is one reason why some mainstream economists dismiss culture and why cul-
tural economists cannot bring out their arguments. Culture indeed is a broad 
concept that can incorporate quite different subjects. In economics, culture is 
usually defined as beliefs and preferences that differ between societies and, 
therefore, allow a differentiation between groups (Fernández, 2008). In institu-
tional economics, culture can be used as a synonym for informal institutions. 
Therefore, culture has to be defined as beliefs, morals, norms, habits, conven-
tions, codes of conduct, and so forth. That is to say, culture consists of rules that 
regulate human interactions on an informal level. With this definition we assume 
                                                
7 See, for example, De Jong (2009); Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006); Harrison & Hunting-
ton (2000).  
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that beliefs, morals, norms, and so on – that is to say culture – determine the 
rules implemented by human beings and which might affect economic develop-
ment. Whether culture affects economic growth is analyzed within this work. 
The MENA region 
To find out whether institutions influence economic development a theoretical 
analysis on the micro- or macro-level is necessary. However, since institutions 
are path-dependent and, therefore, dependent on historical accidents every single 
cause has to be examined itself. That is to say, the theory demonstrates how and 
why institutions in general influence economic development. But the theory will 
not tell us why a certain country realizes low levels of economic development. 
Therefore, empirical and especially historical investigation is necessary. 
The MENA region is one of the world regions that cannot close the gap of 
living standards between itself and highly developed countries. On the contrary, 
the divergence of income levels and growth rates between MENA and highly 
industrialized countries can be observed. Hence, developments in the MENA 
region cannot be explained by the neoclassical model or the mainstream en-
dogenous growth models. 
However, differences between the Arab region and the economically suc-
cessful countries of the Western hemisphere also exist on non-economic levels. 
The MENA countries differ regarding their political and legal structures and 
thereby their bureaucracies and regulations. Furthermore, cultures, religions, and 
histories differ widely between MENA and the Western world. Hence, the rules 
that regulate human interactions – the institutions – differ. Since discrepancies 
exist on the institutional level and regarding growth performances, one could 
assume that both are correlated, namely that the institutional environment of the 
MENA region is less growth supportive than the institutional environment of 
Western states. 
That institutions do differ is demonstrated in chapter four via some descrip-
tive statistics on formal and informal institutional indicators. Accordingly, cur-
rent cultural, political, legal, and economic structures differ widely between 
Arab countries and highly industrialized states.  
However, to explain these differences a historical comparative analysis is 
necessary. Such an analysis must highlight the developments and historical ac-
cidents responsible for the formation of the current institutional system in the 
corresponding region. Since institutions are path-dependent and since at least 
some of them are slow moving, the case study must start at an early point in 
time. Regarding institutional development in the MENA region, the analysis be-
gins in the seventh century with the process of state building. Already at this 
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point in time institutional developments differed widely between the Arab and 
Western (European) regions and had large impacts on the upcoming events. For 
the MENA region we can at least state that the phase of state building that began 
during Muhammad’s lifetime (570–632) already demonstrated an institutional 
lock-in. This holds for political institutions and the relationship between the sa-
cred and the secular. Incidents at this early point in time shaped the institutional 
structure of the Arab world sustainably. 
However, from the phase of state building onwards several historical acci-
dents and institutional developments had long-lasting effects on the institutional 
structure and the development path in general. Of course not all determining 
events can be listed since there are too many of them, several of which are un-
known and will probably never be examined. Therefore, the current analysis 
does not claim completeness but wants to depict some decisive institutional de-
velopments that differed from those in Western Europe. 
After this historical analysis it should be clear why the Arab region and 
highly industrialized Western states realize different economic performances 
and why the gap in living standards has widened. 
Structure of the work 
This dissertation project is differentiated into two parts. The first is a general 
section on institutions that incorporates a theoretical and an empirical analysis 
and examines whether institutions influence economic growth. The theoretical 
chapter deals with the definition of institutions and with equilibrium considera-
tions. Hence, the observed economies develop equilibrium strategies and institu-
tions according to their particular histories and environments. Although the eco-
nomic and societal outcomes might differ, each society might be situated in an 
optimal state and realize optimal strategies regarding the prevalent conditions 
and thereby the specific histories of the countries. The empirical analysis deals 
with institutional data and measurement. A regression analysis demonstrates that 
informal and formal institutions have a significant impact on GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, a society’s religious background seems to influence institutional 
development. 
The second part of the dissertation project deals with the MENA region and 
its institutional development. The current institutional differences between the 
MENA countries and some highly developed economies are depicted. Within 
this analysis it becomes clear that institutions differ widely between the Arab 
region and Western hemisphere. That institutions have a significant influence on 
economic development is demonstrated in the general empirical analysis. We 
can conclude that the different institutional environments of the MENA region 
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and the West continue to lead to varying growth performances. However, why 
institutions in the Arab region developed in their way and not in another is 
shown in the historical analysis. Here, the development path is partly recon-
structed; emphasis, however, is placed on the very early phase of institution 
building. That is to say, we mainly concentrate on medieval times. It is argued 
that these early centuries were decisive for the institutional lock-in. Hence, the 
direction of the development path was determined during that time. 
It should be noted that this study does not deal with the general economic 
history of the MENA region. Furthermore, it is not concerned with the Ottoman 
Empire, colonization, and the politically and economically crucial events of the 
20th century. Emphasis is placed on current institutional differences as well as 
on selected events of the medieval period. This is the case since the study wants 
to demonstrate that early, seemingly unimportant incidents can have long-lasting 
effects on institutional and economic development. Later occurrences of course 
were also of crucial importance. However, they are not the content of this work. 
This dissertation project demonstrates the importance of institutions regard-
ing the analysis of economic growth and economic development. The MENA 
countries were chosen since at least in the past two decades (but also earlier) the 
region played a major role in public perception. Many of the region’s conflicts, 
whether internal or external, can be traced back to the stagnating low living 
standards. High population growth rates and a high percentage of people under 
25 years of age put pressure on the region’s labor markets. To ensure employ-
ment for the growing part of the working age population, MENA’s economic 
performance must improve significantly (Dyer & Yousef, 2007; Sala-i-Martin & 
Artadi, 2003; Yousef, 2004). However, if it is true that economic development 
depends on the institutional environment, then economic change would require 
institutional change. But the path-dependent nature of institutions inhibits fast 
change. 
Although this might seem to be a depressing result for the Arab countries, 
this dissertation project nevertheless demonstrates that the particular institutional 
development in the MENA region is the decisive component for its economic 
performance. Since institutions are complex and complementary entities their 
development paths cannot be prophesied. Therefore, the MENA region might 
develop a solution strategy and improve its economic situation in a way that is 
yet unknown. Hence, since institutional development is unpredictable, the future 
Arab economic development can hold positive or negative surprises. However, 
this study demonstrates that the efficiency and optimality of institutions cannot 
be measured in economic successes and high living standards. A society’s his-
tory and its institutional environment might result in low living standards and 
low growth rates. Nevertheless, regarding the prevailing conditions, the particu-
lar society might realize an optimal outcome. 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
10
2. Institutions – a theoretical approach 
2.1 Introduction 
Institutions constitute the social, political, legal and economic system of a state. 
According to North (1990), “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human inter-
action. […] they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, so-
cial or economic” (p. 1). Hence, institutions are the rules that regulate social in-
teraction. Therefore, they establish the framework within which social life takes 
place. Institutions can take different forms, ranging from an individual’s atti-
tudes and beliefs to the legal system of a state. Regulations might, for example, 
be imposed on the distribution of power, the legal foundation (which must judge 
misconduct), and land tenure or ownership rights. Furthermore, economic regu-
lations, which clarify expected costs and returns, can be established. However, 
these constraints – called institutions – must be implemented by humans to regu-
late their interrelationships. With institutions, people are able to assess others’ 
behaviors since an institution by definition is universal, and thereby all members 
of the observed population adhere to the rule. The risk that somebody violates 
the rule is reduced, because the violator is punished and must pay a cost for their 
misconduct. Therefore, institutions make human behavior predictable. That is to 
say, human interrelations follow a given pattern, which allows preceding calcu-
lations. This is true for both formal rules such as laws and informal codes of 
conduct. It follows that, because of institutions, humans are endued with infor-
mation on others’ behaviors and, therefore, transaction costs can be reduced. 
The institution – whether a formal rule or morals and norms – provides behavior 
guidelines, which help an individual choose their own actions and predict oth-
ers’ behaviors. However, we should not mix this up with a situation of complete 
information, which does not exist. Therefore, transaction costs still exist and 
humans act in a state of uncertainty. Institutions reduce transaction costs and 
uncertainty by providing rules of conduct. Whether institutions are efficient 
cannot be easily stated and depends on the particular case and the applied the-
ory. In fact, certain parts of the population can suffer from high transaction costs 
and uncertainty despite the implementation of institutions. Hence, institutions do 
not imply that all members of the observed population live a materially secure 
and satisfying life. However, to know about one’s own and others’ constraints 
opens up a clearly defined scope for action, even if the institutional environment 
is not efficient. Individuals can calculate their gains and losses resulting from 
specific behaviors. Hence, with distinct rules it is possible to determine whether 
an investment is worthwhile or not. Thus, the decisive property of institutions is 
that they set constraints on human behavior and so determine human action; 
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therefore, they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. Hence, they create in-
centives for particular actions, since gains and losses become predictable.
Institutional analysis, however, is a complex field with several feedback 
mechanisms; it has ‘no beginning’ per se. Institutional development can be de-
scribed as a circuit that continues indefinitely and for which a starting point can-
not be detected. The crucial element, which determines and sustains societal or-
ganization, is human behavior. Hence, institutions are directly connected with 
human behavior, and this brings game theory as an analytical tool into play. To 
find the least common denominator, we can record that institutions are all about 
maximizing an individual’s utility by optimizing their own behavior conditional 
on others’ behaviors in time. Human behavior, however, depends on incentives 
and motivation. That is to say, institutions provide an incentive to act in a certain 
way – they motivate people to do something. In a world without institutions a 
human’s reaction to a particular incentive is unpredictable. No patterns exist to 
help forecast human behavior. Furthermore, misconduct cannot be sanctioned 
since the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior is not defined. This 
world is characterized by uncertainty and, therefore, high transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937; Coase, 1960; Greif, 2006; North, 1990). Therefore, people strive 
for a situation in which others’ reactions are predictable and thereby uncertainty 
and transaction costs can be reduced. To achieve their target, humans are pre-
pared to impose constraints on themselves whereby codes of conduct emerge 
that afford reliable expectations and reduce uncertainty. Thus, the constraints are 
endogenous. At the same time, individuals are born into a world where restric-
tions already exist and which are, therefore, exogenous to them. That is to say, 
the constraints shape peoples’ codes of conduct, whereas the latter determine the 
constraints. The restrictions, however, are called institutions. They are created 
by human beings – consciously or unconsciously – to impose binding rules on 
social interactions. Since almost all members of a society subordinate them-
selves to the self-imposed rules individuals achieve the maximal level of free-
dom under which the particular societal life is possible. Or, according to Hodg-
son (2006): “Regulation is not always the antithesis of freedom; it can be its 
ally” (p. 2).  
However, the preceding explanation of institutional emergence should not 
be misunderstood. We do not emanate from a starting point where no institu-
tions exist. Even an anarchical state, like every other, is distinguished by institu-
tions.8 However, a certain institutional environment might not lead to an effi-
                                                
8 The only situation in which institutions are nonexistent is in a Robinson Crusoe world with 
only one individual alive. In this world, institutions cannot exist since there is no society, no 
reason for the prediction of other agents’ behaviors, and no need for social interaction. How-
ever, even Robinson Crusoe might have already been shaped by the institutional environment 
he used to live in. Therefore, even Crusoe might act according to a particular value system 
and might possess certain habits – that is, at least some institutions might exist (Greif, 2006, 
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cient outcome and individuals might implement and alter institutions to optimize 
their living standards. To improve our understanding, we should consult Hodg-
son’s (2006) definition that describes institutions as “durable systems of estab-
lished and embedded social rules that structure social interactions … institutions 
are social rule-systems” (p. 13). Hence, social interactions require institutions 
and institutions require social interactions. Without institutions, social interac-
tions cannot be realized, since an individual does not know what the other’s be-
havior is meant to express. However, an institution cannot exist without interact-
ing individuals, because otherwise there is no need for an institution. This is the 
beginning of the structure–agency debate and of a discussion that questions what 
came first, the individual or the institution. However, this study will not enter 
that particular debate. Instead, it is assumed that both approaches – structure and 
agency – must be applied and combined in a reasonable manner to examine in-
stitutions. Therefore, the present approach should be regarded as a mixture of 
agency and structure. Individuals make their decisions according to more or less 
rational reasoning. The micro view of the agency approach, however, suggests 
that they build institutions to regulate their social interactions. Anyway, indi-
viduals are a creation of their environments. Thus, prevalent norms and the so-
cial value system do influence their behavior and the decisions they make. 
Hence, on a macro level, individuals are born into an existing institutional envi-
ronment that provides incentives and, therefore, regulates their behaviors. Indi-
viduals maximize their utility according to rational consideration. However, 
what they understand by rationality and utility maximization depends on the 
prevalent social value system and thereby the institutional environment. That is 
to say: “Human reasoning capacities are thus linked to their evolving social and 
biological contexts. Rationality is not detached from the world; it is situated in 
and operates through specific cues, triggers and constraints. These structures and 
circumstances are part of our biological and social heritage. Among them are 
institutions that frame our cognitions, enable some behavioural options and con-
strain us from others” (Hodgson, 2007, p. 8). 
Individuals are utility maximizers and rational actors. However, rationality 
and logic are not exogenous entities; they emerge and exist in a certain social 
environment that is determined by individuals. The rules that determine the so-
cial value system are influenced by the individuals. But the individuals act ac-
cording to the rules. That is to say, both structure and agency require each other 
(Lawson, 1987). Therefore, neither agency nor structure alone can solve the is-
sues of institutional theory: “Institutions depend for their existence on individu-
                                                                                                                                                        
Ch. 2, pp. 29–53). However, this idea further leads to the question of whether some institu-
tions are predetermined in human nature and, hence, are settled in our genes. Anyway, this 
topic leads far into the realms of biology as analyzed by neuro-economists. Although interest-
ing and important, it is not further ensued in this study. 
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als, their interactions, and particular shared patterns of thought. Nevertheless, 
any single individual is born into a pre-existing institutional world which con-
fronts him or her with its rules and norms” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 7). 
Therefore, the present work does not deal with the very beginning of institu-
tions, but with institutional development over time. By the nature of its object of 
investigation institutional analysis cannot detect whether the individual or the 
institution was the starting point. We cannot draw a separating line between the 
micro- and macro-level. Institutions shape individual behavior, which in turn 
generates institutions that again determine behavior, and so forth. Nevertheless, 
for the purpose of analysis it might be useful to emanate from a pure rules-of-
the-game approach.9 Hence, certain questions might necessitate one approach 
while others are better solved with another. To depict the endogenous nature of 
institutions, the assumption of exogenously given institutions that determine an 
individual’s behavior must be abandoned. Instead, an equilibrium approach that 
describes the endogenous, self-enforcing character of an institution can be ap-
plied (Aoki, 2001, Ch. 7, pp. 185–206). 
A plausible scheme of institutions is given by Williamson (2000), who ar-
ranges institutions into four levels. The first is the social embeddedness level, 
which corresponds to North’s (1990) informal institutions. It includes “norms, 
customs, mores, traditions, etc.” and also “religion plays a large role at this 
level” (Williamson, 2000, p. 596). The first-level institutions are characterized 
by their robustness and durability – institutional change at this level happens 
very slowly, that is to say, in a dimension of centuries or even millennia. 
The second level is called ‘institutional environment’. This describes what 
we specify as formal institutions – that is, formal rules such as property rights, 
judiciaries, laws, or constitutions. The formal rules change faster than the infor-
mal institutions, between around 10 to hundred years according to Williamson 
(2000). The first two levels of Williamson’s approach correspond to what North 
(1990) describes as formal and informal institutions. Williamson, however, fur-
ther differentiates institutional analysis by introducing two additional levels. 
Level three is called ‘governance’ and includes issues of private order, con-
tract enforcement, and getting “the governance structures right” (Williamson, 
2000, p. 599). Change on this level needs one to 10 years to happen. Level four, 
                                                
9 Interpreted in this way, the rules-of-the-game approach describes an exogenous understand-
ing of institutions. That is to say, the institution – the rule – is exogenously attached to an in-
dividual, who adheres to the rules. North (1990), who determined the term ‘rules-of-the-
game’, did not understand institutions as being purely exogenous to agents (North, 2005). 
This should be revealed to avoid misunderstanding. When we talk of the rules-of-the-game 
approach, we advert to the micro level where we observe one single individual who in fact 
takes institutions as exogenously given. Anyway, on the macro-level, institutions are endoge-
nous and are shaped by society. That is to say, the rules-of-the-game approach must not mean 
that the particular author takes institutions as generally exogenously given. Institutions are 
still endogenous, but are exogenous to a single individual.
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however, regards the economy from a macro-level and deals with resource allo-
cation and macroeconomic optimality analysis. 
The current study deals with levels one and two. These explanations demon-
strate that a clear definition of institutions is difficult to state. What is defined as 
an institution and what is excluded depends on the kind of analysis. Institutions 
are entities that cannot be precisely described with certain terms. Institutions are 
a concept that must be understood and internalized; it makes no sense to desper-
ately try to define them with a certain range of words. Therefore, whether or-
ganizations are defined as institutions or not and whether culture is an institution 
or not depends on the object of study and the idea being followed. Any defini-
tion of an institution cannot be described as wrong; every approach must be fol-
lowed and discussed to find out whether it makes sense and whether further re-
search should be conducted. 
Therefore, informal institutions might be described as culture, the social 
value system, credible beliefs, habits, worldview, and so on. As a minimum they 
describe the broad, underlying basis of a society. They shape a society’s mental 
model or its belief system, on which formal institutions might emerge. That is to 
say, this study will not commit to a certain restrictive definition of institutions. It 
rather seems to make sense to contribute to the understanding of the concept of 
institutions in general – which will hopefully be achieved by the end of the study 
– than to get lost in definition fetishism. 
North’s (1990) approach seems to include the most comprehensive and ac-
curate definition of institutions. Based on his approach, further more or less re-
strictive definitions can be specified to analyze certain institutional issues. Some 
economists use the term ‘rules-of-the-game approach’ to describe institutions as 
purely exogenous (Aoki, 2001; Greif, 2006). However, North’s approach is not 
tempted to understand institutions as pure exogenously given entities. Neverthe-
less, the exogeneity assumption might be true from an individual, micro point of 
view. Greif (2006), for example, specifies the assumption that institutions “are 
exogenous to each individual whose behaviour they influence” (Greif, 2006, p. 
30) as a determining characteristic of institutions. In any case, at least from a 
macro point of view, institutions are endogenous. This is demonstrated, for ex-
ample, by Aoki’s (2001) equilibrium view of institutions. Both approaches are 
‘right’ depending on the point of view – micro or macro – and, as will be seen, 
complement each other. 
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2.2 Formal and informal institutions 
The current study follows North’s (1990) approach and differentiates between 
formal and informal institutions. This is the case since it should be emphasized 
that institutions do not only correspond to formal entities – that is, to certain 
laws and regulations that are officially written down. Some empirical analyses, 
although very important for examining institutions and their effects on economic 
development, convey the impression that institutions correspond solely to a form 
of government, a legal system, property rights, or business regulations, but do 
not correspond to the sociocultural value system.10 Of course, the fact that em-
piricists concentrate on formal measures of institutions is an issue of data avail-
ability, since a country’s social value system is difficult to measure. However, 
the availability of survey data has led to some interesting results in recent 
years.11 In any case, the objective of the current study is to include informal in-
stitutions or the embeddedness level in its analysis (Williamson, 2000). It is im-
portant to define precisely our understanding of the terms ‘formal’ and ‘infor-
mal’ institutions, since different definitions and approaches exist and are often 
mixed up (Hodgson, 2006). 
In general, rules that constitute the political, legal, economic, and social en-
vironment and are formally written down in a rulebook, be it for example a legal 
text or a constitution, are called formal institutions. Formal institutions imply an 
official formal enforcement mechanism in case the rules are violated. However, 
life is not constrained solely by formal institutions. Morals, norms, values, con-
ventions, traditions, and codes of conduct also influence human behavior. These 
cultural and societal factors are called informal institutions. They are not offi-
cially written down and a violation might not lead to state-run, but rather socie-
tal punishment. Usually, informal institutions underlie formal institutions be-
cause they determine a society’s basic attitudes and beliefs and, hence, its value 
system (Aoki, 2001; Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008; Greif, 2006; North, 2005). 
North (1990) reverts to a plausible example of rules in sports to describe the dif-
ference between formal and informal institutions. Thus, formal institutions can 
be compared to rules that are written down in a rulebook, whereas informal in-
stitutions are “unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal 
rules, such as not deliberately injuring a key player on the opposing team” (p. 4). 
In the present study, informal institutions are defined as values, beliefs, 
morals, convictions, norms, habits, and codes of conduct and the term is used as 
                                                
10 See, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001); La Porta et al. (1999); La Porta 
et al. (2004); Rodrik (2000); Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2004); Persson & Tabellini 
(2008). 
11 See, for example, Fernández & Fogli (2007); Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006); Knack & 
Keefer (1997); Knowles & Weatherston (2006); Tabellini (2005); Tabellini (2008a); Tabellini 
(2008b); Williamson (2009). 
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a substitute for culture. However, institutions can range from the general to the 
specific. Thus, culture can be defined as an institution that corresponds to the 
broadest categorization; further, values, beliefs, morals, norms, convictions, and 
so on can be categorized as culture or informal institutions. Hence, particular 
values or norms correspond to specific categories. 
Culture is used as a substitute for informal institutions since at least in the 
current definition it depicts the rules that regulate human interactions. Culture 
restricts human behavior since individuals belonging to a certain culture share 
the same values and beliefs and, therefore, share norms, codes of conduct, hab-
its, and traditions. Hence, they will behave according to certain defaults, and 
misconduct will be punished. Furthermore, culture offers incentives. Culture 
provides a metaphysical incentive in the sense that people want to act in a par-
ticular way because they are persuaded that they are ‘right’. Hence, they act ac-
cording to religious or other metaphysical beliefs, such as altruism or absti-
nence. They do so because they are persuaded by a particular belief system or 
because they fear societal or divine punishment. Furthermore, culture offers the 
incentive of becoming a member of a cultural group by practicing particular tra-
ditions and codes of behavior. 
If, however, new beliefs and convictions become accepted by the individual, 
at least parts of a society’s belief system and its worldview can be consciously 
altered by its members. Take, for example, attitudes regarding gender equality, 
political equality, vigilantism, the death penalty, or the rule of law. These insti-
tutions have been altered in some societies because the attitudes concerning the 
individual and social coexistence changed. These changes can be traced back to 
conscious decisions that were taken because of rational and logical reasoning. 
However, institutions can also emerge or be altered unconsciously. Hence, rules 
to regulate social interaction are established unconsciously, and after their im-
plementation individuals adhere to the rules without consciously questioning 
them. 
Individuals might feel constrained by informal institutions rather than by 
formal institutions, because informal institutions are connected to their personal 
convictions. That is to say, formal and informal institutions are not clearly sepa-
rable. According to Hodgson: “… the idea that there is a dividing line between 
institutions that are entirely “formal” on one hand and entirely “informal” insti-
tutions on the other is false, because “formal” institutions […] always depend on 
nonlegal rules and inexplicit norms in order to operate. If laws or declarations 
are neither customary nor embodied in individual dispositions, then – “formal” 
or not – they have insignificant effects” (2006, p. 18). 
Hence, a society’s value system or its culture determines its worldview and 
its general understanding of the state and of society. Thus, a conservative or 
non-modern value system might unconsciously support a hierarchical societal 
structure, an authoritarian government, and a restricted judiciary. On the con-
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trary, a liberal and modern social value system might be supportive of a horizon-
tal societal structure, political participation, civil liberties, and an independent 
judiciary. However, since the institutional system is influenced by many exoge-
nous and endogenous factors, exceptions to the hypotheses might be found. 
The differentiation between formal and informal institutions seems reason-
able since it clarifies that not only formal rules are institutions. Nevertheless, 
one should not forget that a clear separation between formal and informal insti-
tutions is not possible since both are connected in several ways and both merge 
into each other. Anyway, depending on the object of study, the distinction might 
be useful. 
Once established formal institutions also impact informal institutions. A 
democratic state that practices the rule of law and in which civil liberties and 
political rights are implemented might induce self-reliant and self-dependent 
individuals who are able to question their political and societal environment. 
They might be able to critically reflect on themselves and on the surrounding 
structures. An autocratic or patrimonic state that oppresses its citizens and does 
not imply civil liberties such as freedom of the speech does not necessarily bring 
up critical and self-reliant individuals. Education also plays a major role. Indi-
viduals with access to a modern educational system will probably develop dif-
ferent personalities compared with individuals with no or less access to educa-
tion. 
Of course, formal institutions, such as in the form of government, property 
rights, the legal system, business regulations, and so on, influence a country’s 
development and thereby its growth performance. Opinions are mixed about in-
formal institutions. The current study’s hypothesis is that informal institutions 
influence economic development because cultures differ between societies. 
Hence, values, beliefs, worldviews, morals, codes of conduct, and so on differ 
between cultural groups. Therefore, preferences, incentives, and utility functions 
differ. These differences lead to varying strategies on the individual level, but 
also regarding collective behavior. Hence, the impacts on economic develop-
ment vary. If, for example, a society has a positive attitude concerning material-
ism, it will probably accumulate more capital and invest more than a society in 
which materialism is considered negative. 
If societies differ concerning their cultural characteristics, aggregated behav-
ior will vary and affect economic outcomes differently. The following sections 
will examine institutional properties, institutional emergence and change, and 
the transmission channels between formal and informal institutions and eco-
nomic growth. 
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2.3 Growth-supporting institutions 
Since we are interested in the impact of institutions on economic growth and 
economic development, we should define the meanings of growth-supporting 
and growth-inhibiting institutions before we examine the issue of institutional 
efficiency and change. An institution that has a positive effect on the growth rate 
is called growth supporting, whereas an institution that has no effect, or that is 
detrimental to economic growth, is called growth inhibiting. A general classifi-
cation in growth-inhibiting and growth-supporting institutions is impossible be-
cause the economic impact of an institution depends on several influencing fac-
tors such as other institutions, history, geography, ecology, the level of eco-
nomic development, and so forth. Depending on the prevalent environment, an 
institution that supports growth in one country might have a different impact on 
the growth rate in another country. However, assuming equal initial conditions, 
certain institutional features are generally described as growth supporting. These 
institutions are considered to be property rights, an independent judiciary, the 
rule of law, and political participation, although the detected effect of democ-
racy is mixed.12 Property rights are growth supporting in two ways. First, they 
expand the possible use of an asset. That is, besides its direct utilization as a liv-
ing space, office, production facility, showroom, farmland, and so forth, the as-
set can be used as collateral and thereby can create new capital (De Soto, 2000). 
Second, clearly defined ownership rights guarantee individual utility maximiza-
tion since the owner can use the asset in a way that best fits her or his interests. 
Therefore, secure property rights are accompanied by higher growth rates 
(Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Williamson & Kerekes, 2009). However, property 
rights are useless if they cannot be enforced by an independent judiciary; hence, 
as long as the state or private interest groups are able to appropriate private 
property or influence the allocation of assets. La Porta et al. (2004) examine the 
effect of judicial independence and constitutional review and discover that an 
independent judiciary matters most in the attainment of economic freedom. Po-
litical participation guarantees that it is not possible for a minority, which is not 
legitimatized, to determine the institutional form. That is, political participation 
prevents interest groups from exerting de facto political power solely based on 
their resources (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005; Rodrik, 2000; Rodrik, 
2007). On the informal level, a societal structure of generalized morality (Plat-
teau, 2000; Tabellini, 2005; Tabellini, 2008a; Tabellini, 2008b), high levels of 
trust (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1997), convictions concerning 
destiny and predetermination, and the level of respect for other people (Knowles 
& Weatherston, 2006; Tabellini, 2005) are proven to support economic growth. 
                                                
12 See, for example, Barro (1999); Persson & Tabellini (2006); Persson & Tabellini (2008); 
Persson & Tabellini (2009). 
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As already indicated, the economic impact of institutions depends on other insti-
tutions, historical accidents, further factors, and reverse causality. The informal 
institutional environment, for example, might not match the relevant formal in-
stitutions – that is, a culture of property rights, rule of law, and political partici-
pation might not exist. In this case, the assumed growth-supporting institutions 
might not support growth. However, if countries could change their institutional 
environments in a way that fits the above-named growth-supporting institutions 
then efficient production would be possible and would result in optimizing the 
growth rate. Of course, this is an unrealistic and less helpful assumption. It re-
veals that if we emanate from a growth model similar to, for example, the neo-
classical model, then the mentioned institutions will support growth. However, 
this is precisely the problem. Real conditions do not correspond to the model 
world. But models can be used in a way that makes sense. Hence, we can detect 
which institutions – emanating from our perfect model world – would support 
growth. Then, we can continue and examine how far the prevalent situation dif-
fers from the model and draw conclusions regarding institutions and growth. 
That is to say, we can compare the model world and the real world; but the ob-
jective should not be to change and perfect the real world according to the model 
world, but to detect differences. 
However, in institutional economics the ‘strongest’ (meaning the economi-
cally most efficient) institution might not prevail and survive. The correspond-
ing hypothesis cannot be brought into line with the persistence of many eco-
nomically, politically, and socially inefficient informal and formal institutions. 
Furthermore, the theory of multiple equilibria has taught us that inefficient states 
can emerge and persist, although they are detrimental to economic growth and 
development. This is not astonishing since utility maximization does not neces-
sarily correspond to material utility maximization. An individual’s utility can 
also be influenced by certain beliefs and convictions. Furthermore, stability and 
security can be rated higher than economic profit, depending on risk adversity, 
societal dullness, values, attitudes, and beliefs. Hence, the persistence of institu-
tions might lead to a state of general inefficiency – that is, even if informal and 
formal institutions are inefficient from an economic point of view they might 
persist because of the complexity and difficulty of institutional change. Thus, 
even if we consult informal institutions and immaterial incentives, the persis-
tence of inefficient institutions cannot be easily explained. But since institutions 
are inertial but changeable, marginal alteration is always possible. Nevertheless, 
as we will see in the following sections, possibilities to accelerate the process of 
change are limited because of the complexity of the institutional system. 
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2.4 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are the costs that arise from transactions such as information 
costs, policing costs, and enforcement costs. To accomplish a transaction, in-
formation concerning the relevant commodity, its value, the seller, the contrac-
tual arrangement, and relevant laws must be gathered. Aside from the commod-
ity’s price, costs for contract enforcement, information about the goods, and in-
formation about the business partner are incurred. Additionally, a risk premium 
must be considered. 
According to North (1990), the theory of institutions is a combination of a 
theory of human behavior and a theory of transaction costs. Since institutions 
have binding rules, they are created in a way to reduce transaction costs (Coase, 
1937; Coase, 1960). Hence, via institutions humans try to reduce, as far as pos-
sible, expenditure on information, monitoring, and enforcement. A clear system 
of rules that punishes offences decreases enforcement costs. Hence, acts of sale 
are well regulated and correspond to specified patterns. The consolidation of 
procedures, through business regulation and laws (for example, contract law, 
patent rights, and the protection of intellectual property) constrains human ac-
tion and fosters predictability. Therefore, even if we are not endued with per-
sonal information about our potential seller, we take less risk in doing business 
with him since we know he must adhere to the rules otherwise he will be pun-
ished. This means the introduction of relevant institutions has decreased risk and 
thereby transaction costs. Institutions have superseded the need for information 
and monitoring and have facilitated enforcement, since binding rules exist that 
can be used by individuals to predict others’ behaviors. The possibility to predict 
human actions increases security. We can rely on people acting under these rules 
since a violation is connected with costs. Since the constraints are binding, the 
environment in which humans act is stable. Thus, institutions decrease transac-
tion costs and increase security and stability. Hence, under these conditions, in-
dividuals maximize their utility. 
Institutions not only increase material utility but also increase immaterial 
utility by providing a stable mental and metaphysical environment that permits 
the prediction of others’ reactions and thereby decreases transaction costs. How 
individuals rate material and immaterial utility, (what they assess as being more 
important) depends on individual attitudes and beliefs. 
However, institutions are not necessarily economically efficient and a par-
ticular institutional environment might not maximize the utility of an individual 
or a society. Consider what happens if somebody achieves maximal personal 
utility by general destabilization. In this case, the individual might try to rear-
range institutions that best fit their interests, for example, if it is an unstable en-
vironment. This could be true for certain minorities that consciously destabilize 
a particular region to enforce their own interests, for example Iraq or Afghani-
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stan in the past couple of years. However, from a societal point of view, this ap-
proach is not desirable since it usually leads to the oppression of large sections 
of the population and economic disadvantages. In any case, the utility of the mi-
nority, which possesses de facto political power, is maximized. 
Utility is maximized under certain assumptions. The assumptions corre-
spond to the prevalent institutional environment and depend on individual pref-
erences. That is, institutions allow individuals to maximize their utility presup-
posing the institutional environment. For example, in a dictatorship that op-
presses its citizens individuals can maximize their utility by adhering to the rules 
and constraints set by institutions. However, if an individual’s utility can be in-
creased by revolting against the authority and the established institutional sys-
tem, it will act accordingly. Nevertheless, such an approach is accompanied by 





/ alteration of 
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Figure 2.1: emergence and alteration of institutions. Source: own calculation. 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the emergence and alteration of institutions. The 
state of prevalent institutions is affected by uncertainty and high transaction 
costs. This might be for different reasons, for example historical accidents, in-
creasing dissatisfaction regarding the current situation (cognitive disequilib-
rium), and so on. In this situation, humans impose further constraints on them-
selves, or alter existing constraints, to regulate their relationships – that is, they 
implement or alter institutions. Institutions make human behavior predictable; 
hence, institutions reduce transaction costs and increase security and stability. 
Within this environment, people will maximize their individual utility, which 
includes immaterial utility. Utility, in general, is an irrational concept since it 
depends on individual attitudes, convictions, and beliefs – that is, the social 
value system and the prevalent culture. 
2.5 Institutional change and transplantation 
Ascribing underdevelopment to institutional quality poses challenges for the 
theory of economic growth in several ways. First, a general growth model, 
which determines the reasons for growth and provides overall solutions that can 
be applied to every economy, cannot be found. Second, this makes it difficult to 
give instructions for improvements in growth performance, since the success of 
reform activities depends on the prevalent conditions. If Pareto-optimal growth 
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is the target, it is possible that existing institutions could hinder its implementa-
tion. Hence, to realize Pareto-optimal growth institutions must be altered in a 
way that supports growth. Thus, the problem could be solved by adopting insti-
tutions from economically successful countries and implementing them in eco-
nomically backward countries. However, as the previous section has already 
suggested, institutional development and change are subject to several influenc-
ing factors and institutional properties, which can make the adoption of such a 
policy difficult. In addition, institutions differ in relation to the nature of change 
and, in particular, to the speed of change. This section, therefore, deals with the 
issue of institutional change and transportability.
To expand this idea, we will refer to the approaches of Boettke, Coyne and 
Leeson (2008) and Roland (2005). These two studies incorporate the basic facts 
of the subsequent argument and will now be summarized. 
Roland (2005) establishes the concept of slow- and fast-moving institutions. 
Institutions can change slowly and continuously, or rapidly and irregularly. Cul-
ture depicts a typical slow-moving institution. Thus, culture is rooted in religion 
or other beliefs that have hardly changed over time. Since it is an institution that 
constitutes the identity of the society, only marginal change is possible. Hence, 
we are talking about a slowly but continuously changing institution. 
By contrast, for example, political institutions can be changed rapidly and ir-
regularly. A military coup or a rebellion can alter the power structure of a state 
overnight or at least within a few weeks or months. Legal institutions can be 
seen as in-between, since the revision of statutes does not occur very quickly, 
but does not take centuries either. 
However, a relationship between fast- and slow-moving institutions exists, 
since institutions are complementary and build systemic consistency (Roland, 
2005). In examining institutions we deal with a system of institutions that influ-
ence and complement each other. Therefore, slow-moving institutions such as 
culture can be understood as the slow, but continuously altering, underlying 
foundation that influences the fast-moving institutions and vice versa. Fast-
moving institutions can change during no observable modification to a slow-
moving institution. Yet, after a long period of marginal change in slow-moving 
institutions, the aggregated shift might suddenly lead to a rapid and irregular ad-
justment in fast-moving institutions. Hence, inconsistencies between slow- and 
fast-moving institutions lead to changes (Roland, 2005). The fact that institu-
tions interact and build complementary systems has far-reaching policy implica-
tions. Disturbing the complex institutional apparatus might result in equally 
complex inconsistencies and might have unpredictable consequences. Hence, 
replacing an apparently growth-inhibiting institution by a seemingly growth-
supporting institution can be risky. 
Another approach that sheds light on the issue of institutional change and 
transportability comes from Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2008). The authors as-
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sign a crucial role to ‘institutional stickiness’, that is, “the ability or inability of 
new institutional arrangements to take hold where they are transplanted” (p. 
332). Within the model, institutions are categorized as ‘indigenously introduced 
endogenous institutions’ (IEN), ‘indigenously introduced exogenous institu-
tions’ (IEX), and ‘foreign-introduced exogenous institutions’ (FEX). Here, for-
eign-introduced means institutions designed by outsiders such as foreigners, 
whereas indigenously introduced denotes institutions established by insiders or 
locals. Exogenous is meant to describe institutions implemented by a subordi-
nate entity, which could be the local government or a foreign organization or 
force. Endogenous, on the contrary, depicts institutions that are not formally de-
signed but developed spontaneously from within the community of indigenous 
individuals. 
Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2008) use the philosophical term métis to de-
scribe the societal and cultural basis that underlies all human and societal life. 
Since métis depicts the origin of the natives’ mentalities, beliefs, and practices, it 
is durable and nearly unchangeable. Hence, the stronger an institution is con-
nected to métis, the stickier it will be. Since IEN institutions are rooted in métis, 
they constitute the stickiest of all institutions. Thus, the further an institution is 
situated from métis, the less sticky it will be. 
IEX institutions are not endogenous but formally created by a superior en-
tity. However, this entity must be indigenous, which implies it must concern a 
local institution, for example, the local government. Since an indigenous author-
ity is familiar with local customs, attitudes, and practices, IEX institutions will, 
in general, be consistent with IEN institutions and métis. Hence, IEX institutions 
are less sticky than IEN institutions, but more inertial than institutions intro-
duced by an outsider. Consequently, FEX institutions are the least sticky since 
they are created and implemented by foreigners and are sparsely, or not at all, 
correlated with métis. 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the closeness of the particular institutions to métis
and to each other and, therefore, their degree of stickiness. The institutions 
within the outermost circle are the easiest to modify, whereas a change becomes 
catchier the further inwards we go.  
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Figure 2.2: institutional stickiness. Source: Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008, p. 
344. 
However, according to Boettke, Coyne and Leeson (2008), the stickiness of 
an institution depends on its stickiness in the former period, hence: 
( )ItItIt ZZZ 1−=         (2.1) 
  ( )ItItIt ZZZ 211 −−− =        (2.2) 
( )( )I ntI ntI nt ZZZ 1+−−− =        (2.3) 
where Z denotes the level of stickiness and I the particular institution. Ac-
cordingly, the stickiness of an institution today at least depends on the stickiness 
at its date of emergence N periods ago. That is: 
( )FEXIEXIENI NtI Nt IIIZZ ,,−− =       (2.4) 
where: 
FEXIEXIEN III ZZZ  .       (2.5) 
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Hence, the stickiness of an institution today depends on its past stickiness, 
which depends on its level of connection with métis. 
This model shows that institutional transplantation can be disputed. Adopt-
ing institutions from an economically successful country and implementing 
them in an underdeveloped economy is consistent with adding or changing FEX 
institutions. These institutions do not match the societal basis and do not com-
plement IEN and IEX institutions. The more the endogenous and exogenous in-
stitutions differ, the less sticky FEX institutions will be. However, one should 
not conclude that IEN and IEX institutions must be economically efficient and 
support growth. If it is not possible to implement particular institutions because 
they do not fit métis, the prevalent institutions are not necessarily ‘better’. On 
the contrary, the métis and the IEN and IEX institutions can be growth inhibit-
ing. However, transplanting institutions that are supposed to be growth support-
ing might not necessarily improve the situation; instead, it could worsen it. 
The model of institutional stickiness can easily be connected to Roland’s 
(2005) theory of fast- and slow-moving institutions. IEN institutions are slow 
moving since they are rooted in hardly changing beliefs and practices. IEX insti-
tutions can be considered fast or slow moving depending on which particular 
institution is involved – which is also true for FEX institutions. However, both 
concepts of institutional change emphasize the rootedness of informal institu-
tions in a societal and cultural foundation on which a society’s identity depends. 
Thus, less connection between the foundation and the institution makes modifi-
cation or transplantation easier. However, less connection also implies that the 
institution will eventually not fit the complex institutional system in a particular 
country; this could mean it might not be accepted, might be seen as useless, or 
might even be abolished. Thus, an institution that leads to economic growth in 
one country might be unsuccessful in another country. Consequently, encourag-
ing economic growth in a country in which growth-inhibiting informal and for-
mal institutions are prevalent is a complex and difficult task, especially for out-
siders not connected to the country’s métis. 
Dolfsma and Verburg (2008) also develop an approach to institutional 
change. Like Roland (2005), they emphasize tensions as the trigger for institu-
tional change. Accordingly, sociocultural values (which we determine as infor-
mal institutions) shape the institutional setting. However, the authors differenti-
ate between three examples of institutional change. First, value tensions are seen 
as crucial, since new sets of sociocultural values might conflict with old values. 
Thus, a new constellation between values and institutions might emerge. The 
second possibility for institutional change is tensions between institutions. 
Third, tensions between values and institutions can trigger institutional change, 
since sociocultural values alter over time and can no longer match the institu-
tional setting. At this point, institutions have to adjust. 
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However, the three outlined theories of institutional change all originate in 
the context of a connection between a sociocultural foundation and a formal su-
perstructure. The sociocultural values, or the general value system, determine 
the formal institutional structure. The closer the informal and formal structures 
are, the more inert they become. However, tensions between or within the struc-
tures cause institutional change. 
Furthermore, institutional change depends on the ability to cooperate. If the 
majority of the population wants to change the institutional environment but is 
not able to cooperate or form an organized representation of interests, it is easy 
for a small group of oppressors to restrict those particular individuals. Individu-
als might not be willing to subject themselves to the high costs of institutional 
change. However, in this case this means that the current institutions, intro-
duced, for example, by a dictator, do their jobs. 
As previously mentioned, interactions between institutions are crucial. The 
absence of institutional change not only depends on costs and the fear of oppres-
sion, but also on the interplay of a myriad institutions. Hence, an inefficient po-
litical and legal system might be preserved because of its connectedness with 
history and culture. 
Because individuals are unsure how others will react to a new situation, 
people are uncertain whether an institutional change will improve or worsen 
their living conditions. To avoid a deterioration in their living standards, they 
will try (consciously or not) to preserve the status quo. In the case of informal 
institutions, the preservation of the status quo might be a matter of the subcon-
scious. 
However, since informal institutions determine self-identification, they build 
the foundation of a society and of an institutional system. Further, formal institu-
tions are based on the fundamental structure of values and beliefs. Institutions 
that determine an individual’s identity are the stickiest, since people do not eas-
ily give up their convictions, belief systems, or origins – that is their identity. 
Informal institutions construct a system of mental guidance and affiliation and, 
therefore individuals identify with a certain culture. They define a society’s 
identity, shape its worldview, and establish a feeling of affiliation. Hence, in-
formal institutions are hard to change; external and internal changes are slow 
moving. 
The complexity of the institutional system has consequences for the issue of 
institutional transfer. If the institutional arrangement is crucial for economic de-
velopment, it seems logical that less well developed countries will adopt the in-
stitutions of rich countries – which we define as growth-supporting institutions. 
It is argued that underdeveloped countries should replace their growth-inhibiting 
institutions by growth-supporting institutions, since this would solve their issue 
of underdevelopment. However, it is not easy to conduct a transfer of institu-
tions. The reasons for this have already been examined. Informal institutions 
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equal culture; cultures differ between regions since cultural components such as 
values, norms, beliefs, conventions, worldviews, and attitudes can all differ. In 
general, since these informal institutions build the fundament of institutional 
structure, institutions will differ between societies. Therefore, fundamental insti-
tutions, as well as institutional superstructures, can vary greatly and (to make it 
even more complicated) a country’s development path can also be hit by histori-
cal accidents. 
Institutions that are exogenously transplanted into an economy correspond 
to FEX institutions. If an external organization, such as the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund, forces a country to liberalize its financial system 
or forces privatization, these are examples of FEX institutions. However, these 
FEX institutions are transplanted into a complex institutional system consisting 
of institutions that are, more or less, connected to the informal foundation and 
complement each other. Substituting one institution for another, or adding a new 
one, can disturb the complex structure and lead to severe consequences. Thus, 
the new institutions (or the institutional changes) might not be accepted because 
they do not match the system. Since FEX institutions are not connected to IEN 
and IEX institutions – that is, to relevant informal and formal institutions – they 
might be dismissed by the institutional structure and then quickly retracted. 
They might also be bypassed and subsequently malfunction. In the worst case 
scenario, they might disturb institutional equilibrium and impact on other insti-
tutions, in turn, making them unsound. If this occurs, the FEX institutions would 
have an inhibiting effect on economic growth. Hence, a transplanted institution 
is not usually rooted in the informal institutional structure. It does not match the 
institutional system, and the consequences of its adoption are incalculable since 
a calculation would require a complete knowledge of the total institutional struc-
ture, which is impossible. 
However, institutional transplantation can work. If the FEX institution 
matches the underlying system, the expected positive effects on the growth rate 
can be realized. As a consequence, the chance of success is higher if the trans-
planted institution better fits the informal structure. Take, for example, the ex-
ogenous institutional innovations in Japan and West Germany after World War 
II, which showed that institutional transplantation can have positive impacts. 
However, if the transplanted FEX institution does not match the informal institu-
tional structure, the outcome of the transplantation is not predictable and the risk 
of a worsening economic situation is high. Hence, if countries’ formal institu-
tional structures differ, the transplantation of institutions should be reconsidered. 
However, historical accidents can also alter the institutional system in the 
short- or long-term.13 Historical accidents are events that randomly change the 
                                                
13 It has also been suggested that historical accidents are responsible for the emergence of 
institutions, in so far as they are the catalysts for the implementation of certain institutions. 
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institutional environment, for example wars, civil wars, natural disasters, politi-
cal upheavals, migrations, or economic crises. Since rapid institutional changes 
correspond to FEX or IEX institutions, the theory of institutional stickiness pre-
dicts that alterations are not durable. However, in relation to how much damage 
is done – that is, to what extent the original institutional system has been demol-
ished – and in relation to power allocation, historical accidents can lead to last-
ing institutional changes. If a historical accident causes an indigenous or exoge-
nous minority group to have sufficient resources (and thereby power) to create 
institutions that best fit their interests and enforce the compliance of those insti-
tutions, then these, potentially inappropriate institutions, might persist. Since 
institutions influence each other, the prevalent environment might eventually 
adjust or the new institutions might never be totally accepted. In this case, they 
might one day be abolished, even if it is a long period of time between imple-
mentation and abolishment. 
Hence, history can be a catalyst of institutional implementation and is re-
sponsible for the shape institutions assume. This shape can differ from that 
which humans had originally created. The outcome depends on how long the 
situation persists, the prevalent institutional system, further historical accidents, 
and other unpredictable factors. Again this demonstrates the complexity and un-
predictability of institutional systems and institutional changes. 
History, in the sense of experience, is also crucial. In the case of informal 
institutions, historical events can influence value systems, societal attitudes, 
morals, and beliefs. At the same time, history influences each individual and 
their personal experiences, values, beliefs, morals, and so on. Since people’s ex-
periences can be traced back to general historical events, many will experience 
the same event; for example, individuals who experience the cruelties and the 
destruction of war. Every individual makes their own experiences; however, on 
an aggregate level, their experiences are similar and, therefore, society is also 
shaped. 
2.6 Institutions and technology 
“Technology relates to a broader set of beliefs about the operation of the physical 
world and about the nature of interactions between humans and their physical envi-
ronment. […] it is the interaction between institutional change and technology that 
drives economic growth” (Roland, 2005, p. 13). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hence, historical accidents might not only change the institutional environment, they might 
also be the starting point of the emergence of a new institution. This is the case when a his-
torical accident alters the environment in a way that makes the implementation of new con-
straints necessary. 
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Technology is the body of knowledge available to society that creates economic 
value. Technological progress is the alteration of the relationship between inputs 
and output and, therefore, can be defined as a change in knowledge. Hence, if 
the same amount of output can be produced with fewer inputs, or if more output 
can be produced with an equal amount of inputs, we talk about technological 
progress. Technological progress is a change in the knowledge about products, 
about the production process, and about the organization of production. This 
knowledge differs between societies. However, this could be the case because 
one society could, potentially, be further behind other societies on its develop-
ment path. In this situation, time is the decisive factor, because the society that is 
behind will further evolve over time and will equal the level of technological 
knowledge of the more developed countries. In any case, this implies that all 
societies exhibit equal initial conditions, which is not a realistic assumption. 
Therefore, differences in technology can be traced back to different initial condi-
tions, such as geography or institutions (Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi, 2004). We are interested in the technological differences that can be 
traced back to institutions. We argue that some societies possess a body of 
knowledge that creates economic value, whereas other societies do not have 
such technologies or at least not to the same extent. According to the current hy-
pothesis, the available technological knowledge depends on the prevalent infor-
mal and formal institutions. Reverse causality also exists – that is, institutions 
influence technology and technology influences institutions. 
According to Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005), technological progress is the 
main driver for long-term growth. The ability to use tools, to invent, and to in-
novate are the crucial properties that led to the unique evolution of the human 
race. Thus, rearranging knowledge about existing technologies and developing 
completely new ideas, make production more efficient and lead to technological 
progress. 
Economic development did not spread evenly around the globe and nor did 
technology. At certain times in history, some societies were, technologically, 
very sophisticated, whereas others were totally backward. However, the rank 
order of the technological leaders has changed several times, and progressive 
societies have suffered setbacks while underdeveloped societies took over the 
technological and scientific leadership. The most remarkable progress took place 
in Britain and spread to Western Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. 
However, if technological progress is crucial, then societies with knowledge 
that creates economic value have an advantage, since they are able to rearrange 
technologies and generate new ideas. That is, innovating societies are better off 
compared with non-innovating societies when the goal is per capita income 
maximization. 
Whether a society can be described as innovating or non-innovating depends 
on several factors. Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005) specify five classes of rea-
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sons for why a society can be non-innovating. Here, we will discuss how much 
of a role institutions play.  
• The ability to innovate depends on the prevalent opportunities and challenges 
the society faces. Hence, some societies are well adapted to their environment 
and for them there is no need to innovate; the prevalent technological stan-
dards might also be low compared with those in other societies. 
• It is possible that people do not realize the opportunities for technological pro-
gress and further development. This is because they interpret their environ-
ment in a way that makes technological progress unnecessary. Lipsey, Car-
law and Bekar (2005) state that “someone whose worldview is mechanical, as 
was common with Europeans in early modern times, will tend to look for 
mechanical solutions. Someone whose worldview is mystical will tend to 
look for magical solutions” (p. 70). 
• Societies might be non-innovating because they do not receive the full return 
of their efforts, for example, because of insecure property rights. 
• Innovating efforts can be restricted by the government in power or by powerful 
interest groups. Also, certain innovations can be forbidden for religious rea-
sons. 
• Humans’ energy to innovate can be influenced by diseases or other circum-
stances that leave no space and strength for innovating activity. 
Institutional matters relate to points one to four. Individuals need incentives to 
innovate. The innovation must improve their current situation. Hence, the ex-
pected returns must be high enough to take the costs of innovating. If individuals 
do not receive the full return from innovating, the remaining return might be un-
der the critical level that does not make innovating worthwhile. In relation to the 
role of property rights, people will not use their assets in an economically effi-
cient way if they cannot be sure whether their ownership will endure and 
whether they will receive the profits from using the assets. Property rights can 
be restrained by an inadequate legal system, by political power, or by powerful 
interest groups. Hence, property rights, which are an institution in themselves, 
depend on further political and legal institutions. Thus, a society can be de-
scribed as non-innovating because it has insecure property rights and an inade-
quate legal system. 
As already mentioned, even if property rights exist powerful interest groups 
might be in a position to ignore them. Furthermore, since particular interest 
groups might possess de facto political power or might be able to influence de 
jure political power, they can change the formal institutional environment in a 
way that best fits their interests and thereby they can abolish property rights 
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005). 
Furthermore, formal and informal institutions, which preclude individuals 
from freely accumulating knowledge, constrain technology and technological 
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progress. In such cases, beliefs, values, and convictions can restrict knowledge 
accumulation; or there might be formal restrictions, such as particular laws or 
political restraints. An authoritarian regime, which oppresses freedom of opinion 
and controls publicly expressed ideas as well as teachings in schools and univer-
sities, does not support the free accumulation of knowledge and thereby does not 
support technological progress. 
Civil rights, especially freedom of speech, rule of law, and material and in-
tellectual property rights, seem crucial for knowledge accumulation and tech-
nology. However, the absence of property rights, civil rights, and an independ-
ent judiciary can lead a society to be non-innovating since it hinders the indi-
viduals from receiving their full returns from innovating. 
Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005) mention several situations in which infor-
mal institutions preclude people form innovating. Here, individuals might not 
realize the opportunities that are offered to them by innovation. In history, most 
economically viable innovations are grounded in scientific and mechanical re-
search. To innovate, humans have to examine the physical world and accept the 
laws of nature. Therefore, if people support a more mystical worldview, which 
often has its roots in religious beliefs, they might not identify the ideas that are 
necessary for economically relevant innovations. A person who believes that, 
every second, God creates a feature of the world anew and who believes that 
everything (at least in the physical world) can be totally changed in a moment is 
not persuaded by the laws of nature. Hence, this individual cannot develop a 
naturalistic and mechanical worldview. Therefore, their basic beliefs shape 
knowledge and thereby technology. 
Furthermore, informal institutions might place constraints on human behav-
ior and bar individuals from innovating. Religious doctrines or other metaphysi-
cal convictions can restrain scientific research and technological progress. Even 
if people receive the full returns for innovating, they might be persuaded that 
their proposed method of innovating was wrong and might not innovate at all. 
People might also put so much time and energy into religious and other meta-
physical activities, that there are not enough resources left for the innovation 
itself.14  
Here, it is argued that the institutional environment influences a society’s 
ability and desire to innovate. Hence, technological progress depends on the par-
ticular institutional structure. Since the institutional system per se is complex, 
the connections and transmission channels between institutions and technology 
are also complicated and difficult to see through. Owing to institutional com-
plementarities, institutions that hinder technological progress might not always 
                                                
14 Barro and McCleary (2003), for example, find that the number of church attendances is 
negatively correlated with the growth rate, whereas religious beliefs, in general, have a posi-
tive impact on growth. 
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be growth inhibiting. The concentration of power, for example, might hinder 
innovative activity since individuals do not receive the full returns from innovat-
ing. However, a powerful interest group (such as a government) might also be 
able to channel resources into the relevant sectors, for example research and de-
velopment, and thereby support innovation and technical progress in a way that 
exceeds private innovating behavior. 
The relationship between institutions and technology is not causal. That is to 
say, a change in technology might influence living standards and, therefore, 
might lead to a change in priorities and preferences. As a result, the feelings of 
material and immaterial stability might be modified and at least some informal 
institutions might change. Hence, a change in the value system, and even in 
worldviews and beliefs because of technological progress, is possible. Neverthe-
less, technology and technological progress emerge from the interplay of institu-
tions, historical accidents, and further technological progress. 
Hence, the hypothesis at hand is that informal institutions, which are not 
supportive of a naturalistic, scientific, or mechanical worldview, do not encour-
age economically viable innovating activity and thereby do not encourage tech-
nological progress. That is, knowledge depends on general beliefs and attitudes 
concerning worldviews and ideology. As regards formal institutions, secure 
property rights will create the maximal incentives for innovation by guarantee-
ing the owner of an asset the full returns from innovating. An independent judi-
ciary and civil rights will also support innovation and technology, since they 
guarantee freedom of action, at least within the boundaries of the rule of law. 
Hence, every individual can use their assets in a way that maximizes utility. 
When property rights, civil rights, and an independent judiciary exist, the ques-
tion of whether individual utility maximization supports innovation and techno-
logical progress depends on the informal institutional setting, because here in-
novating activity is solely restricted by worldviews and beliefs. 
Therefore, the particular development that took place in Western Europe can 
be led by the kind of technological knowledge and the special institutional envi-
ronment that have been prevalent. That is to say, the Industrial Revolution could 
only occur in Europe, since the required conditions were available. Furthermore, 
it started in England since this was the leading country concerning Newtonian 
mechanics. The point in time of the Industrial Revolution was affected by the 
interdependencies between sciences, technology, and institutions. Hence, it 
could have happened sooner or later depending on external influences. But it 
could not have happened anywhere else (Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005). 
The process of industrialization since 1820 is related to the development of 
modern sciences, Newtonian mechanics, and the mechanical worldview that 
pervaded all of Western European society. The diffusion of the mechanical 
worldview can be traced back to the emergence of modern sciences whose basis 
was the acceptance of naturalism. The decisive point is that the ideas of natural-
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ism, the belief in the laws of nature, modern sciences, and a mechanical world-
view were able to penetrate all of society and build the basis of the society’s 
identity. Hence, Western European technology is related to the prevalent beliefs, 
worldviews, and convictions concerning the physical world and its components. 
The informal and formal institutional environment permitted and supported the 
development of the Industrial Revolution. Historical accidents and the emer-
gence of relevant formal institutions such as independent universities, the struc-
ture of the educational system, the role the church played in education, the 
emergence of corporate bodies, and the legal system supported a unique devel-
opment path, which was accompanied and correlated by a body of technological 
knowledge that led to high economic growth. The fact that naturalism could at 
least not be abolished by the Catholic church depicts one of the stochastic his-
torical accidents; another one is depicted by the fact that in Europe political plu-
ralism was prevalent, which also supported its development (Grant, 1996; Huff, 
2003; Jacob, 1997; Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005). 
However, technology and institutions are highly correlated. A society’s 
stock of knowledge, its beliefs and worldviews, and its attitudes concerning the 
fundaments of the physical world differ between cultures. Hence, technological 
developments vary. Therefore, a specific cultural background constrains the de-
velopment of knowledge and thereby of technology. In addition, it determines 
formal institutions, which further influence the development of knowledge and 
technology. 
2.7 Equilibrium view of institutions 
2.7.1 General remarks 
This part of the dissertation project demonstrates a more formal approach to in-
stitutions. That is to say, game-theoretic analysis is used to describe the forma-
tions of self-enforcing strategies and, therefore, institutional persistence. It has 
already been stated that, depending on the object of study, different approaches 
of institutional analysis are reasonable. The rules-of-the-game or design view, 
which depict institutions as exogenously given to human agents, neglect the en-
dogenous character of institutions. Anyway it makes sense to consult this view 
for the examination of several issues. With the assumption of exogenously given 
constraints, we can examine the impact of these constraints on behavior and, for 
example, on economic development. That is to say, we can assume the legal sys-
tem, or in the case of informal institutions the level of trust, is exogenously 
given and study its impact on a situation in which there is no feedback mecha-
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nism. Regarding a single individual or a certain period of time, this proceeding 
can be considered to describe the real world truthfully.  
The equilibrium view, however, tries to explain the self-enforcing character 
of institutions. This approach is useful for an understanding of institutional per-
sistence and institutional diversity. It incorporates feedback mechanisms and 
describes institutional self-preservation in an equilibrium state. The equilibrium 
view demonstrates the circular flow between humans’ actions and institutions; 
that is, institutions determine human behavior, but they are also determined by 
human actions.15 Institutional persistence and the self-enforcing character of in-
stitutions are institutional properties that cause problems for less developed 
economies. If institutions could easily be changed, we could just establish the 
institutions of economically successful countries in underdeveloped economies 
and the problem of underdevelopment would be solved, apart from geographical 
factors. Therefore, it is the robustness of an established institution that causes 
the problems.  
In the subsequent model the reason for institutional robustness is an equilib-
rium state. The only possibility for an alteration of an equilibrium state is an ex-
ogenous shock. Without the appearance of an exogenous shock, the equilibrium 
state will exist indefinitely. Therefore, a pretend ‘inefficient’ equilibrium, in 
which only low living standards and low growth rates are implemented, is hard 
to abolish. However, an equilibrium state suggests that optimal strategies are 
implemented and thereby the state cannot be inefficient. That is to say, societies 
might be situated in an equilibrium state in which only low living standards are 
realized. Nevertheless, contingent on the prevalent conditions, the state might 
present an equilibrium. In economics, however, we are looking for Pareto-
optimal results. Hence, a state in which no individual can be better off without 
putting another individual in a worse position. In any case, an institutional equi-
librium might not be Pareto-optimal. But, according to the equilibrium view, the 
strategies are optimally chosen regarding the prevalent conditions. Hence, the 
individuals choose their strategies in a way that maximizes their utility. There-
fore, strategies are optimal, but not necessarily Pareto-optimal (Greif, 2006, pp. 
407–420). When multiple equilibria are possible, multiple optimal states exist. 
Thus, different equilibrium strategies are possible. Then, however, equilibrium 
behavior or rather equilibrium codes of conduct differ. Different strategies 
originate in different institutions. Hence, varying value or belief systems are 
                                                
15 However, historical path dependence and historical accidents play a decisive role in institu-
tional development (Aoki, 2001; David, 1994; Greif, 1993; Greif, 1994; Greif, 2006; North, 
1990; North, 2005). According to Aoki (2001), institutional development cannot be solely 
described by analytical tools and game theory. Historical events must be consulted to under-
stand a society’s institutional environment. That is why Aoki describes his approach as com-
parative institutional analysis – that is an analytical, comparative, and historical analysis 
(Aoki, 2001, p. 3). 
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equal to different institutions, which determine different optimal strategies (the 
strategy determined by the institution corresponds to the optimal strategy that is 
derived through utility maximization). Since institutions become visible through 
behavior, different institutions become visible through different forms of socie-
tal organization. Hence, according to the equilibrium view of institutions, an 
equilibrium corresponds, for example, to a certain form of societal organization. 
Therefore, forms of societal organization vary and correspondingly result in dif-
ferent economic performances. Comparing societies regarding their economic 
performances or even their institutions and concluding that the society with less 
economic growth or a low living standard is ‘worse’ is wrong. An institutional 
standard that must be fulfilled to be considered a ‘good’ institution does not ex-
ist. Every society optimizes its strategies and, therefore, realizes its individual 
optimal institutions and strategies. Institutions that lead to (Pareto-)optimality in 
one country are not (Pareto-)optimal in another country. Hence, a normative 
comparison of institutions and growth performances is – according to the equi-
librium view – not possible. 
Greif’s (1994) model, which is depicted in the next section, demonstrates 
that two varying societies that reside in their particular equilibrium realize dif-
ferent economic outcomes. Nevertheless, both implement optimal strategies. 
Hence, the state will endure indefinitely – or until an exogenous shock occurs – 
although one society might realize significantly lower growth rates and living 
standards than the other one. The present study differentiates between general-
ized and limited morality. Chapter three describes the two concepts in more de-
tail.16 Here, we define limited morality as a traditional and conservative form of 
societal organization where hierarchical and paternalistic structures are preva-
lent. Societies realizing limited morality are marked by the importance of group 
affiliation, for example the family, the tribe, the clan, the religious group, and so 
on. Furthermore, individualism is less pronounced since the collective is empha-
sized. Generalized morality describes a modern, individualistic society where 
civil liberties are realized. Group membership is not the decisive factor; instead 
individuals cooperate independent of affiliation. 
2.7.2 Shared-beliefs cum equilibrium-summary-
representation approach 
This part of the present study demonstrates Aoki’s (2001) shared-beliefs cum 
equilibrium-summary-representation approach of institutions. According to 
Aoki’s definition: “An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs 
about how the game is played” (Aoki, 2001, p. 185). This definition includes 
                                                
16 In his paper (1994) and his book (2006), Greif refers to individualist vs. collectivist socie-
ties instead of generalized vs. limited morality.  
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three important statements. First, we are entering the sphere of game theory, 
which is unavoidable if we want to study strategic behavior, that is situations in 
which an outcome depends on an agent’s own actions and on other agents’ ac-
tions. Second, an institution is defined as self-sustaining. That is to say, when 
the institution is established (that is when it is implemented in peoples’ minds 
and behaviors), it resides in an equilibrium state and, therefore, is self-
preserving. Third, the institution is a system of shared beliefs. Hence, institu-
tions are built from expectations regarding one’s own and others’ behaviors. 
That is to say, certain beliefs about behavioral patterns are established and every 
agent believes that the other agents behave according to these beliefs. Therefore, 
the agent himself will also act according to the beliefs. The result is a Nash equi-
librium, as will be seen and thereby there exists no incentive for an unilateral 
deviation. 
According to Aoki (2001, Ch. 7, pp. 185–206), five properties characterize 
institutions. First, institutions are endogenous. That is to say, the beliefs about 
how the game is played are not exogenous, but emerge from an equilibrium state 
of the society. Second, the beliefs enable agents to predict others’ behaviors and 
thereby optimally choose their own actions. Therefore, the institution contains 
all the information necessary for the agent to choose his own behavior. This is 
called the summary representation of an institution. Third, institutions are char-
acterized by their robustness or durability; that is institutions are inertial and 
change slowly. Therefore, we can assume institutions are constant at least for a 
certain period of time. Change comes along through a shock or other exogenous 
influences. However, change can also occur because a critical mass of agents 
considers the rules – no matter whether formal or informal – as unsatisfying and 
tries to change them. Such a situation corresponds to a general cognitive dis-
equilibrium (Aoki, 2001, p. 240). Nevertheless, change implies the abandonment 
of an equilibrium path. Hence, the shared-beliefs cum equilibrium-summary-
representation approach examines institutional existence, and persistence, in 
equilibrium. Fourth, institutions are universal to all agents. Since institutions 
regulate human interactions, they have to be universal. An institution becomes 
an institution because agents adhere to it. They do so because an equilibrium 
institution establishes a Nash equilibrium and thereby the agents have no incen-
tive to unilaterally deviate. Finally, since institutions are not given by a natural 
order but develop spontaneously, multiple institutional systems can emerge 
within technologically similar environments. That is to say, multiple equilibria 
are possible. 
Our definition of institutions now becomes more analytical. However, this 
does not change anything regarding the general content. Institutions are neces-
sary to regulate strategic interactions between agents. That is to say, an agent 
maximizes his utility by optimally choosing his action. An agent’s utility, how-
ever, depends not only on his own action but also on others’ actions. Hence, to 
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maximize his utility the agent must anticipate other agents’ actions and choose 
his own behavior accordingly. That is to say, a utility function must incorporate 
an agent’s actions as well as expectations regarding other agents’ actions. Deci-
sions that depend on one’s own and on others’ actions are called ‘strategic’. 
The technologically feasible actions determine a society’s environment. The 
environment influences an agent’s action, but a single agent’s action choice has 
no impact on the environment. Thus, the environment consists of exogenous 
rules (institutions, geography) that influence an individual’s action choices. 
Before the model is presented some general remarks are necessary. As men-
tioned, institutions reduce uncertainty regarding others' behaviors and, therefore, 
decrease transaction costs. Hence, an institution includes information regarding 
others’ actions and lets an agent choose his optimal action given the expecta-
tions concerning the others’ behaviors. A certain moral, for example, makes in-
dividuals behave in a particular way; hence, an agent knows how to behave 
(how others expect him to behave) and he knows how the others will act. Thus, 
codes of conduct based on a certain moral or worldview emerge. The same holds 
for formal institutions, for example a certain law, although the motivation might 
differ.17 However, this is a typical problem solved by game-theoretic analysis: to 
predict behavior in a strategic situation – that is, in a situation in which the out-
come does not solely depend on one’s own action but also on other individuals’ 
behaviors. According to Greif, game-theoretic analysis deals with the issue that: 
“For player A to choose behavior, he has to know what B will do, but for B to 
choose behavior, he has to know what A will do” (Greif, 2006, p. 408). This, 
however, is exactly the problem of social interaction and the reason why humans 
impose institutions. Institutions let player A know how B expects him to behave 
as well as how B will behave, and vice versa. Then it is optimal for A to behave 
like B expects him to do. Hence, with an institution being established, a Nash 
equilibrium is implemented since no player has an incentive to unilaterally devi-
ate; and we can observe the self-enforcing character of institutions: “if each in-
dividual expects others to follow the behaviour expected of them, he finds it op-
timal to follow the behaviour expected of him” (Greif, 2006, p. 408). 
Classical game theory, however, has its drawbacks. As with every theory, at 
least some of the assumptions are unrealistic. In any case, as already argued the 
reasonableness of a theory depends on the object of study. That is to say, the un-
realistic assumptions of complete information, rationality, and homogeneous 
agents, for example, might be acceptable when the objective is to demonstrate 
the self-enforcing character of institutions. Here, however, we want to demon-
                                                
17 The adherence to an informal institution might originate in a metaphysical belief, whereas 
the adherence to a formal institution might be rooted in the fear of official punishment. How-
ever, since formal and informal institutions cannot be clearly separated, usually both motiva-
tions are mingled. 
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strate that institutions are self-enforcing and explain institutional persistence. To 
do so, we will show that the five characteristics of institutions defined above 
hold in the model. Other questions, of course, are better solved using other mod-
els, and thereby other assumptions, for example bounded rationality in evolu-
tionary game-theoretic approaches. 
2.7.2.1 Model I 
Below Aoki's shared-beliefs cum equilibrium-summary-representation model is 
demonstrated (Aoki, 2001, Ch. 7, pp. 185–206). However, the model described 
here partly deviates from Aoki’s model and the interpretation might differ at 
some points. Therefore, the core model is adopted but modifications are made. 
To analyze institutions, we now deal with the most elementary actors, the 
single agents themselves. Institutions as mental models or belief systems are ir-
relevant as long as they are not implemented by human behavior. Hence, human 
behavior makes institutions visible.
The model demonstrates the self-enforcing character of institutions. That is 
to say, an institution depicts the equilibrium state of a strategy. The pure exis-
tence of an institution implies a Nash equilibrium, since the agents have no in-
centive to unilaterally deviate. This, however, implies that the institution is self-
sustaining and will persist until an exogenous shock or a cognitive disequilib-
rium leads to a deviation from the equilibrium path. 
  
The domain of the game includes a finite number of agents – that is, the set 
of agents { }rR ,...,2,1=  as well as the sets of physically feasible actions 
{ } { }riiix λλλλ ,...,,...,1==Λ=Λ )( Ri ∈ . The action profile )(tλ  consists of the ac-
tions chosen by all agents in period t. The action profile actually implemented is 
called the internal state of the domain. The technological and institutional envi-
ronment of the domain – the exogenous rules – is depicted by the consequence 
function. For the moment, we assume the environment to be stationary. Time is 
infinite and agents choose their actions in every period.  
Notation: 
{ }rR ,...,2,1=              set of agents 
{ }ii λ=Λ  set of technologically feasible actions of 
agent i / agent i's action profile )( Ri ∈
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{ } { }riiix λλλλ ,...,,...,1==Λ=Λ  set of all technologically feasible action 
profiles 
i−λ  agent i's expectations regarding others’ ac-
tions 
{ }ω=Ω  set of physically possible consequences / 
institutional environment 
( ) Ω=Λφ              consequence function 
( ) iis Λ=Ω              private action choice rule 
is−  all agents’ action choice rules omitting 
agent i's action choice rule 
i−π  agent i's Nash equilibrium expectations 
regarding other agents’ action choices 
−σ  agent i's expectations regarding others 
agents’ action choice rules 
iu  agent i's utility function 
δ  discount factor 
At first, the relationship between an agent’s action and the environment is 
depicted.  presents the already existing institutional environment – that is, the 
institutions exogenous to the single agent. i is the set of a single agent’s possi-
ble actions. , by contrast, represents the general set of possible actions – 
thereby all agents’ possible actions. Agent i's action i depends on the existing 
institutional environment, which is exogenous to the single agent. This is dem-
onstrated by: 
( ) iis Λ=Ω .       (2.6) 
si presents an agent’s private action choice rule or his strategy. Hence, the 
environment – the prevalent formal and informal institutions – determines an 
agent’s behavior. How the environment influences an agent’s action is described 
by si. Instead, the environment  is determined by the set of all technologically 
feasible action profiles : 
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( ) Ω=Λφ .       (2.7)  
A function φ  assigns to every element of  an element of . φ  is the conse-
quence function, that is, the functional form that describes how  and  are as-
signed to each other. Thus, the environment  is determined by the technologi-
cally possible actions of all agents, . Anyway, an individual agent who maxi-
mizes his utility by optimally choosing his technologically feasible actions i
takes  as exogenously given. Agents observe the environment  in period t. 
Thus, the decision regarding an agent’s action in period t+1 is based on the envi-
ronment in period t. Hence, we have: 
))(()1( tst ii ωλ =+        (2.8) 
si assigns to every )(tω  an action )1( +tiλ .That is to say, an individual’s ac-
tion depends on the institutional environment in the preceding period. The envi-
ronment itself is constituted by the set of all technologically feasible actions of 
all agents, . 
Therefore, we have: 
  
)))((())(( tstsi λφω = ,       (2.9)   
  
)))((())(()1( tstst ii λφωλ ==+ , and    (2.10) 
  
))(())((()1( tFtst λλφλ ==+  for all t.    (2.11)   
))(( tF λ  is the transition function, which describes the transition of the inter-
nal state of the domain from one period to the next. 
The steady state equilibrium of the internal state is determined by: 
*...)2()1()( λλλλ ==+=+= ttt  with ( )** λλ F= .  (2.12)   
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The next step, however, is to explain the action choice rule si in more detail 
and to demonstrate how the equilibrium state is achieved.  
Let us introduce ui as agent i's utility or payoff function and  as the agent’s 
discount factor. First, we assume 0=δ , thereby the agent’s optimization problem 
is limited to the current period. Let -i describe the action profile without agent 
i's action – that is, the actions chosen by all agents in period t omitting agent i's 
action. 
Now we add agent i’s expectations regarding the other agents’ behaviors. 
Another agent’s behavior might cause agent i to reconsider his strategy. There-
fore, agent i’s utility function includes his own actions as well as his expecta-
tions regarding other agents’ actions. However, ii −− Λ∈λ  depicts agent i's expec-
tations concerning the other agents’ action choices )( Ri ∈ . We assume that the 
expectations regarding others’ actions correspond to the actions that are actually 
chosen, and that an agent’s action choice is always the best response. Hence, 
there exists a Nash equilibrium: agents act as they expect each other to act and 
their behavioral response is optimal; there is no incentive for a unilateral devia-
tion. 
Thus, there exists a Nash action profile Λ∈Nashλ  such that: 
  Nashii −− = λπ , and      (2.13) 






  for all i.  (2.14)   
-i depicts agent i's Nash equilibrium expectations regarding other agents’ 
action choices. Agent i's utility depends on his own action i and on his (Nash 
equilibrium) expectations regarding other agents’ action choice rules, -i. Hence, 
agent i chooses Λ∈iλ  so that ui is maximized. Then, under the assumption that 
expected actions and actual actions coincide, and that i is best response, the re-
sulting Nashiλ  is a static Nash equilibrium. The agents act in the way agent i ex-
pects them to act, and agent i himself knows how the other agents expect him to 
behave and since he has no incentive to deviate, he delivers. With the transition 
function transferring the internal state from one period to the next we have: 
Nashttt λλλλ ==+=+= ...)2()1()( . 
Now the conditions for the subgame are imposed. A subgame includes the 
history up to a specific point in time, the internal state. In the current model, (t) 
depicts the internal state including the history up to period t. All following 
events are based on (t). 
Therefore, let us assume that an agent's decision regarding his action choice 
rule (.)is  is made once and for all in period t, depending on the internal state 
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)(tλ . Hence, si in the period t≥τ  is contingent on the internal state )(tλ .That is 
to say: ))(:( tsi λτ . 
At some point in time, the equilibrium state Nashλ  has to emerge; hence, the 
particular action has to appear for the first time. From then on, it is a Nash equi-
librium. Thus, the observed game starts at a certain point in time, at which Nashλ
is determined. We are not directly interested in the history up to that point in 
time, but the history is indirectly included through )(tλ . The period in which the 
internal state Nashλ  is generated for the first time is defined as period t. Further-
more, suppose 0δ . Now the agent must incorporate his own and other agents’ 
future action choices. For simplicity, let us further assume  =  and accord-
ingly )()( tt λω = ; that is the institutional environment is one-on-one determined 
by the set of all technologically feasible action profiles in the particular period. 
The game evolving since period t, and thereby the game contingent on the 
internal state )(tλ , is called a subgame. That is to say, for t≥τ  an agent’s set of 
technologically feasible action choices, i, is determined by the set of all tech-
nologically feasible action choices, . The functional form which maps i and 
, (.)is  is constant for every period t≥τ .  
Suppose (.)i−σ  denotes agent i's expectations regarding other agents’ action 
choice rules, (.)is− . Assume that the expectations regarding other agents’ action 
choice rules correspond to the real action choice rules and that, therefore, agent 
i's action choice rules are the best response. Hence, agent i's expectations regard-
ing other agents’ action choice rules are equal to the agents’ action choice rules 
omitting agent i's action choice rule: 
  ))(:())(:( tst ii λτλτσ −− = .     (2.15) 
is−  are the agents’ strategies omitting agent i's strategy. The terms in brack-
ets indicate that is− , and therefore i−σ , is a function of )(tλ , the set of all techno-
logically feasible action profiles. However, we observe is− , and thereby i−σ , as a 
function of 	 contingent on the internal state )(tλ .
Agent i's utility, however, depends on his own action choice rule ))(:( tsi λτ
and on his expectations regarding other agents’ action choice rules, ))(:( ti λτσ − . 
Now agent i maximizes his utility ui by optimally choosing his action choice 











   (2.16) 
for all 0,)( ≥Ω∈ ttλ , and i. 
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is  is agent i's optimal action choice rule or strategy. It is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Agent i’s utility depends on his own action choice rule and on his 
expectations regarding the other agents’ actions. Both variables, si and i−σ  are a 
function of the environment – that is, to say, of the set of all technological feasi-
ble actions )(tλ . The expectations, however, are consistent with the agents’ ac-
tual actions. Hence, every agent acts in the way the other agents expect him to 
act. Agent i chooses his action choice rule so that his utility is maximized. The 
agents have no incentive to unilaterally deviate. Therefore, the action choice rule 
si becomes self-enforcing. This is what Greif (2006) means when he writes: 
“Behaviour is self-enforcing if, when players expect it to be followed, it is in-
deed followed because each player finds it optimal to so expecting the others to 
follow it” (p. 410). 
So far, we have established strategies, or action choice rules, for the agents’ 
actions that are self-enforcing in equilibrium. That is, the function that converts 
the exogenous environment or the set of all feasible technological actions into an 
individual’s action is constant in equilibrium and does not depend on time. 
Hence, the transition function of the internal state is constant as is the internal 
state itself. Without an exogenous shock, the state will continue indefinitely. 
Hence, we demonstrated how human behavior in a society can become persis-
tent. However, the strategies or action choice rules, s, are not institutions yet. A 
strategy misses an institution’s summary representation function. An institution 
is a bundle of information that includes the information relevant for the agent to 
decide on his strategy or action choice rule, si. 
For now we know that the action choice rule or the strategy si is the function 
that maps the set of all technologically feasible actions, )(tλ . si can be under-
stood as the strategy behind the behavior; that is to say, si is the reason for (or 
the consideration behind) a certain behavior. However, si is included in the util-
ity function. An agent’s utility is maximized by optimally choosing si, the 
agent’s strategy or action choice rule. Now, assume that we have already maxi-






* SxS)s,...,s,...,s(*s =∈= 1 .     (2.17) 
iS  is the set of strategies or action choice rules of agent )( Rii ∈ . Now sup-
pose that there exists a function (.)*iI  associated with the equilibrium that incor-
porates all information necessary to achieve s*. Hence, (.)*iI  summarizes the 
relevant information for the equilibrium strategy; other information is not neces-
sary. As soon as (.)*iI  is the functional form of a strategy, si is the equilibrium 
strategy or action choice rule: *)()( ** sIsI ii =  for iiSxs ∈ . 
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))(())(( *** ssss ii φφ = .       (2.18) 
That is to say, if agent i’s strategy is in equilibrium, then the set of all strate-
gies (all agents’ strategies) are in equilibrium. Since )( ** sIi  includes all relevant 
information, it is defined as agent i’s summary representation. 
An institution, however, is defined to be robust within a certain environ-
ment. That is to say, institutions do not adjust to small modifications in the ex-
ogenous rules; instead most of them are inertial and only extreme external 
shocks cause institutional change. Here, we do not deal with institutional change 
but with the institutional self-enforcement that causes institutional persistence. 
Therefore, we assume the exogenous environment to change within a certain 
range. A change beyond the range would cause institutional adjustment.  
{ }ψ=Ψ  depicts the exogenous environmental parameters. Ψ̂  is the subset of 
the environmental parameters within which the environment can vary without 
causing institutional change. Hence, within the subset Ψ̂ , ( )ψ*s  exists. That is 
to say, the set of all action choice rules now depends on the environmental pa-
rameters. As long as the environment varies within a certain range, { }ψ=Ψ̂ , s* 
remains the equilibrium strategy, since an environmental variation within the 
range causes no strategic changes. Hence, the agent might not directly maximize 
his utility contingent on his own action choice rule, ))(:( tsi λτ , and on the expec-
tation regarding other agents’ actions, ))(:( ti λτσ − . Instead, )( ** sIi  incorporates all 
information necessary for s*. Therefore, *iI  is implied by: 
))(*(* ψsIi   for any Ψ∈ ˆψ .     (2.19) 
The last term indicates that, as long as the environment varies within the 
range Ψ∈ ˆψ , *iI  is the summary representation of the internal state that agent i 
observes, and on which his strategy and actions are based.  
Now assume that the environmental parameters are given by the subset 
{ }ψ=Ψ̂ , but that different sets of equilibrium action choice rules, 
{ } { },...)(***,)*(* ψψ ss , exist contingent on Ψ̂ . Hence, there also exist different 
equilibrium summary representations, ,..., ***** II , emanating from the subset of 
environmental parameters Ψ̂ . That is to say, despite the same underlying exoge-
nous parameters, multiple equilibrium paths are possible. 
Therewith the summary representation *I  can now be defined as an institu-
tion. Aoki’s (2001) five characteristics of institutions, depicted with his shared-
beliefs cum equilibrium-summary-representation view of institutions, are ob-
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served in the model: *I , the institution, is endogenous; it is a summary represen-
tation of the decisive information; it is robust; it is universally relevant to all in-
dividuals (shared cognition); and multiple institutional equilibrium paths are 
conceivable, based on equal technological and ecological environments. 
The institution, however, includes all relevant information the agent needs to 
optimally choose his strategy. With the institution in place, the agent does not 
consciously choose a strategy; the only possible strategy adapted from the insti-
tution is the optimal strategy. The strategy, however, is decisive for the agent’s 
action. Hence, an individual’s behavior is based on the prevalent institution. 
That is to say, without the institution in place, the agent has to consciously 
maximize his utility as depicted in this section to achieve his equilibrium strat-
egy. With an institution in place, the derivation is not necessary. The institution 
includes all relevant information and lets the individual know – without further 
consideration – how others will behave and how they expect the individual to 
behave. This is a Nash equilibrium since an incentive for an unilateral deviation 
does not exist. The state will continue until it is disturbed by an exogenous 
shock. 
This applies as long as the environment varies within a certain range. An 
environmental change exceeding the particular range is similar to an exogenous 
shock and thereby causes institutional adjustment. Hence, the equilibrium state 
is disturbed and a new equilibrium must emerge. As long as the equilibrium 
does not exist, an institution cannot be observed. In this case, the specific uni-
versal rule regulating social interaction does not exist within the examined do-
main. An institution becomes obvious when it is already implemented in human 
behavior. Hence, it becomes obvious when an equilibrium is realized. Therefore, 
an institution is unobservable until an equilibrium state is present. Hence, the 
institution is associated with the equilibrium. However, other institutions, de-
picted by the exogenous environment , do exist. Applying the equilibrium 
view of institutions *I  refers to the one institution under consideration, but of 
course other institutions are prevalent. 
The model is unsatisfying in the sense that it does not describe the emer-
gence of an institution. The institution is suddenly there. However, institutional 
emergence can have several origins. It depends on the definition of an institution 
and its borderlines. Institutions can obviously emerge from other institutions or 
historical accidents. In any case, often institutional emergence cannot be traced 
back to a certain starting point. Invisible random events might, influenced by 
other exogenous events or shocks, generate a new institution without anybody 
recognizing it. Institutional emergence can be a conscious process, that is con-
sciously initiated by individuals to regulate their interactions. However, institu-
tions can also emerge unconsciously (and probably most institutions do); never-
theless, their intentions are to regulate social interaction. 
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So far, we cannot explain the emergence of an institution. At least when it 
comes to the origin of informal institutions, other disciplines such as neurology, 
genomics, evolutionary theory or in general biology and anthropology must be 
consulted. However, if we want to explain certain codes of conduct within a so-
ciety, we can resort on a particular social value system or worldview. These are 
often based on a certain religion, although this might not be the case. Behavioral 
patterns originate in a society’s tradition and culture but the roots of the culture 
are difficult to assess. 
Therefore, the model and the equilibrium view of institutions in general 
have their drawbacks. However, the theory should be used to demonstrate the 
persistence of institutions and the issue of equilibrium strategies and inertial be-
havior; no more and no less. 
The case study in chapter five demonstrates the emergence of a new world-
view in the Arab region during the early Middle Ages because of societal, his-
torical, religious, and accidental reasons. Starting with subtle changes, institu-
tional modifications were put into motion that, together with external random 
events, altered the existing institutional environment and created a new starting 
point for technological development, modern sciences, and economic growth. 
According to the equilibrium view, it could be argued that external shocks 
and a cognitive disequilibrium originating in a new worldview disrupted the in-
stitutional equilibrium and ended up, after hundreds of years, in a new stable 
equilibrium that seems to be less growth supportive, at least from a Western 
economist's point of view. Now, institutional persistence makes it difficult to 
change institutions in a growth-favoring way. 
However, the institutional equilibrium that might become disrupted does not 
have to relate to the general institutional system of a state or a society. Institu-
tional systems emerge within institutional systems. This is what makes the topic 
so complex. An institutional equilibrium might exist on a low level; hence, a 
certain institution might regulate the interactions of a certain group of individu-
als in a particular case. That is to say, talking about institutions does not neces-
sarily mean talking about the ‘big’ institutions, such as the constitution, the ju-
risdiction, property rights, or the general social value system. A certain institu-
tion can be relevant for only a few individuals. Therefore, it is important to de-
fine the observed population. Institutions might exist within a circle of friends, 
the family, colleagues, a firm, a nation, and so on. Other institutions might be 
relevant not only for a country but for a whole cultural area, which might cross 
national borderlines. That is to say, the term ‘institutional persistence’ does not 
intend to suggest that all institutions within a state are in equilibrium and cannot 
be changed. Instead, an institutional system consists of a myriad institutions, 
formal and informal, relevant to a certain group or to all individuals in the sys-
tem. All institutions interact with each other, are influenced by exogenous fac-
tors, and, of course, change. One institution in the system might be disrupted 
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and modified. This can be without result for the other institutions, it can have 
consequences for a few institutions, it can have a sudden impact on the whole 
institutional system, or it can have a slow but strong influence on the other insti-
tutions. In the model, for example, we demonstrated institutional persistence for 
a certain domain, and thereby for the observed set of agents and their physically 
possible actions. The model can be applied to a large state-level institution or an 
informal institution affecting only a few individuals, but it cannot be applied to 
the whole institutional system. 
For example in the Arab case, we cannot say that the institutional system per 
se experienced an exogenous shock and, therefore, deviated from the equilib-
rium path. Some institutions changed, others did not, and some were modified 
subtly, others consciously. However, some of the changes had long-lasting ef-
fects on societal and economic development. An institutional system is a dy-
namic entity with some constraints never changing and others being modified 
constantly. Thus, the equilibrium view of institutions should not be misunder-
stood. The model deals with only one institution for a given population. It ema-
nates from partly unrealistic assumptions. Therefore, it cannot be applied one-
on-one on the institutional environment of a state. The objective is merely to 
demonstrate the issue of equilibrium strategies in the case of institutional analy-
sis. Hence, when individual and collectivist behavior is in equilibrium, codes of 
conduct cannot be changed. Thus, we cannot just change institutions because 
they are economically inefficient. Even if they result in low economic growth 
rates, the individuals’ strategies are optimal regarding the prevalent conditions. 
2.8 The form of societal organization 
Institutions, however, are the reason for a certain form of societal organization. 
Societal organization describes the collective behavior of the members of a soci-
ety. Hence, with societal organization we can examine the impacts of different 
institutions on collective behavior. When different institutions lead to different 
individual and, since institutions are universal, to different collective behavior, 
different forms of societal organization are the consequences. Thus, choosing 
societies that vary in their form of organization means we can demonstrate the 
impact of different institutions on, for example, the equilibrium wage. 
However, how does the issue of institutional persistence adhere to societal 
organization? Well, if optimal strategies are realized, then the value system and, 
therefore, norms and codes of conduct will not change until an exogenous shock 
causes a deviation from the equilibrium path. In any case, this means the form of 
societal organization is persistent. Hence, limited or generalized morality will 
survive, no matter which outcomes they produce. Outcomes, however, can vary 
widely depending on societal organization. 
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The next model demonstrates the impacts of different forms of societal or-
ganization. Again it is important to note that the objective of the analysis is not 
to identify the ‘better’ form of societal organization. Both societies cannot be 
normatively compared. In both societies, optimal strategies are implemented 
contingent on the corresponding prerequisites. Individuals maximize their utility 
by choosing the optimal strategy contingent on the others’ behaviors and at least 
indirectly contingent on the institutional environment. Hence, it is demonstrated 
that different forms of societal organization cause different results. No statement 
is made regarding which result and which organizational form is ‘better’, since 
every form and every result is optimal per se. 
2.8.1 Model II 
This section partly depicts the model by Greif (1994). Greif, however, examines 
the development paths of a collectivist and of an individualist society, where the 
former corresponds to the concept of limited morality and the latter is similar to 
a society practicing generalized morality. 
The original paper from 1994 combines the game-theoretic analysis with a 
historical case study of Genose and Maghribi merchants of the 11th and 12th 
centuries.18 Here, however, only the theoretical part will be presented. 
The model depicts the agency relationships between entrepreneurs and 
agents. The one-side prisoner’s dilemma game demonstrates that different forms 
of societal organization lead to different patterns of agency relations that are 
separately in equilibrium. Agents can decide whether to cheat and earn a one-
period gain from cheating, or whether to play honest and earn the regular wage. 
Entrepreneurs, by contrast, can hire an agent or decide to work on their own and 
not hire an agent. Whether to hire an agent or not depends on the possibilities of 
avoiding cheating. Thus, the entrepreneur, who pays the agent’s wage if he hires 
the agent, can provide an incentive to play honest by correspondingly choosing 
the wage. The wage must be higher than the gain through cheating. Then again 
the entrepreneur must decide whether it is worthwhile paying the wage. Thus, 
the incentive structure works via a wage, which must be high enough to provide 
an incentive for the agent not to cheat. The wage must also be low enough to 
provide an incentive for the entrepreneur to hire an agent, since he can also do 
the work himself. 
The equilibrium wage that ensures that an agent is hired, and that the agent 
plays honest, is calculated using the players’ corresponding utility functions. 
When the wage is fixed, however, the differences between societies practicing 
                                                
18 See also Greif (1993). 
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limited rather generalized morality become obvious. It is demonstrated that, de-
pending on the form of societal organization, the equilibrium wage and societal 
structures differ. 
Notation: 
E    entrepreneurs 
A   agents 
AE    agents are more numerous than entrepreneurs 
0α   agent’s one-period payoff from cheating  
δ   agent’s time discount factor 
0≥η   agent’s reservation utility 
0κ  entrepreneur’s payoff if he does not hire an agent / payoff 
from noncooperation  
γ  entrepreneur’s gross gain when he hires an agent / gross gain 
from cooperation 
0≥W   wage 
ξ   termination probability 
Players live indefinitely. An entrepreneur hires one agent and an agent can 
work for only one entrepreneur per period. Entrepreneurs and agents meet ran-
domly; however, the entrepreneur can exclude certain groups of agents from the 
possible pool according to the information available to the entrepreneur. When 
the agent is employed he can decide whether it is worthwhile playing honest or 
to cheat. The reservation utility η  is the utility the agent receives from being un-
employed. Furthermore, the agent runs the risk that, even when he plays honest, 
the agency relationship is terminated. This could be the case because the entre-
preneur becomes ill or retires. ξ  depicts the probability that the entrepreneur 
terminates the relationship even though the agent plays honest. All players are 
aware of the history of the game. 
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Agent playing honest: 
When the entrepreneur hires an agent and the agent plays honest, the entre-
preneur receives W−γ ; that is the gross gain from cooperation minus the wage. 
The agent receives the wage W . 
γ   entrepreneur’s gross gain from cooperation 
W−γ   entrepreneur’s net payoff from cooperation  
W   agent’s payoff from cooperation 
Cooperation is assumed to be efficient, that is ηκγ + . The left-hand side 
of the inequality depicts the gross gain from cooperation, thereby the entrepre-
neur’s and the agent’s payoffs. γ includes the entrepreneur’s net gain plus the 
agent’s wage. The right-hand side describes the gain from noncooperation, 
thereby the entrepreneur’s payoff κ  plus the agent’s reservation utility η . 
Agent playing cheat: 
0  entrepreneur’s payoff 
ηα    agent’s payoff 
If the agent cheats the entrepreneur receives zero payoff. Hence, the entre-
preneur prefers noncooperation over being cheated or having to pay α=W  since 
noncooperation provides him with 0κ .   
Derivation of the equilibrium wage: 
Up next the players’ utility functions are described, which are then used to 
derive the equilibrium wage. 
hh   probability that an unemployed agent who was honest in the last 
period he was employed will be hired in the current period 
ch   probability that an unemployed agent who cheated in the last period 
he was employed will be hired in the current period
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hV   present value of the lifetime expected utility of an employed agent 
who, whenever hired, is honest 
u
hV  present value of the lifetime expected utility of an unemployed hon-
est agent 
u
cV   present value of the lifetime expected utility of an unemployed 
cheater (who will be honest in the future if hired)
One period of cheating must be less attractive than the utility an agent re-
ceives from playing honest in every period. Hence: 
   uch VV +≥ α        (2.20)  
  
must hold for the agent to play honest. 
Utility functions:  
( ) uhhh VVWV ξξδ +−+= 1*      (2.21) 
( )( )uiihiui VhVhV +−+= ηδδ 1   chi ,=  (2.22) 
To gain the equilibrium wage *W  we have to dissolve equations (2.21) and 
(2.22) for hV  and ucV , which we then have to insert in the above inequality 
(2.20). The full derivation is demonstrated in appendix A. 
Dissolve (2.21) for uhV : 
ξ
*WVV huh
−=   with: ( )ξδ −−= 11    (2.23) 
From (2.22); setting i=h: 
( )( )uhhhhuh VhVhV +−+= ηδδ 1       (2.24) 
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Dissolve (2.22) with i=h for uhV : 
ηδδ hhh
u
h PVHV +=      (2.25) 







   









   chi ,=
Similarly; setting i=c in (2.22): 
ηδδ chc
u
c PVHV +=      (2.26) 











*      (2.27) 
Remember: 
u
ch VV +≥ α      (2.20) 












     (2.28) 



















*      (2.29) 
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Dissolve (2.29) for W*: 



























*   (2.30)  
   
  ( ) ηαηξδ ,,,,,* ch hhwW = .    (2.31) 
w  decreases in the agent’s time discount rate δ  and in the probability of hir-
ing an honest agent hh . w  increases in ch , the probability of hiring a cheater; in 
ξ , the termination probability; in η , the reservation utility; and in α , the payoff 
from one period of cheating. 
Hence, the optimal wage is ( ) ηαηξδ ,,,,,* ch hhwW =  with )1,0(∈δ  and 
1ch . 
Until now no difference has been made between limited and generalized 
morality. The optimal wage depends on the agent’s discount factor, on the prob-
ability of hiring an honest agent or a cheater, on the termination probability, the 
reservation utility, and the agent’s payoff from one period of cheating. Alto-
gether the wage has to be greater than the reservation utility since it must pro-
vide an incentive to an unemployed agent. 
The two observed forms of societal organization differ regarding the prob-
abilities of hiring an honest agent hh  or a cheater ch . A society that practices 
limited morality is characterized by informal networks of social interaction. 
Within these networks or groups, information is transposed at no charge. That is 
to say, an entrepreneur is told which of the agents have cheated in the past. 
Hence, the entrepreneur has information on which of the agents have cheated 
and, therefore, is able to employ only from the group of previously honest 
agents. With limited morality, 1hh =  and 0=ch . An entrepreneur will not em-
ploy an agent who cheated in the past since he knows the agents’ histories. He 
will hire an agent from the pool of honest agents. 
In a society practicing generalized morality, no such informal information 
networks exist. Hence, an entrepreneur does not know whether the considered 
agent is a cheater or not. Therefore, 0ch hh = . The probability of hiring a 
cheater is equal to the probability of hiring an honest agent. The entrepreneur 
does not know the agents’ histories. Entrepreneur and agent are randomly 
matched and agents are chosen from among the pool of all agents. Hence, the 
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entrepreneur must pay a wage high enough to prevent agents who previously 
cheated from cheating in the current period. 
In the case of limited morality, the entrepreneur knows that the hired agent 
will play honest. Hence, an incentive to keep the agent honest is not necessary. 
The wage must merely be higher than the agent’s reservation utility, since only 
then it is worthwhile for the agent to get a job. 
Hence, under limited morality the optimum wage is lower than under gener-
alized morality. Societies practicing generalized morality possess no informal 
information network to provide the entrepreneurs with the agents’ histories. 
Thus, the probability of employing a cheater equals the probability of employing 
an honest agent. Therefore, agents must be provided with an incentive to play 
honest. 
As long as κγ ≥− *W  holds, both strategies constitute a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. That is to say, the net gain from cooperation has to be greater than 
or equal to the equilibrium wage. If this condition holds, it is worthwhile for 
both the entrepreneur and the agent to cooperate. Hence, both have no incentive 
to unilaterally deviate. The wage is low enough to make cooperation efficient 
for the entrepreneur and the wage is high enough to provide an incentive for the 
agent to play honest. Under limited morality, an incentive to play honest is not 
necessary. Thus, the wage has merely to be higher than the agent’s reservation 
utility. In this case, work is more efficient to the agent than unemployment. The 
probability of employing a cheater is zero. Under generalized morality, history 
is irrelevant. The wage provides an incentive for the agents not to cheat, but co-
operation is still worthwhile for the entrepreneurs. Since agents play honest un-
der the equilibrium wage, cheating never occurs in equilibrium, neither under 
limited nor under generalized morality. Both the entrepreneur and the agent 
know how the other player will act, thereby expectations correspond to real ac-
tions; the players behave as they are expected to since this strategy is the best 
response. Thus, entrepreneur E knows how agent A will behave and agent A 
knows how entrepreneur E will behave. Behavior that violates the expectations 
will not occur since entrepreneur and agent would put themselves in a worse po-
sition. 
This first result demonstrates that different equilibrium states can exist. Each 
state implicates another outcome *W . However, both states are optimal even 
though wages differ. Hence, strategies can be in equilibrium even though eco-
nomic outcomes differ. However, even the society with the lower equilibrium 
wage realizes its optimal wage. The generalized strategy is to hire from the pool 
of all agents, whereas the limited strategy is to hire only from the pool of honest 
agents.19
                                                
19 Strategies off-the-path-of-play are not depicted here, however, corresponding evidence can 
be found in Greif, 1994, p. 920 and p. 945. 
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2.8.1.1 Horizontal and vertical societal structures
The informal information network plays a major role in the model since it exists 
only in the case of limited morality. A further important assumption refers to the 
collective punishment strategies. Limited morality needs informal collective 
punishment strategies, since otherwise the information network would be futile. 
A third-party enforcer does not exist; however, official formal rules would be 
necessary for such an enforcement mechanism to exist. Since the rules regulat-
ing social interactions consist of norms, traditions, habits, and so on they are in-
formal and no legitimate third-party enforcement exists. Thus, regulation and 
enforcement have to be provided informally. 
Regulation is guaranteed by informal institutions, whereas the enforcement 
of the institutions is ensured by unofficial collective punishment strategies. 
Hence, society itself and not a third party such as the state punishes the viola-
tors. Of course, informal enforcement results in subjective punishment strate-
gies. These are governed by subjective sentiments and might seem rude and un-
justified to observers that are used to the rule of law and an independent judici-
ary. Nevertheless, these informal enforcement mechanisms are optimal strate-
gies for the particular society. 
In the case of our model, informal enforcement has nothing to do with crude 
punishment but with the fact that society punishes cheaters because entrepre-
neurs do not employ agents who cheated in the past. Hence, unemployment is 
the punishment strategy applied for dishonest agents. 
Now it is assumed that entrepreneurs can work as agents for other entrepre-
neurs. In the original model by Greif (1994), entrepreneurs are restricted to mer-
chants, since the historical case study deals with two groups of merchants. Re-
garding the historical example of Maghribi and Genose traders, it was in fact the 
case that merchants installed agency relations with other merchants. This made 
sense since merchants were situated at different locations and thereby a mer-
chant in one place could act as an agent for a merchant situated in another loca-
tion. Or, a merchant who was travelling between places could act as an agent for 
locally bound merchants. Merchants who were members of a society practicing 
limited morality (the Maghribi) actually preferred to hire other merchants from 
the particular society as agents. For reasons considered below, merchants were 
more trustworthy than pure agents. 
However, in the present model we now add the possibility that entrepreneurs 
can be hired as agents by other entrepreneurs. In addition, pure agents exist 
(who can only work as agents and not as entrepreneurs). Hence, an entrepreneur 
can choose between employing an agent or employing an entrepreneur who pro-
vides agency services. An entrepreneur who provides agency services can either 
cheat or play honest. 
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If the entrepreneur is honest while providing agency services we obtain: 
A












*WV Ah  entrepreneur’s lifetime expected utility if he is always honest 
If the entrepreneur cheats while providing agency services we obtain: 
α  gain from cheating while providing agency services in 
the current period 
A
cV  entrepreneur’s expected utility from being an agent 
*W−γ    payoff from being an entrepreneur in the current period 
E






c VVW ++−+ *γα  present value of the lifetime expected utility of an en-
trepreneur who cheated while providing agency ser-
vices 
An entrepreneur should not gain from one period of cheating while providing 
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If this inequality holds, the entrepreneur will play honest while providing agency 
services. 




h VV +≥ α         (2.33) 
must hold.  
The difference between generalized and limited morality becomes visible 
via the punishment strategy. By assumption, under limited morality an entrepre-
neur who cheated while providing agency services gets punished by withholding 
information from him. Thus, the entrepreneur does not learn which of the agents 
cheated in the past. Hence, he has to pay a higher wage, since he has to choose 
his agent from the pool of all agents, which includes honest agents and cheaters. 
Therefore, the entrepreneur has to provide an incentive for the agent to play 
honest. If the entrepreneur himself plays honest while providing agency ser-
vices, he will not get punished and thereby gets to know the agents’ histories 
and can choose from the pool of honest agents. Then, he does not have to pro-
vide an incentive to play honest and can pay a wage that is higher or equal to the 
agent’s reservation utility. 
The argumentation, however, might seem far-fetched. But Greif (1994) 
demonstrates that exactly the punishment strategy described above was applied 
by the Maghribi traders in the 11th century. 
Under limited morality, an entrepreneur who cheated while providing 
agency services has to pay a higher wage to his agent, since he does not know 
his history. Therefore, the lifetime expected utility of the entrepreneur decreases. 
That is to say, EcV  on the right-hand side of equation (2.32) decreases and 
thereby it becomes less attractive for an entrepreneur to cheat while providing 
agency services, since cheating decreases his future utility because of higher la-
bor costs. Thus, cheating while providing agency services influences the entre-
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Equation (2.34) includes the gains from being an entrepreneur. The left-hand 
side depicts an entrepreneur’s gains from entrepreneurship when he plays honest 
while providing agency services; the right-hand side represents the gains from 
entrepreneurship when the entrepreneur cheats while providing agency services. 
Again, EcV  decreases and thereby it becomes more attractive to play honest. 
However, because under limited morality cheating as an agent impacts on an 
entrepreneur’s utility from entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur has more to lose 
from cheating than under generalized morality. Therefore, the probability that 
the entrepreneur cheats while providing agency services is lower under limited 
morality. Hence, under limited morality entrepreneurs prefer to employ other 
entrepreneurs as agents, since for them cheating is less attractive because it has a 
negative influence on their utility from entrepreneurship. 
A society practicing generalized morality misses the informal information 
network and the collective punishment strategy – that is to say, history is irrele-
vant. Therefore, an entrepreneur who cheats while providing agency services 
does not get punished and might not pay a higher wage. However, as has been 
proved before, the equilibrium wage under generalized morality is higher since 
the probability of employing a cheater equals the probability of employing an 
honest agent. 











γ .      (2.35) 
  
That is to say, the lifetime expected utility from entrepreneurship of an en-
trepreneur who plays honest when providing agency services equals the lifetime 
expected utility from entrepreneurship of an entrepreneur who cheats when pro-
viding agency services. Hence, under generalized morality entrepreneurs do not 
prefer to hire other entrepreneurs for agency services. Since an entrepreneur who 
provides agency services realizes an income from entrepreneurship, his reserva-
tion utility might be higher than that of a pure agent. Therefore, under general-
ized morality, entrepreneurs might prefer to employ pure agents instead of en-
trepreneurs providing agency services, since the latter might demand a higher 
wage for playing honest because of their higher reservation utility. 
It can be concluded that under limited morality, entrepreneurs prefer to hire 
other entrepreneurs providing agency services instead of pure agents. The col-
lective punishment strategy deprives an entrepreneur who cheated as an agent of 
the information regarding the honesty of other agents and entrepreneurs. Hence, 
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the cheating entrepreneur has to pay a higher wage since he does not know 
whether the hired agent is honest or not. Therefore, entrepreneurs providing 
agency services have more to lose when working as an agent. Thus, they need a 
lower incentive to play honest and thereby a lower wage.  
Under generalized morality, entrepreneurs prefer to hire pure agents. Since a 
collective punishment strategy does not exist, and since the agents’ histories are 
irrelevant, the entrepreneurs anyway pay a higher equilibrium wage. However, 
because of the high reservation utility of entrepreneurs providing agency ser-
vices, entrepreneurs prefer to employ pure agents. 
Thus, limited morality advances a horizontal social structure, whereas gen-
eralized morality results in a vertical social structure. This is what we would ex-
pect according to our previous definition of generalized and limited morality. 
Hence, limited morality is characterized by group affiliation. Within these 
groups, informal networks and punishment strategies exist. Wages are lower 
compared with individualistic societies. Limited morality results in a horizontal 
social structure. Hence, income differences are less notable. Social mobility is 
constrained since there is not much space for up- or downward movement. This 
matches the significance of the collective. Less social mobility hampers incen-
tives to invest. Hence, incentives and preferences differ compared with a vertical 
social structure. This might result in less productivity, economic growth, and 
consequently lower living standards. 
Generalized morality describes an individualistic society. Group affiliation 
is not important. Transactions are conducted independent of certain member-
ships and are regulated via formal rules. These are enforced by a third-party en-
forcement mechanism. Since informal networks do not exist, wages are higher 
and a vertical social structure is realized. Hence, social mobility is possible and 
income differences are bigger compared with limited morality. Therefore, incen-
tives and preferences differ. Incentives to invest are higher and productivity and 
living standards might be higher compared with a collectivist society. 
Greif (1994) indeed proves that the Maghribi traders of the 11th century re-
alized a horizontal structure. A clear dividing line between a class of merchants 
and a class of agents could not be drawn. On the contrary, the society of the Ge-
noese merchants of the 12th century was structured vertically. Merchants rarely 
functioned as agents and instead a relatively rich class of merchants and a rela-
tively poor class of agents emerged (Greif, 1994, p. 928). 
The current chapter shows that different institutions – and thereby the rules 
that regulate human interactions – lead to different behavioral patterns and that 
these cannot be easily changed once implemented. This can be demonstrated 
with the equilibrium view of institutions and a model that presents the issue of 
institutional persistence via equilibrium strategies. These strategies can only be 
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changed by an exogenous shock; otherwise they persist indefinitely. However, 
multiple equilibria are assumed to be possible and different equilibrium strate-
gies can occur. Since institutions determine an individual’s behavior, they also 
determine the societal patterns of behavior since they are universal to all mem-
bers of the observed population. Hence, different institutions imply different in-
dividual and collective behaviors. Although behavior differs, it might corre-
spond to an optimal strategy regarding the particular population. Varying behav-
ior can result in different economic outcomes, as Greif’s (1994) model shows. 
However, although one society might realize lower economic growth rates and 
living standards compared with another one, it might still realize equilibrium 
strategies. Hence, the outcome might be optimal regarding the particular society 
and the prevalent basic conditions. Hence, a bad economic performance does not 
imply that the societal structure per se is inefficient and has to be changed. If 
change is still to be promoted this might be a difficult task. Since institutions are 
the main drivers for behavior, institutions must then be modified. However, ac-
cording to the equilibrium view, institutions are associated with an equilibrium 
and thereby the implemented strategies are equilibrium strategies. Therefore, a 
modification of collective and individual behavior is only possible by a preced-
ing institutional modification, which can only occur via an exogenous shock. 
Hence, two points should be stressed: first, if a society’s institutions do not 
promote high economic growth this does not mean that the society itself is in 
disequilibrium and, therefore, inefficient. Second, institutional change is not eas-
ily conducted. 
Until now the institutional analysis in this thesis has been conducted theo-
retically. The next chapter, however, depicts an empirical analysis of institu-
tions. It will be demonstrated how formal and informal institutions can be meas-
ured. Furthermore, issues of the empirical examination of institutions are pre-
sented. Then, a regression analysis is run that examines whether informal and 
formal institutions influence per capita income. Hence, it will be examined 
whether the theoretical consideration can be empirically verified. 
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3. Institutions – an empirical approach 
3.1 Informal institutions 
Informal institutions are defined as morals, values, conventions, norms, tradi-
tions, codes of conduct, habits, attitudes, and beliefs. They incorporate culture in 
general and, therefore, the societal value system. Hence, the term ‘informal in-
stitutions’ is used as a substitute for culture or cultural factors. The correspond-
ing transmission channel is the individual himself as informal institutions affect 
economic development on an aggregated level through their influence on peo-
ple’s behaviors. 
However, even Adam Smith (1759) discussed the impact of cultural traits on 
economic development in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Later, Banfield 
(1958) and Putnam (1993), inter alia, composed popular writings connecting 
culture and specific developments. 
After cultural and institutional impacts on economic growth had been for-
gotten for a while, North (1990) surged ahead with his popular publication Insti-
tutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. His approach was to 
help growth theory out of the stagnation concerning the explication of persistent 
growth differences between countries. However, the often mathematically so-
phisticated models of endogenous growth theory, which tried to improve the in-
consistencies of neoclassical theory, turned out to be too abstract to explain the 
real world. As good as these models were, they were not able to explain why the 
proximate determinants of growth varied that much between countries and why 
differences in productivity between countries could not be solved by applying 
the sophisticated economic knowledge that the models offered. 
North and Thomas (1973) and North (1990) brought institutions as the deci-
sive missing link back into play. Furthermore, North’s theory of institutions in-
corporated cultural factors since he faced the fact that informal institutions are 
constraints implemented by individuals to regulate social interaction. However, 
North (1990) constitutes the chronological and content-related starting point of 
the recent study. 
The effect of culture on economic development was then emphasized by 
Landes (1998), who traces the Western European economic success back to its 
supportive culture. whereas in other regions of the world, such as the Middle 
East or China, the existing cultural conditions were not favorable for an West-
ern-style Industrial Revolution. 
However, starting with these works cultural economics experienced a gentle 
revival from the beginning of the 1990s, as observable in de Jong and Eelke 
(2009), Platteau (2000), North (2005), Inglehart and Welzel (2005), and Harri-
son and Huntington (2000). Furthermore, several journal articles dealing with 
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culture, informal institutions, and economic development appeared.20 Since in-
formal institutions are a subjective matter, cannot always be explained ration-
ally, and cannot be measured in generally accepted units, the formal incorpora-
tion in economic models is a difficult task. Because direct observations are not 
possible, proxy variables must be used instead. That is to say, data that permit 
inference on a society’s organization, beliefs, and values are used instead of the 
cultural variables themselves, which are not directly observable. However, we 
will revert to the issue of the measurement of informal institutions later. 
For now we will concentrate on the theoretical argumentation of informal 
institutions and their impacts on economic growth. An early example regarding 
informal institutions and their influences on economic development is Max We-
ber’s popular thesis concerning the Protestant work ethic (Weber, 2002). Weber 
argues that the emergence of capitalism was closely related to the belief and 
thereby the resulting behavior of the Protestant population. Following his argu-
ment, work was not just a means to an end but the purpose of life and God’s 
will. People believed that God’s chosen ones were blessed with a materially 
good and safe life. Hence, everybody tried to achieve a high living standard in 
order to believe that they were a chosen one. In other societies, where material 
standards play no role regarding God’s goodwill, people lack the accordant in-
centives to work hard and invest. Therefore, according to Weber, countries with 
a high proportion of Protestant citizens were economically more successful than 
those without. Consequently, the beliefs, attitudes, and codes of conduct result-
ing from such a religious affiliation affect the development of economies. We-
ber’s thesis comes close to this work, because religious origins result in the 
norms and values that people implement in their everyday lives. For now we 
will skip the religious dimension but will refer to this point later.  
The hypothesis states that particular attitudes, norms, values, and codes of 
conduct support factor accumulation and technological progress whereas others 
do not. The challenge is to measure informal institutions and point out concrete 
features with which the impact on economic growth can be analyzed. Hence, we 
must consider which human properties can be depicted and demonstrate a clear 
relationship to culture. That is, the accordant characteristics must depend on 
values, norms, convictions and so forth, and must differ according to those crite-
ria. 
                                                
20 See, for example, Barro & McCleary (2003); Dolfsma & Verburg (2008); Fernández 
(2008); Fernández & Fogli (2007); Gorodnichenko & Roland (2010); Greif (1994); Guiso, 
Sapienza & Zingales (2003); Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006); Knowles & Weatherston 
(2006); Porta & Scazzieri (1997); Tabellini (2005); Williamson (2009). 
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An often used indicator for culture and societal organization is the level of trust. 
The role of trust in an economy has been studied for some time, especially in 
game-theoretic approaches. “In prisoner’s dilemma type of situation, interac-
tions between trusting individuals are more likely to lead to efficient outcomes, 
whereas lack of trust make it more difficult to overcome the inefficient equilib-
rium” (Tabellini, 2005, p. 9). An individual’s level of trust depends on their cul-
tural and societal background, as well as on experiences, which again are shaped 
by society, culture, and history (Putnam, 1993). If children are taught to trust 
other people, they will apply what they have learned without critical request, 
eventually for all their lives, and will pass their attitudes onto their own children. 
The same is true if we are taught not to trust others or not to trust a certain group 
or certain people. Knack and Keefer (1997), for example, find that the level of 
trust is higher in countries with less ethnical and class discrepancy. Hence, it 
might be true that in hierarchical societies, among which the affiliation to the 
family or tribe is very distinct, the level of trust within the group is high, but be-
yond it people might not trust others. In how far individuals of a society trust 
each other and trust the members of other societies depends on upbringing, (re-
ligious) beliefs, historical accidents and experiences, and traditions. Since trust 
is an informal institution, it is slow moving and can be characterized as an IEN 
institution. That is to say, the attitudes and beliefs that shape the level of trust 
change slowly and an external alteration is difficult. Nevertheless, change is 
possible, since experiences and historical accidents never stop shaping an insti-
tution. Furthermore, individuals might alter their attitudes and beliefs after logi-
cal reasoning or because they become persuaded by something else, although 
this way of change might be rare and take a long time. 
However, because of the characteristics of slow-moving institutions, trust 
represents a stable determinant that does not change in an obvious way for a 
long time. Hence, once established the influence of trust on economic outcome 
is durable and must be taken for granted. Nevertheless, we will not define trust 
as an exogenous parameter since it can be influenced by per capita income. Be-
cause of its slow convertibility the assumption of trust being an exogenous vari-
able might be justifiable in empirical work in some cases. 
However, trust has several impacts on economic performance. Trust regu-
lates social interactions and lowers transaction costs. In high-trust societies, in-
formation is replaced by trust. Hence, the corresponding monitoring expenses 
are lower. Furthermore, people in high-trust societies might not record every 
detail of an act of sale and spend less time and money on lawyers and the moni-
toring process. The business environment and, in general, economic transactions 
can be less regulated than in low-trust societies. People in high-trust societies 
might also place more confidence in the government and other official agencies, 
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which might result in higher credibility. However, incentives to innovate and 
invest are higher in high-trust societies. Since transaction costs are low, more 
capital and time is available for innovation and investment. This also means that 
the expected returns are higher since fewer costs and a lower risk premium can 
be discounted. Hence, the innovator and the investor retain their full returns. 
Furthermore, investors in a high-trust society will realize the optimal investment 
strategy over the long run rather than the short run. 
Trust enhances anonymous market exchange and decreases the need for 
formal institutions and, therefore, external enforcement. That is to say, trust also 
increases the gains from labor division and trade (Knack & Keefer, 1997, p. 
1252). La Porta et al. (1997) find that trust increases judicial efficiency, bureau-
cratic quality, tax compliance, and decreases corruption (p. 335). 
However, these examples already indicate the ambiguous character of insti-
tutional relations since an adequate regulatory structure and legal system might 
also increase the level of trust. At least higher per capita incomes might lead to a 
general change in perspectives and priorities and thereby modify a society’s 
level of trust in the long-term. Thus, a clear causality between trust and the re-
spective formal institutions rather than per capita income does not exist. In any 
case, it is obvious that a high level of trust decreases transaction costs, whereas 
increasing the quantity of transactions. Therefore, trust is associated with higher 
economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Putnam, 1993). 
3.1.2 Limited and generalized morality 
The concept of generalized and limited morality corresponds to the organization 
of society per se. The societal organization can be seen as the general framework 
that depends on the prevalent morals, norms, beliefs, and values. Institutions are 
implemented through behavior, and thereby societal organization allows infer-
ences regarding the institutional environment. Hence, knowing the societal or-
der, we might be able to deduce the value system and vice versa. However, lim-
ited morality (collectivist societies) characterizes hierarchical societies, in which 
high levels of trust and cooperation are prevalent inside groups such as the fam-
ily, the clan, the tribe, and religious or ethnic groups. That is to say, within the 
respective group transaction costs are low and business is done. However, be-
yond the group mistrust is dominant. Cooperation between members of different 
groups depends on high monitoring and information costs and thereby transac-
tions between the groups are rare. Hence, a hierarchical society with distinct fa-
milial or tribal structures suffers from restricted economic relations because of 
high transaction costs. Contracts between affiliates of the same group are closed 
according to informal rules. Hence, traditions, morals, and codes of conduct play 
a decisive role in business relationships. The same holds for enforcement 
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mechanisms, which are conducted informally regarding morals and traditions. 
Official formal institutions are either nonexistent or individuals ignore the for-
mal rules. Hence, an official enforcement mechanism implemented by a third 
party does not exist. Instead, informal rules and enforcement mechanisms (col-
lective punishment) regulate social interaction. The macroeconomic outcome 
and thereby per capita income, could be increased by optimizing business rela-
tions, trade, and production in general. However, this is not possible because of 
certain morals and norms, which stand in the way of the corresponding eco-
nomic activity. Hence, in societies where limited morality is prevalent, innova-
tion, investment, factor accumulation, trade, and thereby economic development 
per se is restricted through the limited possibilities of cooperation. Nevertheless, 
the members of the society optimize their strategies and achieve an equilibrium 
state. Hence, the societal organization of limited morality and its economic out-
come cannot be described as inefficient per se (Platteau, 2000; Greif, 1994; 
Greif, 2006; Zweynert & Goldschmidt, 2006). 
By contrast, societies in which social interactions are conducted independent 
of familial or tribal affiliation practice what is called generalized morality. 
Transaction costs are reduced via formal rules that regulate, for example, the 
formation of contracts and enforcement mechanisms. Hence, societies that real-
ize a form of generalized morality need to develop a formal institutional frame-
work to regulate their interactions and decrease transaction costs. That is to say, 
a third-party enforcement mechanism and authorized punishment strategies are 
necessary. Thus, economic transactions are conducted independent of group af-
filiation and unfamiliar informal rules. Therefore, high efficiency gains can be 
realized. Furthermore, in a society where generalized morality is prevalent, the 
free-rider issue on public goods might be less dominant. Since people trust each 
other and legitimized punishment strategies are conducted by a third party, pub-
lic goods might not be misused. Hence, transaction costs are low and the scope 
of cooperation increases. Innovation and investment are stimulated and so the 
concept of generalized morality supports economic development.21 Generalized 
morality is a form of societal organization that emerges from a strategy optimi-
zation and depicts a different equilibrium state than does limited morality. 
Therefore, because we are talking about two completely different entities, a 
comparison that rates the societies according to their economic performances is 
pointless. Both societies realize their individual optimal outcomes. 
However, the transition from limited to generalized morality is fluent. We 
can imagine that norms of good conduct and trust decrease with distance. Hence, 
a society that practices generalized morality concerning its own members might 
mistrust geographically or culturally distant societies. That is to say, even if 
                                                
21 See also Greif (1993); Greif (1994); Platteau (2000); Tabellini (2005); and Tabellini 
(2008a,b). 
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generalized morality is prevalent within the society, limited morality might be 
practiced if we extend the geographical scope. 
However, Tabellini (2008b) argues that limited and generalized morality not 
only shape economic development, but also are a matter of the development 
progress itself. Accordingly, “at early stages of development, transactions are 
mainly local, and both values and cooperation remain more limited in scope. As 
development progresses, and impersonal transactions gain relevance, this is ac-
companied by a generalization of the scope of values and cooperation” (p. 932).  
Hence, Tabellini hints at the issue of reverse causality, since societal organi-
zation influences economic development, whereas economic development im-
pacts values and beliefs and, therefore, societal organization. In another article, 
he demonstrates that democratic political institutions support the realization of 
generalized morality, whereas countries that practice generalized morality pos-
sess better government indicators and legal institutions (Tabellini, 2008a). How-
ever, we should not rely on the fact that economic development shapes values 
and beliefs in a way that supports generalized morality and, therefore, further 
progress. The interdependencies between economic development and general-
ized versus limited morality can also lead an economy to be stuck in a state of 
backwardness. Societies that practice limited morality can have less respect for 
the law and be more tolerant of lax law enforcement, since informal institutions 
govern their interrelationships. By contrast, the quality of law enforcement 
strengthens sound values, beliefs, and morals (Tabellini, 2008b). Accordingly, 
“in Western Europe impersonal exchange took place in anonymous markets 
supported by specialized institutions obeying formal procedures. In East Asia 
markets were organized through a web of kin-based social structures linked by 
personal relations (Greif, 2005). […] these different arrangements are likely to 
encourage the diffusion of different values: in the West a generalized respect for 
the individual and their rights, in the East a culture of loyalty to the local com-
munity or to a network of relatives and friends. […] these different values facili-
tated the evolution of different political and economic arrangements, with feed-
back effects in both directions” (Tabellini, 2008b, p. 930f.). Hence, this might 
explain why “… distant historical circumstances have such long lasting effects, 
and why some societies might remain trapped in cultural, institutional and eco-
nomic backwardness” (Tabellini, 2008b, p. 938). 
The form of societal organization allows us to draw conclusions regarding 
the institutional environment. Hence, a society practicing limited morality will 
be characterized by a conservative value system and corresponding attitudes. A 
society realizing generalized morality is assumed to be indicated by modern val-
ues and morals. However, the equilibrium view demonstrates that whether con-
servative or modern every society acts optimally given the prevalent conditions. 
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3.1.3 Beliefs that encourage the accumulation of physical 
and human capital 
However, to examine the impact of informal institutions on economic develop-
ment theoretically and empirically, it is not enough to speculate on beliefs, val-
ues, norms, and attitudes in general. To make meaningful statements research 
must become more concrete. Therefore, particular informal institutional features 
will be singled out, which are also used in the empirical analysis, and their influ-
ence on economic development will be described. Since beliefs and attitudes 
influencing economic activity are manifold, we concentrate on the particular 
variables that can be measured empirically and have been used in econometric 
analysis before. This allows us to demonstrate the empirical results later on and 
to use the particular variables for the following analysis. However, many other 
beliefs, attitudes, and so forth exist, which influence an individual’s economic 
behavior and aggregated economic outcome. Hence, the following enumeration 
is not complete and is thought to demonstrate a few examples. 
3.1.3.1 Destiny 
An informal institutional feature that depends on the cultural environment and 
influences economic activity is an individual’s conviction concerning their con-
trol over their own life. However, destiny as a relevant determinant of economic 
development might first appear to be somewhat abstract. Nevertheless, the belief 
concerning one’s destiny is an informal institution that perfectly demonstrates 
the interrelationship with economic growth. If people are persuaded of being 
able to influence destiny they will try to improve their situation and be proac-
tive. If, by contrast, people believe in predestination, they are not in the position 
to better their situation through their own initiative. Hence, investment in physi-
cal and human capital will in general be lower than in a society in which every-
body works hard and invests to improve her or his life. That is to say, the indi-
vidual has no incentive to innovate and invest. The attitude concerning control 
over one’s own life originates from religious beliefs since in some religions God 
determines everything in life rather than the individual itself. However, even the 
belief concerning one’s destiny is subject to reverse causality and influenced by 
the institutional environment. A higher per capita income might change one’s 
worldview and purpose in life and people might rather feel that they are in con-
trol of their fate. Furthermore, an authoritarian political system that domineers 
over its citizens combined with bad economic performance, and thereby low per 
capita income, probably does not entail self-confidence but resignation. In any 
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case, believing in predestination rather inhibits growth on an aggregated level.22
Several approaches use World Values Survey (WVS) data to measure the impact 
of culture or informal institutions on economic development using control as a 
single variable or as part of an indicator (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Knowles & 
Weatherston, 2006; Tabellini, 2005; Tabellini, 2008a). 
3.1.3.2 Life after death 
However, as already indicated, institutions do their jobs through incentives. 
Hence, if people believe in life after death or reincarnation, these beliefs influ-
ence people’s behaviors since they offer an incentive to live life in a certain 
way. Thus, abiding by the religious rules might guarantee a good life after death 
or a reincarnation on a higher level. However, not only life after death but also 
the belief in heaven and hell offers incentives to abide by certain rules. Living 
life according to a certain morality might guarantee a place in heaven, whereas 
breaking the rules might lead to hell. The rules that must be followed to arrive in 
heaven might inhibit economic growth. If, for example, a population is required 
to live an abstinent, traditional life without any luxury, this does not boost factor 
accumulation. Hence, if materialism and luxury are regarded as a sin, this does 
not foster growth. The same is true concerning the accumulation of human capi-
tal. Certain beliefs and attitudes concerning the natural world might prevent in-
dividuals from becoming educated. Furthermore, a belief in God or being reli-
gious per se makes believers live their lives following religious doctrines. This 
can be the case because individuals are persuaded by what they believe and 
thereby what they do or because they fear hell or another kind of divine punish-
ment. Anyway, every restriction provides an incentive to act in a certain manner. 
Of course, the beliefs might not promote behavior that supports growth. On the 
contrary, if, for example, materialism and modernism are banned by religious 
doctrines, if women are not allowed to work, if naturalism is regarded as blas-
phemy, then the believers have no incentive to accumulate physical capital and 
to use their human capital in a productive way. According to Weber (2002), the 
contrary is true concerning the Protestant work ethic. Calvinism propagated that 
all humans belonged either to the group of chosen ones or to the group of not-
chosen ones. Who is a chosen one and who is not is predestined and cannot be 
influenced by the human being. However, since work effort and economic suc-
cess are signs of being a chosen one and dawdling and accumulating luxuries are 
a sin, people worked hard to prove to others and to themselves that they be-
longed to the chosen ones. Hence, the fear of not being a chosen one drove peo-
ple to work hard and be economically successful. That is to say, the religious 
                                                
22 Data on the attitude concerning control over one’s own life (control) is taken from the 
WVS. The relevant question text can be found in the data description at the end of the chapter. 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
69
doctrine stimulated growth since it indirectly forced people to accumulate capi-
tal and invest. However, the argument is not without controversy. It has also 
been stated that the economic success of the Protestant work ethic depended on 
the fact that people became better educated since they had to be literate to read 
the bible (Becker & Wößmann, 2009). 
Nevertheless, we can imagine that widespread beliefs that directly or indi-
rectly influence factor accumulation, investment, innovation, technological 
knowledge, and so forth can inhibit or support growth on an aggregated level. 
Religious doctrines or other convictions regarding destiny, life after death, rein-
carnation, or God’s goodwill offer incentives for people to act in a certain way. 
We can also imagine non-religious incentives that are rooted in tradition and 
other cultural traits other than religion. However, the incentives can be either 
growth supporting or growth inhibiting. 
This section already hinted at the role of religion regarding economic devel-
opment and institutions. Several of the mentioned informal institutions are influ-
enced by religious doctrines. This leads us to the question of what determines 
informal institutions. We will leave it at that for now but will return to the ques-
tion later. 
3.2 Formal institutions 
Since institutions can be classified from general to specific categories – that is, 
for example, from the categorization of political, legal, and social institutions to 
regime type, electoral rule, business regulations, and so forth – formal institu-
tions are manifold and cannot be enumerated completely. However, some formal 
institutions turn out to be growth supporting in general. Hence, guaranteeing 
these formal institutions basically stimulates growth unless they do not match 
the prevalent informal institutions. If this is the case, economic progress will be 
difficult to prevail. However, the most basic formal institutions thought to sup-
port growth if matched by the informal environment are depicted in this section. 
3.2.1 Property rights 
Regarding formal institutions, the protection of property rights is usually de-
scribed as the decisive institutional feature concerning growth (De Soto, 2000; 
Kerekes & Williamson, 2008; North, 1990; Platteau, 2000; Rodrik, 2000; Wil-
liamson & Kerekes, 2009). Property rights afford the individual the right to de-
cide on their labor supply, physical and human capital, and the goods and ser-
vices they possess (North, 1990, p. 33). That is to say, the individual has the ex-
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clusive rights to decide on their assets. Hence, the owner benefits from the com-
plete returns on the usage of the property. The exclusiveness and irreproachable 
allocation of ownership offer the crucial incentive to invest. Furthermore, prop-
erty rights highlight the economic potential of an asset, since the owner will use 
his property in a way that maximizes his utility. Therefore, it is assured that the 
asset is used optimally. However, since we do not emanate from a pure homo 
economicus, individual utility maximization might not be equated with profit 
maximization. It is assumed that individuals are selfish and want to maximize 
their own utility. Anyway, individual utility is not equal to material utility. Peo-
ple might want to maximize their immaterial utility – that is, they might be altru-
istic because it makes them feel better or they might abstain from something be-
cause they are persuaded of doing the right thing. Hence, abstaining from some-
thing, abiding divine rules, or being altruistic makes people feel good and, there-
fore, maximizes their individual, eventually immaterial, utility. Nevertheless, the 
owner is most suitable to value his asset. 
However, since property rights reveal an asset’s economic potential, prop-
erty can be used as collateral and can generate new capital and receive credit. De 
Soto (2000) explains that one of the foremost problems of underdevelopment is 
that in many underdeveloped countries property is not clearly assigned to a par-
ticular owner and cannot be used as collateral and to generate new capital. How-
ever, property rights, coupled with an appropriate law to protect them are, ac-
cording to De Soto (2000), the lifeline of economic success in Western econo-
mies. 
Despite the direct channel on income, the dominance of secure property 
rights also makes a statement concerning the political and legal environment of a 
state. Property rights are usually not afforded in dictatorships or authoritarian 
states, where expropriation by the political power or even by private interest 
groups is possible since no appropriate law and no independent judiciary exist. 
Hence, unsecure property rights are accompanied by less political and economic 
freedom, fewer civil rights, and a manipulable judiciary. To maximize economic 
outcome the opposite situation is necessary. 
Therefore, economic success depends on secure property rights. But who 
decides on the protection of ownership, and, thus, the structure of the legal and 
economic system? Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) developed a theo-
retical approach that ascribes the emergence of the political, legal, and economic 
institutional environment to resource endowment and, therefore, to property 
rights. In their model, political power is crucial regarding the formal institutional 
environment of a state — that is, the elites in power will arrange formal institu-
tions in a way that best fits their interests. The essential theoretical feature is the 
differentiation between de jure and de facto political power. The former depicts 
the legitimate or official political power, whereas de facto political power is not 
legitimized, but able to enforce its interests. Hence, legitimate governance can, 
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but might not necessarily, possess de facto political power. Instead, de facto po-
litical power depends on resource endowment. Thus, an interest group with an 
adequate endowment of capital and other resources might be able to determine 
formal institutional properties. The exercise of de facto political power can vary. 
One possibility is a military coup in which individuals equipped with arms and 
money, and eventually supported by further interest groups, use their resources 
to overthrow the current government. Then, the de facto political power will im-
plement formal institutions that fit its interests, that is, the retention of political 
power. Therefore, civil property rights and political participation will not be af-
forded, since this would endow individuals with resources that could be used to 
overthrow the rebels. 
A less martial example is lobbying. Even in democratic states, particular in-
dustries or other interest groups use the power resulting from their resource en-
dowment to determine the institutional form in a way that best fits their interests, 
that is, the further accumulation of resources. 
Hedlund (2001, p. 217–227; 2005) describes the historical dimension of the 
implementation of property rights in Russia. His article and book demonstrate 
that property rights necessitate a culture and tradition of private property. Hence, 
in a country’s history historical accidents and path-dependent developments 
must have led to the convention of property rights implemented by the citizens 
and the executive. If a tradition of property rights is missing and if a society 
never experiences being entitled to private property, the positive effects of pri-
vate ownership cannot be implemented. Hence, property rights might not be un-
derstood as a natural right, they might also occur through convention (Hedlund, 
2001, p. 217). Since conventions differ between states and regions, not every 
country could develop a tradition and culture of private property. 
3.2.2 Legal system – the rule of law 
Property rights are useless if they are not secured by an appropriate law. Hence, 
to utilize the full potential of property rights the legal system must guarantee the 
owner complete freedom of choice and exclusiveness with respect to the rele-
vant asset. Hence, neither state-run nor private expropriation can be tolerated. 
However, complete secure property rights can only exist under the rule of 
law and thereby with an independent judiciary. Any other legal system offers a 
possibility for private or state-run interest groups to intervene. Even if a non-
democratic government provides secure property rights, the form of government 
permits minorities to enforce their interests via a coup d’etat or bribery, for ex-
ample. Hence, de facto political power is able to determine the legal environ-
ment to the detriment of property rights. Therefore, the rule of law and an inde-
pendent judiciary are essential for secure property rights. The rule of law and an 
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independent judiciary are guaranteed in democratic states.23 Hence, the alloca-
tion of secure property rights is usually accompanied by a democratic system 
and postulates an independent judiciary. This is the case since the legal system 
must be able to enforce property rights against governmental and private of-
fences. Democracy ensures that formal institutions cannot be changed on behalf 
of a certain interest group that possesses the appropriate resources. Property 
rights in conjunction with civil liberties guarantee the efficient use of every asset 
in a society, and thereby the optimization of per capita income. Nevertheless, 
property rights can also exist and be protected in other political systems, but 
since their application will probably be constrained in a non-democratic state, 
total economic efficiency will be adversely affected (Besley & Kudamatsu, 
2008; Rodrik, 2007). Furthermore, to develop their full potential ownership 
rights must be accompanied by a free-market system that allows any individual 
to use their assets in a way that maximizes their utility. Then, the economy can 
realize its maximal growth potential on an aggregated level. 
La Porta et al. (2004) examined a sample of 71 countries and found that ju-
dicial independence is a strong predictor of economic freedom. However, as in 
the case of property rights, the rule of law corresponds to an institutional entity 
that depends on random historical developments, too. Hence, the rule of law ne-
cessitates a tradition of private property and of generally accepted rights that 
hold for every member of society. Therefore, the rule of law also necessitates a 
certain understanding of the state. The state must be constrained and subordi-
nated to the rule of law; however, it must also enforce the rule. Hedlund (2001, 
2005) describes the difference between a state that subordinates itself to the law 
and a one that overrides the law with the terms ‘rule of law’ rather ‘rule by law’. 
Rule by law, as in the Russian case, does not support a tradition of property 
rights, civil liberties, and equality before the law. On the contrary, a tradition of 
rule by law inhibits confidence in the state. Instead, it conveys the impression of 
a state that officially adheres to the law but can override it whenever in the 
mood. Hence, the relationship between the members of the society and the state 
per se differs compared with a society with a tradition of the rule of law. This 
has impacts on all further developments. When a country accidentally strokes 
the way of rule by law, the emergence of a constitutional state and secure prop-
erty rights is impossible. Even if foreign or indigenous forces try to implement 
the rule of law at a later point in time, a tradition and culture of property rights 
and the rule of law will be missing. Hence, FEX or IEX institutions will not 
match IEN institutions and will, therefore, remain ineffective. 
                                                
23 La Porta et al. (2004) examined the effect of judicial independence and constitutional re-
view empirically and affirmed the hypothesis that indicial independence guarantees economic 
and political freedom by the protection of property rights inter alia. 
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3.2.3 Form of government – democracy  
Democracy is a broad concept with which we usually associate power being di-
rectly or indirectly exercised by citizens through a system of representation. Fur-
thermore, universal suffrage, civil rights, the rule of law, and the separation of 
powers are components of democracy. Since definitions are broad and different 
concepts of democracy exist, we borrow the Polity IV definition, which states 
that democracy is conceived as three elements (Jaggers & Marshall, 2005): 
1) “The presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express 
effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders” (p. 13). 
2) “The existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the ex-
ecutive” (p. 13). 
3) “The guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of 
political participation” (p. 13). 
“Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and 
balances, freedom of the press and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, 
these principles” (p. 13).  
Since different political regimes determine different economic and legal institu-
tions their impact on economic growth varies. The question is whether democ-
racy yields institutions that support growth rather than autocracy.  
Democracy inhibits resource-rich minorities from implementing institutions 
that best fit their interests. Hence, the possibility that a minority overthrows the 
government by using its resources, for example money or weapons, is lower 
than in an autocracy where no separation of power and thereby no independent 
judiciary gives shelter to the head of state. In a non-democracy, the elites in 
power will enforce the institutions that best fit their own interests. In the major-
ity of cases, these interests will increase their profits and power, but will be det-
rimental to aggregated economic growth. Hence, improvements in the general 
living standard are not optimized. Institutions in a democracy might not be 
growth maximizing, and political participation and universal suffrage will in-
hibit the establishment of institutions that benefit a small elite. Hence, democ-
ratic institutions might not maximize growth, but, compared with other institu-
tional environments, democracy guarantees the most efficient economic out-
come. 
What mostly affects the efficiency of democracies is the freedom it guaran-
tees its citizens. Civil liberties are constrained by institutions such as constitu-
tion and the rule of law, which optimize social coexistence in decreasing trans-
action costs and guarantee individual utility maximization. Property rights, free-
dom of opinion and speech, and the right to physical integrity offer incentives to 
accumulate physical and human capital and to invest. Democratic institutions 
allow the largest possible individual freedom. The constraints, thereby the insti-
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tutions, that characterize democracy are there to afford maximal individual free-
dom since less restrictions would mean that the individuals themselves would 
reduce their freedom through uncertainty. Hence, transaction costs would be 
high and capital accumulation and investment would be lower. 
However, the growth effect of democratic institutions again depends on the 
complex system of institutions and other relevant determinants. Just to say that 
democracy is the most efficient institutional system is too simple in reality. A 
country’s political system is determined by the prevalent deep determinants - 
that is, geography, institutions, and history. Therefore, the implementation of 
democracy might not be efficient if a country has a non-democratic history, is 
embedded in a non-democratic institutional environment concerning its 
neighboring countries, or if its formal and informal institutions do not support 
democracy. Hence, democratic institutions might not have positive growth ef-
fects if they are implemented in a non-democratic environment. This is the case 
because the implementation will fail. That is to say, the relationships and de-
pendencies with the prevalent institutions will not come about. Hence, the de-
mocratic institutions will exist in isolation and will have no effect at all. In this 
case, they will be abolished as soon as possible. However, the implemented de-
mocratic institutions can even have detrimental effects if they demolish parts of 
the existing institutional system. By contrast, it might also happen that the 
prevalent institutional system adjusts to democracy and supports it. However, 
this process will take time and come at some cost. 
Empirical evidence on democracy and its influence on growth is mixed. 
Rodrik (2007) finds that a participatory political system guarantees less volatile 
growth rates, better adjustment regarding external shocks, and less distributive 
inequality.  
Persson and Tabellini (2009) examined the economic effects of political re-
gimes. Via a panel estimation they analyzed data from up to 155 countries for up 
to 180 years. Accordingly, democracy supports economic growth via physical 
capital accumulation, which in turn fosters democracy. However, high per capita 
income does not encourage a transformation from autocracy to democracy. De-
mocratic capital, which is defined as a society’s civic values that support democ-
racy, plays a decisive role. Therefore, a virtuous circle can emerge, because de-
mocratic experience supports capital accumulation (also democratic capital) and 
thereby fosters democracy. 
Persson and Tabellini (2006) demonstrate that economic liberalization must 
precede political liberalization. That is to say, economic liberalization followed 
by democracy has a positive and significant effect on economic growth, whereas 
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democracy followed by economic liberalization has a negative and significant 
impact on the growth rate.24
3.3 Measuring institutions – a literature review 
It is not enough just to form a theory about the influence of institutions on eco-
nomic growth nowadays. In the past 20 years, the revival of growth theory has 
been based on a mixture of theoretical and empirical reasoning. The term ‘in-
formal institutions’ has been known since North’s work in 1990. Despite that, 
empirical measures of institutions were predicted from factors describing formal 
institutions, because determinants such as values, norms, morals, attitudes, hab-
its, and codes of conduct cannot be easily measured. However, since the incor-
poration of societal and cultural factors into economic theory has gained more 
acceptance research projects dealing with the issue have emerged. The WVS, for 
example, is an oft-used data source for indicating and measuring informal insti-
tutions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart et al., 2004). It is based on surveys 
and is separated into different parts dealing with topics such as “perceptions of 
life”, “politics and society”, and “religion and morals”, inter alia. This section 
provides a short overview regarding influential empirical work on informal and 
formal institutions. 
An influential work concerning culture and its impact on GDP per capita, 
which is based on the WVS data, is Tabellini (2005). The author examines data 
on European regions and identifies history as the decisive determinant of eco-
nomic growth. He argues that culture depicts the connection between history and 
current economic development. That is to say, historical accidents shape a soci-
ety’s values, attitudes, and morality. Values, attitudes, and morality determine 
peoples’ behaviors and, therefore, economic development on an aggregated 
level. Since culture is slow moving and only marginal change occurs from one 
generation to the next, values, attitudes, and morality are persistent determi-
nants, which indirectly connect history with current economic performance. 
Hence, Tabellini has had to identify a variable that reflects culture, is shaped by 
history, and influences current economic growth. Therefore, he created a cul-
tural indicator using the WVS data set. The indicator is meant to measure indi-
vidual values and beliefs and thereby comprises data on the level of trust and 
respect for other people as well as on the confidence and self-determination of 
the individuals taken from the WVS. Accordingly, trust, respect for other peo-
ple, and individual self-determination encourage economic development, 
whereas obedience, seen as a measure of the hierarchical structure of a society, 
                                                
24 Further references on democracy and the economy include Acemoglu & Robinson (2005) 
and Acemoglu et al. (2008). 
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is detrimental to economic growth. Tabellini uses the percentage of the popula-
tion being Protestant (La Porta et al., 1999) and, in another regression, literacy 
rates in 1880 and political institutions between the 17th and 19th centuries as 
instrumental variables for culture. All variables are explained in detail in the ap-
pendix of his paper. His argument is that the instrumental variables do not influ-
ence current economic outcome directly, but only through their effects on cul-
ture. Hence, European regions that were poorly educated at the end of the 19th 
century differ from better educated regions regarding their cultural characteris-
tics even today. The same is true for early political institutions, which affected 
cultural patterns and thereby current income. However, Tabellini detects that 
early political institutions have had a significant influence on economic per-
formance today. Culture, as explained by historical variables, is a decisive de-
terminant of regional economic development and performance in Tabellini’s 
work. Particular cultural traits – that is, trust and respect on the one hand and 
individual confidence and self-determination on the other hand – are found to be 
favorable to economic development. Furthermore, no primacy of formal institu-
tions over culture or informal institutions can be observed. On the contrary, both 
interact with each other and thereby shape the economic environment. Tabel-
lini’s accurate article became a guideline for further research since he explains 
his theoretical, empirical, and methodical proceedings in detail and is correct in 
his analysis. Furthermore, the cultural indicator created by Tabellini has been 
used in several studies on the impact of culture or informal institutions on eco-
nomic performance since then. 
Tabellini (2008a) also uses survey data from the WVS, which measure the 
level of trust and the level of respect for other people as proxy variables for the 
character of morality – that is, generalized vs. limited morality. Via a probit 
model he estimates the effect of the ancestors’ countries of origin on the current 
level of trust. Furthermore, Tabellini uses certain language properties (rules on 
the use of pronouns) as instrumental variables for values. He finds that there ex-
ists a correlation between grammatical rules and his proxies of morality. Then, 
Tabellini regresses the first-stage results on the measures of the quality of gov-
ernment and trade. However, he detects that generalized morality is correlated 
with better government indicators and vice versa. In addition, a connection be-
tween the prevalent character of morality and the specialization in certain sec-
tors can be found. 
Knowles and Weatherston (2006) rely on the WVS data set to measure the 
effect of informal institutions on economic growth. The authors refer to the deep 
determinants of growth literature and incorporate proxies for institutions, geog-
raphy, and openness as independent variables in their regression analysis on per 
capita income.25 They differentiate between formal and informal institutions, 
                                                
25 See also Rodrik (2000); and Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2004). 
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which are defined as conventions, norms, and codes of behavior. Informal insti-
tutions are measured using an indicator similar to Tabellini’s cultural index (Ta-
bellini, 2005). The authors add together Tabellini’s variables regarding the lev-
els of trust and respect (TRUST, RESPECT) and control over one’s own life 
(CONTROL) and call their indicator INFORM. Formal institutions are measured 
by the ‘average protection of risk against expropriation’ taken from the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide and ‘constraints on the executive’ from the Polity IV 
data set. Since formal and informal institutions are endogenous, Knowles and 
Weatherston run two and three stage least squares (2SLS and 3SLS) regressions 
using the proportion of the population speaking English, the proportion of the 
population speaking a major European language (Hall & Jones, 1999), state his-
tory (Bockstette, Chanda & Putternam, 2002), population density in 1500 (Glae-
ser et al., 2004; McEvedy & Jones, 1978), and the proportion of the population 
being Protestant (La Porta et al., 1999) as instrumental variables. Of course, they 
also use instruments for geography and openness; nevertheless, this is not our 
current topic. However, the authors find significant effects of formal and infor-
mal institutions and geography on per capita income. Accordingly, informal in-
stitutions are no less decisive for economic performance than formal institutions 
are. 
Williamson (2009) examines the relationship between different formal and 
informal institutional arrangements. Her aim is to detect whether institutions are 
transferrable and, therefore, whether the institutional structure of economically 
successful countries can be imposed on underdeveloped economies. She uses a 
modified indicator of Tabellini’s cultural index on a country level to measure 
informal institutions (Williamson & Kerekes, 2009; Williamson, 2009). 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) use the WVS data to measure the ef-
fect of culture on expectations and preferences and their impacts on economic 
outcomes. They estimate, for example, how far trust influences the probability 
of becoming an entrepreneur (data source: WVS and General Social Survey) and 
how cultural traits affect saving decisions and political preferences such as re-
distribution. They use religion (proportion of people of the different religious 
denominations in each country) and ethnicity (ancestors’ countries of origin) as 
instrumental variables for culture, since both measures are nearly time-invariant 
and thereby the causality issue can be faded out. Cultural traits are measured us-
ing questions on redistribution and the importance of thriftiness from the WVS. 
However, cultural traits are highly correlated with countries’ saving rates and 
governmental redistributive policies, whereas the endogenous cultural variables 
are highly correlated with data on religious denomination and ancestors’ origins. 
In an earlier work, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) analyzed the influ-
ence of religion on particular cultural traits measured via the WVS data. By us-
ing the answers to questions that ask for the frequency of attending religious 
services and whether the particular person was raised religiously, they studied 
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the degree and the type of a person’s religiosity. The religious variables are then 
regressed on the societal attitudes that are shown to be supportive of growth, 
such as attitudes towards trust, thriftiness, cooperation, the market economy, and 
so forth. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) estimate the effect of interpersonal trust and 
norms of civic cooperation on economic performance. Trust (TRUST) is meas-
ured via the corresponding answers to the question from the WVS (see appen-
dix). Norms of civic cooperation (CIVIC) are measured via a questions asking if 
certain statements can be justified, with the possible answers ranging from 1 
(never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). The statements are: “Claiming gov-
ernment benefits to which you are not entitled“; “Avoiding a fare on public 
transport”; “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance“; "Failing to report damage 
you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle”; and “Keeping money that you 
have found“. They find that TRUST and CIVIC are correlated with economic 
outcome, secure property rights, and contract rights. 
Fernández and Fogli (2007) study the effect of culture on economic per-
formance, using work and fertility rates of second-generation American women. 
Accordingly, culture influences peoples’ beliefs and preferences and thereby 
peoples’ attitudes concerning, for example, the role of women in society. There-
fore, conservative societies exhibit low female labor supply and high fertility 
rates, since the predominant opinion is that women should stay at home and 
raise children. On the contrary, modern societies feature high female labor sup-
ply and lower fertility rates. However, when individuals emigrate they take their 
culture with them, but live in a new institutional environment. If culture is partly 
responsible for the large variation in incomes per capita, it should be persistent. 
Hence, ancestors’ beliefs and preferences should equal the beliefs and prefer-
ences of their descendants. If culture adjusts immediately to the new environ-
ment, it is not a deep determinant of growth and cannot help explain per capita 
income differences. Therefore, Fernández and Fogli use data on labor and fertil-
ity of second-generation American women, who were born and raised in the 
United States. Hence, these women grew up within the same institutional envi-
ronment, but their cultural heritage differs according to their parents’ countries 
of origin. The authors use 1970 values of female labor force participation and 
total fertility rates as proxy variables for culture. They use female labor force 
participation and total fertility rates from the woman’s country of ancestry in 
1950 as instrumental variables for culture. They then run several regressions us-
ing different techniques and variables and find that past female labor participa-
tion of the ancestors’ countries of origin and past fertility rates of the ancestors’ 
countries of origin have a significant effect on female labor participation and 
fertility today. The results are robust to the inclusion of women’s education data, 
husbands’ education data, husbands’ incomes, data on institutions and markets, 
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and so on. Thus, culture decisively influences the proximate determinants of 
growth and thereby a country’s economic performance. 
Since empirical analyses on formal institutions are manifold, the following 
summary is incomplete. However, the most influential approaches concerning 
the dissertation thesis are depicted. Several approaches explain the economic 
success of Western industrialized countries with certain institutional prerequi-
sites that were prevalent in these countries. 
Hall and Jones (1999), for example, estimate the impact of social infrastruc-
ture on per capita income levels. They define social infrastructure as the institu-
tions and government policies that determine the economic environment within 
which individuals act (Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 84). To measure social infra-
structure, the authors create an indicator called “government antidiversion poli-
cies” (p. 97) from Political Risk Services data. Hence, they use data on law and 
order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, and government 
repudiation of contracts (p. 97f.). They further include a measure for a country’s 
openness to international trade. Since causality between social infrastructure
and output per worker (the dependent variable) can run both ways, Hall and 
Jones (1999) conduct an instrumental variable estimation. The fraction of the 
population speaking English or a major European language and distance from 
the equator are used as instrumental variables for social infrastructure. The 
choice of instruments is justified by the fact that these variables are said to 
measure the extent of Western European influence and are positively correlated 
with social infrastructure. Hence, countries that were influenced by Western 
Europe developed a growth promoting social infrastructure, whereas others did 
not. According to the authors, early Western European influence can be meas-
ured through the extent to which English, French, German, Portuguese, and 
Spanish are spoken as first languages today (Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 100). Con-
cerning distance from the equator, Hall and Jones argue that “Western Europe-
ans were more likely to migrate to and settle regions of the world that were 
sparsely populated at the start of the 15th century … such as the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina … [and] it appears that Western 
Europeans were more likely to settle in areas that were broadly similar in cli-
mate to Western Europe” (Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 101). They discover that so-
cial infrastructure, and thereby political and economical institutions, have a sig-
nificant effect on economic development. Accordingly, differences in capital 
accumulation, education, and productivity can be partly explained by differences 
in social infrastructure. 
Another approach that emphasizes Western European influence comes from 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). The authors trace current economic 
performance back to particular colonization strategies. That is to say, current 
economic performance depends on current formal institutions. The quality of 
current formal institutions, in turn, depends on the quality of early institutions. 
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Hence, a country that possessed growth-inhibiting formal institutions in the past 
is still characterized by growth-hindering formal institutions today. However, 
the quality of early institutions depended on the colonization strategy. Where 
Western Europeans settled, they replicated European institutions, emphasized 
property rights, and restricted governmental power. In areas where Europeans 
could not settle they set up extractive institutions that helped exploit resources 
but did not protect property or constrain the particular government. Whether 
Europeans were able to settle was dependent on their probability to survive. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use records of the 18th and 19th cen-
turies concerning the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors in former 
European colonies to create a measure of 'settler mortality', which is then used 
as an instrument for current institutions. They do so because settler mortality in 
the 17th and 19th centuries should have no effect on current economic perform-
ance other than through institutions. Data on the risk of expropriation (Political 
Risk Services) and on constraints on the executive (Polity IV) are used as prox-
ies for current institutions. However, the authors obtain high correlations be-
tween mortality rates and European settlements, between European settlements 
and early institutions,26 and between early and current institutions. 
Moreover, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) demonstrates a ‘rever-
sal of fortune’.27 It shows that former European colonies, which were relatively 
rich before colonization, are relatively poor today and vice versa. Data on ur-
banization and population density in 1500 is used as a proxy for economic pros-
perity before colonization. However, the authors find a negative relationship be-
tween economic prosperity in 1500 and economic prosperity today. Again, they 
trace the development back to colonization strategies and institutional quality. 
Accordingly, the colonizers preferred to settle in places that were sparsely popu-
lated and did not settle in regions that were densely populated. In regions where 
Europeans settled, they established secure property rights and restricted gov-
ernmental powers, whereas extractive institutions were introduced, or could re-
main, in populated places. Again, average protection against expropriation risk 
(Political Risk Services) and constraints on the executive (Polity III) are used as 
proxies for current formal institutions. In both papers, Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001, 2002) control for many additional variables on geography, pol-
icy, history, and ethnicity, and conduct several tests of robustness. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) examine the importance of property rights 
institutions and contracting institutions. Although contracting institutions corre-
spond to transactions between private individuals or parties, property rights in-
                                                
26 Early institutions are measured with data on constraints on the executive in 1900, an index 
of democracy in 1900, and constraints on the executive in the first year of independence (Pol-
ity III). 
27 See also Przeworski (2004). 
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stitutions regulate the relationships between private citizens and the political 
power. The authors detect that countries with secure property rights (measured 
with ‘constraints on the executive’ taken from the Polity IV data set) have sig-
nificantly higher per capita incomes. However, contracting institutions seem to 
affect financial intermediation, but have no impact on per capita income once 
property rights are controlled for. 
Further important empirical work on formal institutions comes from La 
Porta et al. (1999), who examine the influence of political and cultural institu-
tions on government performance (thereby on another institution). Governance 
performance is measured with several indices measuring government interven-
tion (property rights index, business regulation index, top marginal tax rate) and 
government efficiency (corruption, bureaucratic delays, tax compliance, average 
government wages). The independent variables are: ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization, which is used as a proxy for political institutions; legal origin, also used 
as a proxy for political institution; and the religious affiliation of the population, 
used as a proxy for cultural institutions.28 The authors discover a positive rela-
tionship between government performance and per capita income. However, 
their results “present clear evidence of systematic influence of historical circum-
stances, as captured by ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, legal origins, and religion, 
on government performance” (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 265).  
La Porta et al. (2004) focus on legal institutions. They regress measures of 
political and economic freedom (for example, a property rights index, a democ-
racy index, a political rights index) on proxies for judicial independence and 
constitutional review. They find that especially judicial independence is corre-
lated with economic and political freedom. 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) deal with the so-called deep deter-
minants of growth such as institutions, geography, and integration and with the 
question of which of these determinants is most important for the level of per 
capita income. They measure the quality of (formal) institutions with an indica-
tor from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (2002). The indicator is com-
posed of data “that capture the protection afforded to property rights as well as 
the strength of the rule of law” (Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004, p. 138). 
Integration is measured with the ratio of trade to GDP, and several measures of 
geography are used, for example, distance from the equator and an index of ma-
laria risk. Furthermore, the authors use several instrumental variables depending 
on the particular country sample. For example, they use the Frankel and Romer 
(1999) instrumental variable for integration and the settler mortality variable 
from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) as an instrument for institutions. 
Further instruments are the proportion of the population speaking English or a 
                                                
28 La Porta et al. (1999) focus on Catholic and Muslim religions “which have been recently 
singled out by Landes (1998) as hostile to institutional development” (p. 224). 
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Western European language. The dependent variable is GDP per capita. How-
ever, the results suggest that institutions matter the most for the level of per cap-
ita income. In any case, the authors stress the policy implications that could be 
deduced from the regression results and emphasize that they do not provide a 
general pattern to increase income in individual countries. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) critically regard current empirical approaches on insti-
tutions and growth. They emphasize the causality issue in institutional econom-
ics and bring human capital into play as a decisive determinant of growth. They 
demonstrate that democracies exhibit higher educational levels than autocracies, 
whereas causality cannot be determined. Hence, it is not clear whether democ-
racy supports education or whether education supports democracy. However, 
both factors probably influence each other and neither can be exposed as the 
starting point. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that constraints on political power 
might be overrated as a growth-relevant determinant. Accordingly, this is the 
case since human capital accumulation is decisive. Economic growth, it is ar-
gued, can also be obtained in autocratic regimes where the political power is un-
constrained. Furthermore, the measures for institutions are criticized, since many 
of them measure choices rather than constraints. Hence, no clear causality from 
institutions to growth can be determined. However, Glaeser et al. (2004) de-
scribe Polity IV’s ‘constraints on the executive’ as being the best available 
proxy for formal institutions. The authors emphasize instrumental variable esti-
mation as a valid method to solve the causality issue. They challenge the usage 
of ‘settler mortality’ by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) as instrument 
for institutions, stating that the fact that European settlers brought their human 
capital along is more decisive than the institutions they established. In addition, 
the exogeneity of the instrument is questioned. The authors run several regres-
sions including educational variables and demonstrate a significant relationship 
between education and income. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) are right in their critical reflection of empirical institu-
tional analysis. However, every economist engaged in the field should be aware 
of these issues otherwise reliable research is impossible. Nevertheless, research 
should be performed using the available data. It is in the hands of the particular 
researcher to conduct serious work and be aware of the respective methodical 
issues and data problems. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) also use a disputatious variable, namely the initial years 
of schooling, to measure human capital. First, reverse causality and correlation 
with the error term might also be an issue regarding years of schooling. Second, 
years of schooling might not be a valid measure for human capital. It excludes 
many important properties, such as the subjects taught, the quality of education, 
the human capital acquired outside schools or universities, and so on. Hence, it 
might be incomplete and not comparable across countries. Nevertheless, it is 
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often used as a proxy for human capital since it probably is the best available 
measure. 
However, Glaeser et al. (2004) are right that human capital should be stud-
ied in relation to institutions. Informal institutions such as beliefs, attitudes, 
worldviews, and so on are definitely correlated with educational standards and 
the subjects taught. For example, morality and beliefs might hinder the teaching 
of certain subjects such as evolutionary theory. Furthermore, traditional societies 
might despise the role of education and hinder parts of the population from be-
coming educated. For example, in many underdeveloped countries girls are not 
allowed to go to school or they go to school only to learn the essential basics 
such as how to read and write. Comparable attitudes still exist in some devel-
oped societies or in parts of nearly every society.
Furthermore, the level of education influences an individual’s general un-
derstanding of the state and society. Hence, highly educated societies tend to be 
democratic as shown by Glaeser et al. (2004). 
3.4 Endogeneity 
The empirical analysis of institutions is particularly hampered by the fact that 
“institutional quality is as endogenous to income levels as anything can possibly 
be” (Rodrik, 2007, p. 185). Institutions influence each other and are influenced 
by further factors. That is to say, institutions impact per capita income and vice 
versa. 
However, the transmission channels between informal institutions and eco-
nomic development have already been described using several examples. Par-
ticular norms and values lead to behavioral patterns that do not necessarily sup-
port growth. Take, for example, the exclusion of women, and thereby a large 
part of the potential workforce, from education and economic life in several so-
cieties. By contrast, it is conceivable that income levels also influence cultural 
features. In general, institutions are characterized by their stickiness. In any 
case, institutions can be changed, although this might take time, especially if 
informal institutions are involved. As usually only marginal progress is made 
from one generation to the next, a change in norms, values, and conventions can 
take decades or centuries (Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008; Roland, 2005). 
Institutions emerge to reduce transaction costs, uncertainty, and instability. 
Informal institutions guarantee a kind of non-material or social stability, 
whereas formal institutions secure material stability. As the standard of living 
increases, perspectives, priorities, and preferences are modified. That is to say, 
under the premise of material stability, the significance of non-material stability 
changes. People living at the margin of subsistence have other preferences and 
purposes in life than people receiving a regular salary and social security. Fur-
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thermore, higher material security alters the incentives for social affiliation. So-
cial patterns that exist for security reasons are no longer necessary when income 
increases. Modern societies, for example, are usually linked with the breakup of 
the traditional family structure. That is to say, family, clan, or tribal affiliation 
becomes less important. More emphasis is on the individual. The birth rate de-
creases since couples have fewer children. In traditional societies, several gen-
erations often live under one umbrella, whereas the spatial distance between 
family members widens with modernity. Other social relationships, such as 
friends or colleagues, become more important. Therefore, the societal structure 
of generalized morality can rather be observed in modern societies.29
An increase in the living standard is accompanied by a change in values, 
norms, beliefs, attitudes, and convictions, as well as morality, habits, and codes 
of conduct. Since material stability is warranted from a certain level of income, 
the role of beliefs that are responsible for immaterial stability changes. Hence, 
attitudes concerning the individual, the family, women’s work participation, mi-
norities, materialism, and so forth change. With the collapse of familial and 
tribal boundaries, trust and respect concerning other people widens. Further-
more, even if an individual loses a part of their property, they still might not fear 
for their existence. Consequently, priorities in life change. Furthermore, increas-
ing income levels are often accompanied by higher educational standards. 
Hence, people might be able to question traditional belief and value systems. 
They will realign informal institutions corresponding to their new preferences 
and needs. 
However, trust depends on common norms and values, and if these are al-
tered because of higher per capita incomes the level of trust will also adjust. We 
are trusting when we do not expect other people to cheat us, and thereby our ex-
pectations regarding other peoples’ behaviors are decisive. Peoples’ actions de-
pend on their beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, and so forth. Hence, if the 
common norms and values that are responsible for the level of trust change be-
cause of higher per capita income, trust will also adjust. An increase in the gen-
eral level of trust alters the societal structure and generalized morality is thereby 
observable in modern societies. 
The belief concerning control over one’s life also becomes modified. A 
higher living standard contributes to an attitude of self-determination and self-
confidence. People endued with property would rather that their wealth be traced 
back to their own decisions and activities. These individuals will also believe 
that they can shape their futures according to their own wishes. Of course, 
wealth can also be traced back to destiny such as, for example, in Weber’s thesis 
on the Protestant work ethic. In this thesis, people thought God’s chosen ones 
could be recognized by their material standards, and thereby people worked hard 
                                                
29 See, for example, Tabellini (2005, 2008a). 
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and accumulated capital to show to themselves and others that they belonged to 
the chosen ones. A high living standard will be preferred to be traced back to 
one’s own efforts, and thereby will encourage further endeavor. Even in We-
ber’s argument, people worked hard and invested to show that they are the cho-
sen ones, and thereby their wealth could be traced back to their own efforts, 
even though they believed it was because of God’s will. 
Since the modernization that accompanies an increase in per capita income 
is associated with higher educational standards, a more rational and logical view 
of life and the world in general emerges. As a consequence, even religious doc-
trines and cultural traditions might need to adjust. Religious doctrines and tradi-
tions as well as conservative attitudes, values, and beliefs might be reconsidered 
and reinterpreted using this new knowledge (Mokyr, 2002). 
Nevertheless, since humans are social beings, the non-material stability war-
ranted through informal institutions cannot be completely replaced or altered. 
Several beliefs, values, and norms maintain since individuals need certain in-
formal institutions for self-identification and self-orientation. Therefore, some 
informal institutions might not be changeable, independent of variations in liv-
ing standards. Since informal institutions are sticky, an alteration takes time and 
only marginal change might be observable from one generation to the next. In-
formal institutions do not only impact per capita income, they also are influ-
enced by higher living standards. 
However, an increase in per capita income not only alters informal institu-
tions but also formal institutions. We have already discussed this matter with 
reference to the model of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). Higher per 
capita incomes can shift the power allocation within a state. A group or person 
endued with appropriate resources is able to takeover de facto political power 
and, therefore, arrange institutions in a way that best fits their respective inter-
ests. If parts of the population gain de facto political power through economic 
growth and thereby higher per capita incomes, they will try to enforce their in-
terests. However, radical changes in political and economic institutions are diffi-
cult to explain without the introduction of informal institutions. An increase in 
per capita income alters informal institutions, which then impact formal institu-
tions. Hence, all three factors – per capita income and formal and informal insti-
tutions – influence each other. Thus, the basic settings of a society can jointly be 
responsible for the general concept of the state, the political system, and the 
structure of power. An autocratic government and a hierarchic system might en-
hance explicit cultural features such as disrespect, mistrust, resignation, a collec-
tive social structure and, hence, limited morality. In turn, these cultural charac-
teristics again support the preservation of an authoritarian government and, in 
general, of the prevalent formal institutional structure. An increasing per capita 
income improves the level of informal institutions in the sense that people be-
come more trustful and respectful, self-reliant, and confident. Apart from that, it 
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could be correlated to higher educational standards, which are associated with 
more open-minded and educated individuals. These people might have the abil-
ity to question and criticize the predominant institutions, both formal and infor-
mal, and alter them. Therefore, in general, some level of physical and human 
capital is necessary to be able to understand the importance of a growth-
promoting institutional framework. 
Owing to their higher per capita incomes, individuals are able to enforce the 
institutions that fit their interests. Hence, they will question the current system 
and further enforce property rights and political participation. A democratic state 
might support growth-supporting informal institutions. Independent citizens who 
can freely participate in political, economic, and social processes might realize a 
higher level of trust, self-determination, and self-confidence. 
The interplay between informal and formal institutions and the effect on 
economic growth is also mentioned by Persson and Tabellini (2008). They name 
the cultural and societal features that support democracy ‘democratic capital’. 
Accordingly, democracy must be supported by the democratic attitudes and 
convictions of the citizens. Societies with no democratic tradition possess no 
accordant attitudes and are not persuaded by the ideas of democracy. Hence, 
democratic capital emerges through democratic experience. The longer democ-
racy exists in a country, the stronger its democratic capital will be. That is to 
say, with the experience of democracy, people become more and more per-
suaded of its ideas and are prepared to plead and even fight for the preservation 
of democracy. Hence, certain attitudes and values might be more supportive of a 
political system than others, but a political system can also influence attitudes 
and values. 
3.5 Deep determinants of growth 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of institutions on economic devel-
opment. However, institutions are added to the explanatory variables because 
the variables that have been obtained in growth models so far have not helped 
explain the divergent processes of income levels and growth rates around the 
globe. That is to say, mainstream growth theory does not explain why the con-
ventional factors of production – factor accumulation and technology – differ 
between countries. Or, more precisely, why countries are not able to use these 
conventional factors of production in a way that optimizes their growth per-
formances. Factor accumulation and technology are called the proximate deter-
minants of growth or the proximate causes of growth (Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004; Acemoglu, 2009, pp. 109–143). Hence, it must be 
examined which factors determine the proximate determinants of growth. If we 
know which variables determine factor accumulation and technology, we know 
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why the proximate determinants differ and, eventually, we can seize the problem 
by the roots and help countries find a way out of the underdevelopment trap. 
The theory of the deep determinants of growth states that the proximate de-
terminants are endogenous and are determined by the deep determinants of 
growth. The deep determinants depict the pre-existing environment within 
which a country develops. Hence, the deep determinants are the basic condi-
tions, which, at least for a certain period of time, must be taken as given. They 
are the underlying factors that shape a country’s social, political, and economic 
development. 
The deep determinants of growth are institutions, geography, and openness 
(Knowles & Weatherston 2006; Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 
2004). Acemoglu (2009, pp. 109–143) speaks about the "fundamental causes of 
growth" instead of deep determinants. He defines these fundamental causes as 
luck or multiple equilibria, geography, culture, and institutions.  
Since institutions are differentiated into informal and formal institutions, our 
analysis incorporates the fundamental causes of growth, which Acemoglu calls 
‘institutions’ and ‘culture’. 
Of course, geography is a further determinant that affects factor accumula-
tion and productivity. It makes a difference whether a country has access to the 
seaside and is located in a temperate climate zone, or whether it is embedded in 
inaccessible terrain and has to cope with climatic extremes such as droughts and 
heat or severe rainfall and cold. Moreover, its geographical position determines 
a country’s resource endowment and is responsible for the disease environment. 
However, the following analysis also includes openness as a deep determi-
nant, since we follow the approach of Knowles and Weatherston (2006) and 
Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2004). The degree of a country’s openness to 
international trade mainly depends on its geographical position, its institutions, 
and its history. Nevertheless, openness is defined as a deep determinant since we 
want to examine the level of current per capita income. Hence, we wish to find 
the underlying factors that determine the current proximate determinants. The 
level of openness influences factor accumulation and technology. Therefore, it 
will be included as a deep determinant of growth. However, openness is com-
pletely endogenous. It entirely depends on the remaining deep determinants, the 
proximate determinants, and per capita income (Dollar & Kraay, 2004). 
Not only openness but also institutions and geography are at least partly en-
dogenous.30 Therefore, Figure 3.1 demonstrates the connections between the 
                                                
30 Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) assume geography to be the only clear exogenous 
deep determinant of growth. From a theoretical point of view, this assumption is right since a 
country’s geographical position, and thereby its environment, cannot be influenced by other 
factors. However, concerning the empirical analysis, geography is often pooled with ecology. 
Hence, ecological factors are described as geographical factors. This might not be wrong, 
since a country’s ecological conditions depend on its geographical position. This, for exam-
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proximate and the deep determinants of growth and per capita income. The 
proximate determinants are endogenous, that is to say, an analysis that only in-
corporates the proximate determinants of growth cannot express development 
processes since it does not consider the effects of the deep determinants and the 
reverse causality matters. A theoretical analysis that does not include the deep 
determinants of growth will not reproduce a real picture and thereby cannot ex-
amine real operations, since the assumed prerequisites are wrong. An empirical 
analysis that excludes the deep determinants will eventually suffer from an omit-
ted variable bias. However, the empirical work knows methods to deals with this 
issue.31
Figure 3.1: deep determinants of growth. Source: own illustration. 
3.6 Methodical issues
The endogeneity and causality issues in institutional analysis depict a particular 
challenge for empirical work. Typically, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion cannot be run because of a possible omitted variable bias and reverse cau-
sality. Institutions, as they are defined in this work, can be influenced by several 
factors, but we are not able to detect every determinant that might affect institu-
                                                                                                                                                        
ple, is true regarding a country’s disease burden. Growth regressions often use the risk of con-
tracting malaria in a country as a proxy variable for geography. However, malaria risk is 
clearly endogenous. A higher per capita income decreases the risk of a malaria infection, 
since it is accompanied with improved health care and widespread vaccination. Therefore, 
geography is defined as partly endogenous. However, other geographical proxy variables are 
clearly exogenous. 
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tional quality. Hence, it is unavoidable that certain variables correlated with in-
stitutions are incorporated into the error term. That is, the coefficients are biased 
because of omitted variables.  
The aim of the work is to estimate the effect of institutions on per capita in-
come. As stated above, this effect is not unidirectional. Formal and informal in-
stitutions influence each other and income, which again has an impact on both 
kinds of institutions. Hence, the institutional coefficient of an OLS regression 
would not only estimate the unidirectional effect of, for example, informal insti-
tutions on income but also the feedback reaction from income to informal insti-
tutions. 
However, the problem of endogeneity in growth empirics is commonly 
solved through instrumental variable estimation, that is, an instrumental variable 
must be found for each of the endogenous regressors. The detection of an ade-
quate instrument can become tricky. An instrumental variable must possess two 
features: it has to be correlated with the appropriate endogenous variable and it 
must be uncorrelated with the disturbance. While the former can be tested, the 
fulfillment of the second feature, and thereby the relevance and accuracy of the 
regression result, relies on the researcher's intuition. Because causality is the 
main issue in the deep determinants analysis, a channel that transmits the effect 
of the particular endogenous variable in the right direction – and thereby from 
institutions to income and not vice versa – must be determined. It must be en-
sured that the instrumental variable does not influence the dependent variable 
directly, but only through its effect on the endogenous variable. If this require-
ment is fulfilled, the causality issue is solved and the estimated coefficient 
measures the effect of institutions on income. 
3.6.1 Two stage least squares 
The problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causality can be solved via an 
instrumental variable estimation. 
  
Figure 3.2: endogeneity and reverse causality. Source: own illustration. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, endogeneity exists if an independent variable 
x1 is correlated with an omitted variable included in the error term. Furthermore, 
the issue of reverse causality occurs if x1 not only influences y, but if y also has 
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 n ny x x x ... x= β + β + β + β + + β + ε
Causality Endogeneity
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a reverse impact on x1. In the case of a single endogenous regressor we want to 
estimate the following equation: 
  εβββμββ ++++++= nn xxxy ...332210     (3.1) 
with: y: dependent variable   
: endogenous variable 
 xi: exogenous variables   : instrumental variable 
: error term. 
Hence, 
 is assumed to be endogenous and influenced by y. If an OLS re-
gression is run, 1β  and eventually the other coefficients would be biased. In addi-
tion, 1β  would measure the bilateral effect between 
 and y instead of the unidi-
rectional effect going from 
 to y. Hence, to solve the problem of omitted vari-
able bias and reverse causality, an instrumental variable for 
 must be found. 
However, the instrument  must satisfy two premises: 
1) to avoid omitted variable bias, it must not be correlated with the error 
term: 
( ) 0, =ερiCov . 
However, this precondition deters  from being an omitted variable in-
cluded in the error term of the first-stage regression . Furthermore, the 
assumption declares that no direct correlation between y and  is al-
lowed, thereby  
    ( ) 0, =iyCov ρ . 
Therefore, the causality issue is solved since the direction of the effect 
goes from  to 
 to y and not vice versa. 
2) The instrumental variable must be correlated with the relevant endoge-
nous variable: 
( ) 0, ≠μρiCov . 
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Applying the 2SLS method, two equations are estimated: 
Second-stage regression:  εβββμββ ++++++= nn xxxy ...ˆ 332210 ,  (3.2) 
First-stage regression:  υθθθρθθμ ++++++= nn xxx ...3322110 ,  (3.3) 
     nn xxx θθθρθθμ ˆ...ˆˆˆˆˆ 3322110 +++++= .  (3.4) 
Hence, first a regression on 
 is run, including the instrumental variable 1
and all exogenous independent variables xi. This regression results in the fitted 
value μ̂ . Then, μ̂  is used to estimate the coefficient of interest 1. Since 1 is not 
correlated with  the problem of omitted variable bias is solved. However, 1 is 
not correlated with y either – that is, there is no direct effect between the instru-
ment and the dependent variable. Only an indirect effect between 1 and y exists 
because 1 influences μ̂ , which is correlated with y. Hence, the transmission 
channel is unidirectional from 1 to μ̂  to y. Therefore, 1 measures the effect of 
μ̂  on y and not vice versa. 
In the case of multiple endogenous regressors, at least one instrumental vari-
able for each endogenous variable is needed. If fewer instruments than endoge-
nous variables are available, the equation is underidentified and the regression 
cannot be run. However, if the number of instruments equates the number of en-
dogenous variables, the equation is said to be exactly identified and the regres-
sion can be run. The same holds if the number of instruments exceeds the quan-
tity of endogenous regressors – that is, if the equation is overidentified. 
With multiple endogenous regressors 
i, one first-stage regression for each 
endogenous variable must be run: 
Second-stage regression: 
εβββμβμβμββ +++++++++= +++ mmnnnnn xxxy ...ˆ...ˆˆ 221122110  (3.5) 
First-stage regressions and fitted values: 
12211221101 ...... υθθθρθρθρθθμ +++++++++= +++ mmnnnnn xxx  (3.6) 
mmnnnnn xxx +++ ++++++++= θθθρθρθρθθμ ˆ...ˆˆˆ...ˆˆˆˆ 2211221101  (3.7) 
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22211221102 ...... υθθθρθρθρθθμ +++++++++= +++ mmnnnnn xxx  (3.8) 
mmnnnnn xxx +++ ++++++++= θθθρθρθρθθμ ˆ...ˆˆˆ...ˆˆˆˆ 2211221102  (3.9) 
nmmnnnnnn xxx υθθθρθρθρθθμ +++++++++= +++ ...... 221122110  (3.10) 
mmnnnnnn xxx +++ ++++++++= θθθρθρθρθθμ ˆ...ˆˆˆ...ˆˆˆˆ 221122110  (3.11) 
However, instrumental variable estimation has its disadvantages, especially 
regarding the issues of instrument validity and instrument weakness. The valid-
ity of an instrumental variable depends on its correlation with the error term of 
the first-stage regression  and, therefore, the compliance with assumption one. 
If the instrument is correlated with , it is not valid and an instrumental variable 
estimation cannot be conducted. The weakness of an instrumental variable is 
determined by its correlation with the endogenous variable 
i. If 
 and  are only 
sparsely correlated, the instrument is said to be weak. 
An instrumental variable estimator (j) is consistent if assumptions one and 
two hold. If either condition fails, the instrumental variable estimator is incon-
sistent. However, even if the independent variable 
i is endogenous so that in-
strumental variable estimation is necessary, the estimator j is never unbiased. 
Thus, especially in small samples, the bias in the instrumental variable estimator 
can be substantial. 
If assumption one fails and the instrument  and the error term  are sparsely 
correlated, this can lead to a large asymptotic bias of the instrumental variable 
estimator. However, weak instruments cause large standard errors of the instru-
mental variable estimator and large asymptotic variances. 
Therefore, 2SLS should only be run if the relevant independent variable is 
clearly endogenous. In addition, a large sample size and instruments that are 
strongly correlated with the relevant endogenous variable provide for more pre-
cise estimates.32
3.7 Religion as an instrumental variable for 
institutions 
In recent years, several studies have dealt with the impact of religion on eco-
nomic development.33 However, the idea that religion might influence economic 
growth is not new. As already exemplified, Weber discussed the issue in 
                                                
32 The section on instrumental variable estimation is based on the following literature: 
Wooldridge (2003); Stock & Watson (2003); Baum (2006); Baum, Schaffer & Stillman 
(2003); Murray (2006). 
33 See, for example, Barro & McCleary (2003); De Jong (2008); Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 
(2003); Norris & Inglehart (2004); Platteau (2008); Tripp (2006). 
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1904/05 and established a connection between religious doctrines, human be-
havior, and economic growth. Weber emphasized the impact religion has on in-
stitutions respectively behavior. Hence, religious doctrines determine peoples’ 
behaviors and thereby economic development. In Weber’s case, the belief that a 
certain level of material wealth indicates the chosen ones and that idleness is a 
sin (as is luxury) led to an ethic of hard work and thereby capital accumulation 
and growth. Therefore, according to Weber, Protestants were economically more 
successful than Catholics. However, Weber’s approach is not without contro-
versy. Using the data of 452 counties of 19th century Prussia, Becker and 
Wößmann (2009) demonstrate that Weber was right about Protestantism leading 
to higher economic prosperity. However, the authors trace the Protestant eco-
nomic success back to the high literacy rates of Protestants. Hence, to read the 
Bible Protestants had to become literate, which, according to human capital 
theories, fosters economic growth. The decisive transmission channel might not 
be a particular work ethic, but the accumulation of human capital through liter-
acy. Using ‘distance to Wittenberg’ as an instrument for the share of Protestants 
in a county in 19th-century Prussia, Becker and Wößmann run instrumental 
variables regressions to estimate the effect of Protestantism on literacy. Apply-
ing a bounding analysis, they show that Protestantism has no effect on economic 
prosperity independent of its effect on literacy. However, the authors state that 
the human capital theory might be complementary to explanations emphasizing 
belief-based work effort and thrift. Nevertheless, they find the key channel of 
Protestant economic success to be literacy.34
Landes (1998), for example, emphasizes the positive growth effect of Prot-
estantism and describes Catholicism and Islam as less supportive or even detri-
mental to growth. However, Noland (2003) empirically examined the connec-
tion between culture, religion, and economic performance and found no similar 
connection between religious affiliation in general and economic growth. Al-
though approving the correlation between religion and culture, Noland detects 
no significant relation between culture and economic performance. However, 
Noland finds a connection between religion and economic performance, al-
though no robust pattern concerning certain religious affiliations and growth is 
observable. In any case, Noland’s results do not affirm a negative effect of Islam 
on economic development. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) examine the 
effect religion has on economic attitudes. The authors model the impact of relig-
ion on informal institutions, since religious doctrines work through morals and 
attitudes. Hence, religion shapes informal institutions, which determine behav-
ior, which influences economic performance on an aggregated level. However, 
                                                
34 Ekelund, Hébert & Tollison (2002) and Blum & Dudley (2001) also deal with the issue of 
the Protestant economic success by applying different approaches that partly support and 
partly refute Weber’s thesis. 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
94
they are not only interested in religious affiliation but in the intensity of beliefs 
and whether the consulted person was brought up religiously. They use the 
WVS to measure the particular kind of religiosity. The religious variables are 
regressed on peoples’ attitudes concerning cooperation, the government, work-
ing women, legal rules, thriftiness, and the market economy. They find that reli-
gious beliefs are generally correlated with growth-supporting attitudes. Accord-
ingly, Christian religions are associated with attitudes that are more conducive to 
growth than others, whereas Muslims’ attitudes are the most anti-market. Barro 
and McCleary (2003) studied the effect of church attendance and religious be-
liefs on economic outcome. However, they found that religious beliefs in gen-
eral support growth. Nevertheless, church attendance seems to be less conducive 
to the growth rate, although the authors point out that the net effect has to be 
considered since church attendance might foster beliefs that are supportive of 
growth. They justify their results on the consideration that certain religious be-
liefs encourage specific individual behavior that supports growth. La Porta et al. 
(1997) examine the impact of trust on economic performance using the WVS 
data. However, they follow Putnam (1993) and argue that hierarchical religions 
discourage the formation of trust. To measure the impact of ‘hierarchical relig-
ion’ they take the percentage of the population being Catholic, Eastern Ortho-
dox, and Muslim. The indicator is negatively correlated with trust. Running fur-
ther regressions they demonstrate that “countries with more dominant hierarchi-
cal religions have less efficient judiciaries, greater corruption, lower-quality bu-
reaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, lower rates of participation in civic ac-
tivities and professional associations, a lower level of importance of large firms 
in the economy, inferior infrastructures, and higher inflation” (p. 336f.). How-
ever, as is the case with every empirical study, general statements must be made 
consciously, since empirical results always depend on the particular data and 
methods applied. Noland (2003), for example, uses other data to measure relig-
ion and culture than Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) do, whereas Barro and 
McCleary (2003) again use other data sets on religion. Even though the data are 
used as a proxy for religion and culture, far-ranging differences in the results can 
be traced back to varying data sets. Therefore, the empirical results should be 
interpreted according to the particular data used, the regression method applied, 
and the corresponding theoretical foundation. Hence, it is possible that studies 
that seem to examine the same issue –for example, religion and economic per-
formance – arrive at different conclusions. However, De Jong (2008) gives an 
overview concerning existing work on religion and economic performance. He 
critically reveals quantitative and qualitative approaches dealing with the topic 
and examines values, institutions, and governance as transmission channels. He 
also states that economic development might influence religiosity. He finds that 
the results of the studies considered differ concerning the way religion is meas-
ured, that no particular religion can be found to be more pro-growth than an-
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other, and that causality between values and economic performance can go both 
ways. 
However, if religion does affect economic outcome, we would like to know 
whether religions exist that are more conducive to growth and development than 
others. If this was the case, it would explain parts of the differing development 
patterns around the world. Discussing religion as a growth-relevant determinant 
requires clear definitions of the main terms and transmission channels. It is im-
portant to define what is meant by religion since different understandings exist. 
It must be clarified whether one is examining the formal writings of the holy 
texts such as the Bible, Quran, or Torah, how religion is practiced, or even if the 
practices correspond to the religious texts. Furthermore, if only the formal holy 
texts or religious doctrines are being analyzed which are specified by a particu-
lar person and which might not correspond to the formal writings. Hence, if a 
political or religious leader exploits religion to force his interests, is this still 
called ‘religion’? Do we still talk about a religion, when a certain interpretation 
is meant that might deviate from the original statements? The impact on individ-
ual behavior and thereby institutions is the same, no matter whether the indi-
viduals believe in a formal text or in the words of a preacher. However, as soon 
as the definition of religion is detached from a text, it is open to different inter-
pretations. When examining religion from an institutional view, it is important 
to differentiate between what people believe and what they do. Hence, describ-
ing oneself as an adherent of a certain religion has no impact on institutions. The 
impact emerges when the person is persuaded of the religious doctrines and 
thereby acts according to the religious morals. 
However, finding an exact definition of religion is not easy. Iannaccone 
(1998), for example, defines religion as: “any shared set of beliefs, activities, 
and institutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces” (p. 1466). Here, re-
ligion is defined as basic divine, spiritual, or supernatural doctrines and the ac-
cording statements concerning morals and codes of conduct. However, religion 
is not equal to behavior. Hence, there must be a differentiation between the basic 
religious doctrines, which we call religion, no matter if they are written down or 
if they are common sense, and the convictions and the behavior with which hu-
mans implement religion. The statements of formal religious texts are not exam-
ined here, since this is the content of religious economics (Iannaccone, 1998, p. 
1466). The emphasis is on whether and how people implement religious doc-
trines. Hence, the interpretations of religious texts or doctrines are incorporated 
that might be exploited by certain interest groups or political and religious lead-
ers, as long as a connection to basic religious beliefs is observable. This might 
be a disputatious point. Anyway, since we are interested in the implementation 
of beliefs through behavior, it does not make sense to drop certain interpreta-
tions. We do not want to examine the motivation of a certain preacher, religious 
or political leader, or interest group. We are solely interested in the behavioral 
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implementation of beliefs. Hence, the underlying motivation of the person or the 
group that passes on the beliefs is not essential. Beliefs become relevant as soon 
as people implement them. Since people believe in the particular interpretation 
and implement the morals and the corresponding behavior, it does not matter 
whether the statements can be traced back to an originally holy text or whether 
they are made by a particular person. However, statements should be attributable 
to a certain religion and individualistic spirituality and metaphysical thought are 
excluded, although the borders might be woolly. Therefore, the current defini-
tion of religion is a subjective matter and might be wrong from a religious stud-
ies point of view. However, this is why the current understanding of religion 
should be clearly defined. 
However, the causality between religion and economic development seems 
clear when religion is defined as the formal writings of a holy text, since devel-
opment or income cannot alter what has been written down. Nevertheless, if re-
ligion is defined as what people believe and how they act, then it might be influ-
enced by higher incomes and thereby better living standards. Hence, the analysis 
of religion and economic development is depicted by the possibility of reverse 
causality. Religion might not only influence the growth rate, but religious beliefs 
might also be influenced by economic development. A higher per capita income 
changes perspectives and priorities in life. Coupled with education, it generates 
a more open-minded society, which reflects religious doctrines more critically. 
Hence, religious doctrines might become reinterpreted by individuals. Accord-
ingly, what changes when income increases are not the basic religious doctrines 
per se, but peoples’ preferences and priorities and, therefore, peoples’ values, 
beliefs, and morals. Hence, basic religious statements are unchanged, but institu-
tions change. Peoples’ values, beliefs, and morals alter when living standards 
improve. The religious origin remains unchanged but becomes reinterpreted. In 
any case, besides asking what determines institutions and concluding that relig-
ion plays a crucial role, we could also ask how religion emerges. Answering this 
question, we are again confronted with reverse causality since religions might be 
the result of cultural value patterns and cultural differences (Hofstede, 1997). 
The present hypothesis is that religion, defined as basic divine, spiritual, or 
supernatural doctrines, has no impact on economic outcome. Hence, we follow 
Weber (1904/05), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003), and Barro and 
McCleary (2003) and interpose the level of institutions between religion and 
economic performance. That is to say, we assume religion influences institutions 
but not, directly, economic performance.35 Therefore, religious doctrines influ-
                                                
35 Nevertheless, the achievements of Becker & Wößmann (2009) are considered as well. 
However, their results refer to the special case of the Protestant economic success and We-
ber’s thesis of the Protestant work ethic. Furthermore, their findings do not mean that religion 
has generally no impact on behavior and economic prosperity. 
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ence peoples’ behaviors provided the individuals are persuaded of the religion – 
that is, they believe. Then, people will behave according to the religious morals 
and their behaviors will influence economic outcome. 
Religion defined as basic spiritual, divine, and supernatural doctrines, which 
identify and determine the religion, cannot be altered. Therefore, religion is 
taken as exogenous source of variation. To differentiate between religion and 
changeable religious beliefs religion is measured with data on the proportion of 
the population belonging to a certain religion. Hence, we do not use survey data 
that question whether people think they are religious. Religious affiliation data 
do not measure an individual’s or a society’s level of religiosity. We want to 
measure the underlying influence of religious doctrines. That is to say, we in-
corporate people who do not believe in God and do not attend religious services, 
but who, nevertheless, describe themselves as Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, 
and so on. These people belong to a religious group because of tradition, culture, 
or social pressure, or because it is ‘usual’, but not because they are convinced by 
the religious content. Hence, they implement religious norms and morals, but no 
longer connect their own behavior, attitudes, habits, and beliefs to religion. 
An individual might describe themselves as not religious but belong to a part 
of the population belonging to a certain religion. We are interested in the deeper 
social and behavioral effects religion has on society. Hence, people who do not 
describe themselves as being religious (and all others) still behave according to 
particular religious morals because these morals have become a part of the soci-
ety’s culture. One could argue that all religions can be traced back to similar ba-
sic statements and, therefore, that all religions influence society in the same 
way. However, we will see if this is true when we regress religious affiliation on 
institutions.  
The analysis so far demonstrates that the incorporation of religion into eco-
nomics is a critical subject. However, the intention of the work at hand is not to 
emphasize the issue of religion and economics. Religion is going to be intro-
duced as an exogenous factor of variation necessary for the instrumental vari-
able estimation. The main intention of the current section is to justify the use of 
religious affiliation variables as instruments to introduce the topic of religion 
and economic development and to depict the approach’s critical points. Never-
theless, we do not want to interfere with the topic any further. For the analysis at 
hand, religion is defined as basic divine, spiritual, and supernatural doctrines 
that identify a religion and determine human beliefs, values, morals, codes of 
conduct, and thereby human behavior. However, the divine, spiritual, and super-
natural doctrines might be determined by culture. Since this has long happened, 
there is no connection to current culture aside from religion. Furthermore, even 
if religion is influenced by modern thought, its basic ideas such as its main doc-
trines and statements do not change. Hence, the basic religious statements are 
exogenous. 
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The current study is aware that the theoretical and empirical analysis of re-
ligion, institutions, and economic performance is mixed and no clear pattern is 
observable. Hence, the results of the forthcoming regression analysis and theo-
retical argumentation do not articulate general statements. All results, empirical 
and theoretical, must be considered under the particular assumptions and defini-
tions made. As soon as we move beyond our definitions of religion and institu-
tions, and as soon as we modify or extend the theoretical argumentation, the re-
sults might become indefensible. Hence, one should not generalize the forth-
coming results, but consider them regarding the particular assumptions and defi-
nitions applied. It is important not to read more into the results than there is and 
not to misinterpret them. 
Informal institutions are, inter alia, defined as a society’s value system, be-
liefs, morals, and norms. In general, institutions are constraints humans impose 
on themselves to regulate their social interactions. Of course, this also applies to 
informal institutions. However, an interesting question is why particular infor-
mal institutions are implemented. That is to say, what determines the implemen-
tation of certain informal institutions? How do values, beliefs, norms, and mor-
als emerge, and why do they differ between societies? Hence, which strategy do 
people apply when they place constraints on themselves? How do they justify 
the particular rules and constraints? 
The origins of most of our values, beliefs, morals, and norms can be as-
cribed to religion and, therefore, depend on which religion has been, and still is, 
dominant in a particular region. Why, for example, do we speak of the Christian 
West or the Islamic countries? Why do we use religious terms to describe a 
group of countries or a region? The differences between these countries must 
exist in obvious areas such as social, cultural, or political life since it must affect 
us in some manner otherwise we would not care about it. Moreover, the differ-
ence must be attributed to religion since in other respects we would not use reli-
gious terms to describe the countries. Thus, religion seems to matter, and it mat-
ters so much that we classify countries according to their religious affiliations. 
In speaking of Christian, Islamic, or Buddhist countries, for example, we explic-
itly want to highlight their religious affiliations. Hence, we associate the preva-
lent religion with obvious features that differ between the countries. This can 
constitute particular conventions, values, morals, habits, attitudes, or behavior, 
as well as societal, political, legal, and economic differences. Thus, we are talk-
ing about different institutions. That is to say, religion has an impact on institu-
tions. Since institutions influence economic development, religion has an indi-
rect effect on the economy. 
Concerning the analysis at hand, it is assumed that the religious environment 
affects institutions, which then influence per capita income. Religion cannot di-
rectly be correlated with income if we want to use it as an instrumental variable. 
However, applying our definition of religion as basic divine, spiritual, or super-
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natural doctrines, just being religious does not affect economic outcome. Relig-
ion cannot achieve anything as long as it is not implemented in peoples’ atti-
tudes, habits, and behaviors as well as in social, hierarchical, and political struc-
tures. Only then is an indirect influence on income possible. Over decades and 
centuries, religious doctrines have become a part of the prevalent culture. Al-
though individuals, acting according to particular cultural norms and values, 
might no longer connect these features to religion, tracing the cultural properties 
back to their origins shows that religion is the starting point. 
“The predominant religious cultural traditions in any society, such as the 
legacy of Protestantism and Catholicism in Western Europe, are expected to 
leave a distinct imprint upon the contemporary moral, beliefs and social attitudes 
that are widespread among the public in these nations” (Norris & Inglehart, 
2004, p. 20). Even if religiosity declines, the prevalent religion has left its traces 
in culture. Hence, certain habits, morals, and norms can be attributed to religion, 
although the particular individual, who acts according to the rules, might not de-
scribe themselves as being religious. 
Again, incentives play a role. Humans implement religious guidelines be-
cause they act from conviction, they fear punishment, or both; hence, their be-
havior corresponds to religious morality. Of course, this incorporates their eco-
nomic behavior and, thus, being religious does not influence economic growth. 
Religious beliefs do not influence economic development until they become 
converted into norms, values, habits, and codes of conduct. Thus, just being 
Protestant does not affect economic development, because Protestantism must 
operate through its effect on human behavior, that is, through informal institu-
tions. 
However, the fact that formal and informal institutions are closely related to 
each other has led to the consideration that both kinds of institutions can be 
traced back to the same instrumental variable approach. Religious doctrines de-
termine the general understanding of the state, the connection between secular 
and divine powers, and the role of the individual. Even modern states and de-
mocracies still implement religious statements in their constitutions. Hence, re-
ligious origins can also determine formal institutions. Certain religious beliefs 
can encourage property rights and, therefore, constraints on the executive, 
whereas others might inhibit it. The relationship between religion and formal 
institutions can best be seen in theocratic states, where religion claims terrestrial 
and religious power. But even in countries where state and religious power are 
separate, a basic attitude arising out of the religious background is prevalent. 
Originally, religious beliefs constituted worldviews and ideologies such as po-
litical ideologies, the general understanding of the state, and the societal system 
per se. Even if this is not the case and no general political ideology is prevalent 
in a society, certain cultural traits originating in religion support a particular po-
litical system through acquiescence and obedience. 
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Thus, using religious affiliation as an instrumental variable for formal insti-
tutions, we must assume that religion does not influence per capita income di-
rectly but only through institutions. As already elucidated, this is the case. Relig-
ion cannot achieve anything as long as it is not implemented in peoples’ atti-

















Figure 3.3: religious affiliation and informal 


























Figure 3.4: religious affiliation and formal 
institutions. Source: own illustra-
tion. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the relationship between the religious affiliation 
of the population and institutions. A high Protestant proportion of the population 
is accompanied by high levels of inform4, that is, growth-supporting informal 
institutions.36 By contrast, countries with a high proportion of Muslim citizens 
realize a minor level of inform4, and thereby have growth-inhibiting informal 
institutions. However, Figure 3.4 demonstrates the relationship between reli-
gious affiliation and the Freedom House property rights index 2000, which is 
scaled from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating unprotected and 100 completely pro-
tected property rights. A high Protestant proportion of the population is attended 
by a strong protection of property rights, whereas a high Muslim proportion of 
the population shows fewer protected property rights.37 However, these Protes-
tant and Muslim affiliations of the population are used as instrumental variables 
for informal and formal institutions, respectively. This is the case because we 
are looking preferably for unequal instruments. Since the current hypothesis is 
close to that of Weber on an argumentative level, Protestant affiliation is used to 
illustrate informal institutions, because Protestantism is said to alter norms and 
                                                
36 The indicator inform4 is explained in more detail in part 3.8.1 of the current work. 
37 In Figures 7 and 8, countries with a Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim proportion of the 
population greater than 50 percent are included. 
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values in favor of economic growth. From a Western point of view, the differ-
ences in formal institutions that can be traced back to religion become particu-
larly obvious in Islamic countries. Consider, for example, the political and legal 
systems, which often cannot be described as democratic or constitutional com-
pared with Western standards. Hence, to note these differences, the Muslim af-
filiation of the population is used to illustrate formal institutions, that is, Protes-
tant affiliation is assumed to be supportive of economic growth, whereas Mus-
lim affiliation is said to be growth inhibiting (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2003; 
La Porta et al., 1999; Landes, 1998). More precisely, Protestantism and Islam 
are assumed to have different impacts on institutional development, and particu-
lar institutions then influence the growth rate. These statements will be tested 
within the empirical analysis. Of course, other religions should be considered, 
too. Thus, regressions including the Catholic affiliation of the population were 
run, although the intuitional justification is less clear, as are the empirical re-
sults. In any case, since several data sets had to be merged for the empirical 
analysis, insufficient observations remained to be able to run regressions with 
further religious affiliation variables. Therefore, our empirical analysis is re-
stricted to proxies for Protestantism and Islam and, for the sake of completeness, 
Catholicism. Since it is expected that Protestantism and Islam, in particular, 
have different effects on institutions, and since both religions are widespread, 
this is not a disadvantage. However, when arguing that religion influences the 
development of institutions, we should be clear that we are talking about Protes-
tantism and Islam and not religion in general. 
3.8 Regression analysis: the impact of formal and 
informal institutions on per capita income 
3.8.1 Data 
My analysis follows Tabellini (2005) and Knowles and Weatherston (2006) with 
respect to their informal institutions index. Using data from the WVS, Tabellini 
composed an index of four cultural features. According to Tabellini: ”Three of 
them are expected to encourage a positive and productive attitude towards mar-
ket exchange, entrepreneurial activities, or the production of public goods … 
The fourth indicator is symptomatic of a more hierarchical society where indi-
viduals are less likely to take advantage of economic opportunities or to cooper-
ate with each other” (Tabellini, 2005, p. 8f.). The measures are trust, control, 
respect, and obedience. As already illustrated, a high level of trust decreases 
transaction costs but increases the quantity of transactions and, accordingly, 
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economic growth. In the WVS, trust is measured with the following question: 
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Possible answers are “Most people 
can be trusted”, “Can’t be too careful”, and “Don’t know”. The level of trust in a 
country is measured by the percentage of respondents who answered that “Most 
people can be trusted”.  
The second measure that favors economic development is control. The cor-
responding question in the WVS is: “Some people feel that they have com-
pletely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what 
they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale (from 1 
to 10) where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ’a great deal’ to indicate how 
much freedom of choice and control in life you have over the way your life turns 
out”. As already explained, being persuaded of having control over one’s own 
life supports growth and, thus, a high number for control is positively correlated 
with per capita income. To measure control I follow Knowles and Weatherston 
(2006) who used the percentage of respondents in a country who gave a score of 
7–10 for the former question. 
The last growth-supporting feature is respect. In the WVS, the correspond-
ing question is: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to 
learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please 
choose up to five.” Respondents can decide between “good manners, independ-
ence, obedience, hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, thrift, saving 
money and things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfish-
ness, and tolerance and respect for other people”. The variable respect is meas-
ured as the percentage of respondents in each country that mentioned “tolerance 
and respect for other people”. 
The fourth element of Tabellini’s cultural indicator is obedience. This factor 
is not supportive of growth as it increases. The appropriate question in the WVS 
is again the one asking for important qualities in children. Hence, obedience is 
measured by the percentage of respondents answering that obedience is an im-
portant quality for children to learn. According to Tabellini, obedience without 
further reflection is a typical feature of hierarchical societies. Individualism is 
suppressed and obedience is more important than one’s own opinion and per-
sonal responsibility. The suppression of individualism makes cooperation diffi-
cult and has negative effects on economic development (Tabellini, 2005, p. 11). 
Therefore, respect and obedience are used as proxies for the societal structure, 
resulting in generalized vs. limited morality. Accordingly, a country with a high 
level of respect and a low level of obedience is expected to realize generalized 
morality and vice versa. 
Tabellini creates two indicators using the four cultural traits. He obtains the 
first by applying principal component analysis and the second by adding the 
three positive measures minus obedience. Here, it was decided to follow the 
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second approach to create an indicator of informal institutions. Therefore, trust, 
control, and respect were added together, and obedience was subtracted. The 
resulting indicator is called inform4. 
A proxy for formal institutions can reflect the interrelationship between 
formal institutions and growth. As already shown, property rights are usually 
assumed to be the main determinant of growth. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), 
for example, emphasize the importance of property rights institutions. Accord-
ing to the authors, “property rights institutions are intimately linked to the distri-
butions of political power in society because they regulate the relationship be-
tween ordinary private citizens and the politicians or elites with access to politi-
cal power” (p. 951). Hence, their preferred measure of property rights is Polity 
IV’s “constraints on the executive”, which measures the extent of institutional-
ized constraints on the executive. Its scale ranges from “unlimited authority” (1) 
to “executive parity or subordination” (7). Following Acemoglu and Johnson, 
this means of measuring has two advantages, “first, it corresponds to the proce-
dural rules constraining state action, and second, it highlights the close relation-
ship between property rights institutions and political institutions” (p. 951). I 
follow Acemoglu and Johnson’s approach and use Polity IV’s “constraints on 
the executive” as a proxy for formal institutions in my regression analysis. 
To allow for ecological conditions and geography, I use a measure of ma-
laria risk. The variable is called malfal94 and was first introduced by Gallup, 
Sachs and Mellinger (1998). It emerged from a variable called MAL94P, which 
depicts “the proportion of each country’s population that live with risk of ma-
laria transmission” (Sachs, 2003, p. 5). Malfal94 “multiplies the MALP94 index 
by an estimate of the proportion of national malaria cases that involve the fatal 
species, Plasmodium falciparum, as opposed to three largely non-fatal species of 
the malaria pathogen (P. vivax, P. malariae, and P. ovale)” (Sachs, 2003, p. 5). 
The measure was also used by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002), and Knowles and Weatherston (2006). 
Openness is measured with data from the Penn World Tables 6.2. I use the 
variable openk, which represents exports plus imports divided by real GDP per 
capita in constant prices. The base year is 1996. The data from the Penn World 
Tables 6.2 are also used to measure per capita income. The corresponding vari-
able is called rgdpl, which represents real GDP per capita in constant prices. 
Again, the reference year is 1996. 
Figures 3.5 to 3.10 demonstrate the correlations between the measures of in-
formal and formal institutions and per capita income. Accordingly, trust, con-
trol, and respect are positively correlated with GDP per capita, whereas obedi-
ence is negatively correlated with per capita income. This strengthens the hy-
pothesis that generalized morality is correlated with higher living standards and 
that limited morality is accompanied by a lower per capita income. The causality 
cannot be determined according to the figures; however, they do explain that 
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several feedback mechanisms exist and that the form of societal organization 
and GDP per capita interact. The figures demonstrate that levels of trust are 
lower in less developed economies, that people in poorer countries are less con-
vinced of being in control of their lives, and that respect for other people is con-
sidered less important in low-income countries. Obedience, on the contrary, is 
considered more important than it is in high-income states, which indicates the 
hierarchical structures and prevalence of limited morality in less developed 
economies. The indicator inform4 is positively correlated with GDP per capita, 
which also affirms the hypothesis of a connection between the form of societal 
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Figure 3.6: GDP per capita and control. Source: own illustration. 
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Figure 3.9: GDP per capita and inform4. Source: own illustration. 
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Figure 3.10: GDP per capita and xconst. Source: own illustration. 
Furthermore, a correlation between xconst – that is, the indicator of formal 
institutions – and per capita income exists. However, the correlation might not 
seem that clear because of the scaling of xconst (the index is scaled with integers 
from one to seven) and because of a group of outliers in the upper left-hand cor-
ner. These countries are Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar, which exhibit relatively 
high per capita incomes, but underperform with respect to their levels of formal 
institutions. Indeed, these states are characterized by features that distinguish 
them from other countries with growth-supporting formal institutions. The men-
tioned Gulf states, for example, can afford a relatively high living standards for 
their indigenous populations because of their oil wealth; therefore, they are able 
to afford ‘bad’ institutions.38 Thus, the positions of these outliers can be traced 
back to their resource wealth. 
3.8.2 Regression approach 
The aim of the regression approach is to measure the impacts of formal and in-
formal institutions on per capita income. Hence, a regression is run that uses per 
capita income as a dependent variable and indices for formal and informal insti-
tutions as independent variables. As already elucidated, this kind of regression 
would lead to biased coefficients, since the error term would include further 
growth-relevant factors that are correlated with institutions. Therefore, we fol-
low the deep determinants of growth approach, which defines institutions, geog-
raphy, and openness as the deep determinants of growth. Hence, the deep deter-
minants influence the proximate determinants – that is, factor accumulation and 
                                                
38 The term ‘bad’ institutions refers to institutions that are not supportive of economic growth. 
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technological progress – and, therefore, the deep determinants are the fundamen-
tal factors determining a country’s economic development path. 
However, there might still exist unknown factors influencing the deep de-
terminants of growth. Furthermore, the deep determinants (even geography, de-
pending on which proxy is used) depend on per capita income. Hence, a change 
in per capita income has an impact on institutions, on openness, and, eventually, 
on geography (for example, if a measure a disease burden is used as a proxy for 
geography). Therefore, instrumental variable regressions are run. 
The equation to be estimated is: 
  1 2 3 4y I F GEO OPEN= α + β + β + β + β ,    (3.12) 
where y indicates GDP per capita, I stands for informal and F for formal in-
stitutions, GEO denotes geography, and OPEN is openness. 
Equation (3.13) corresponds to (3.12) with only the accordant proxies being 
inserted: 
  1 2 3 4log(rgdpl) inf orm4 xconst malfal94 openk= α + β + β + β + β . (3.13) 
First, the equation is estimated via OLS. However, because the causality be-
tween institutions and per capita income is mutual, endogeneity is definitely an 
issue in the regression, and therefore OLS might not be an accurate estimation 
method. Therefore, the 2SLS method is used to solve the problem of unclear 
causality between institutions and per capita income. Consequently, the other 
regressors are assumed to be exogenous. 
After instrumenting for formal and informal institutions, endogeneity could 
still be an issue in respect to geography and integration. A higher per capita in-
come definitely lowers malaria risk. Better health care is affordable at the state 
and individual levels and vaccines are available for major parts of the popula-
tion. Being aware of this issue, Sachs (2003) introduced an instrumental variable 
called 'malaria ecology' (ME) which “is built upon climatological and vector 
conditions on a country-by-country basis, and is therefore exogenous to public 
health interventions and economic conditions, [therefore] ME provides an ideal 
instrumental variable for malaria risk” (p. 7). Hence, ME is used as an instru-
ment for malaria risk.  
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Concerning openness, it could be argued that richer countries are prone to 
open their economies because they are not protecting infant or other indigenous 
industries from competition on the world market. Hence, openness can lead to 
higher incomes, but higher incomes might also cause more openness. As in the 
former malaria case, this reverts to a well-established instrumental variable con-
cerning openness and, therefore, the natural logarithm of the Frankel–Romer 
actual trade share is used (Frankel & Romer, 1999).
3.8.3 Regression results 
Since the empirical analysis consists of different data sets, the number of in-
cluded countries varies between 55 and 72. No differentiation is made between 
particular country groups such as OECD countries, developing countries, or 
former colonies since this would further decrease the sample size. Instead, all 
countries for which data are available are incorporated in each case. Tables 3.1–
3.5 as well as the data sources can be found at the end of the current chapter. 
The first column in Table 3.1 demonstrates the OLS regression results. A 
one percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 1.1 percentage point increase 
in per capita income. The result is significant at the one percent level. The coef-
ficient on xconst is also significant at the one percent level. Accordingly, a one-
score increase leads to a rise in per capita income of 13 percent. Of course, the 
coefficient on malfal94 has a negative sign since an increase in malaria risk 
leads to a decline in income. Openk is significant at the five percent level and its 
coefficient is small, but at any rate a positive effect of openness on income be-
comes apparent. 
Because the size of the coefficients can be misleading concerning the vari-
ables’ relative impacts on income, the first column in Table 3.2 presents the 
beta-coefficients of the OLS regression. When measured in standard deviations, 
inform4 has the largest effect on per capita income compared with all included 
variables. Therefore, informal institutions seem to play a decisive role in ex-
plaining per capita income patterns. 
Columns two and three in Table 3.1 show the first- and second-stage regres-
sions of a 2SLS estimation using protestant as an instrument for informal insti-
tutions. The remaining independent variables in this regression are assumed to 
be exogenous. The coefficient on protestant in the first-stage regression, which 
is significant at the one percent level, demonstrates the variables’ correlation 
with inform4, which is a precondition for its use as an instrumental variable. The 
second-stage regression confirms the OLS results. The coefficient on inform4 is 
significant at the one percent level. A one percentage point increase in inform4
leads to a 1.2 percentage point rise in per capita income. A one-score increase of 
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xconst on its scale from one to seven leads to a 12 percent or higher increase in 
per capita income. 
Again, the beta-coefficients in column three of Table 3.2 shed some light on 
the relation of the independent variables concerning their impacts on per capita 
income. A one standard deviation increase in inform4 leads to an increase of 
0.49 standard deviations in per capita income. The other variables’ beta-
coefficients are smaller than that. 
Table 3.3 demonstrates further 2SLS results. In regression (4) we use prot-
estant and muslim as instruments for inform4 and xconst, respectively. Protes-
tant is highly significant in the first-stage regression on inform4. As expected, 
muslim is negatively correlated with xconst and significant at the one percent 
level in the first-stage regression on xconst. Hence, a higher Protestant affiliation 
of the population enhances growth-supporting informal institutions, whereas a 
higher Muslim affiliation decreases the level of growth-supporting formal insti-
tutions. In the second-stage regression, all variables are significant at least at the 
five percent level. A one percentage increase in inform4 leads to a rise in per 
capita income of 1.1 percentage points. If xconst increases by one score, per cap-
ita income rises by 17 percent. A look at the beta-coefficients in Table 3.4 again 
demonstrates the superiority of inform4, which, when rising by one standard de-
viation, leads to a 0.44 standard deviation increase in per capita income. 
Regression (5) demonstrates the case where we use catholic in place of mus-
lim as an instrumental variable. Again, protestant is significant at the one per-
cent level concerning inform4. Protestant and catholic are both significant in the 
first-stage regression on xconst. In the second-stage regression, inform4 be-
comes insignificant, whereas the coefficient on xconst increases. 
Regressions (6)–(8) show the 2SLS results when we use instrumental vari-
ables for all independent variables. Thus, regression (6) uses protestant as an 
instrument for inform4, muslim as an instrument for xconst, me as an instrument 
for malfal94, and logfrankrom as an instrument for openk. Regression (7) is con-
sistent with regression (6), but it uses catholic instead of muslim as an instru-
ment for xconst. Regression (8) also corresponds to regressions (6) and (7), but 
uses catholic and muslim as instruments for xconst. Hence, regressions (6)–(8) 
differ concerning the instrumental variables used to instrument for xconst. Apart 
from that they are equal. The first-stage regressions for malfal94 and openk are 
listed in the continuation of Table 3.3. In any case, the instrumental variables me
and logfrankrom are highly significant in each case. 
In regression (6), muslim is used as an instrumental variable for xconst. 
Now, protestant is only significant on inform4, whereas muslim is significant 
and negatively correlated with xconst. All regressors of the second-stage regres-
sion are significant at least at the 10 percent level. A one percentage point in-
crease in inform4 leads to a 0.89 percentage point increase in per capita income. 
If xconst rises by one score, per capita income increases by 18.4 percent. Re-
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garding the beta-coefficients in Table 3.4, a one standard deviation increase in 
inform4 leads to a rise in per capita income by 0.37 standard deviations, which is 
nearly the same amount as the beta-coefficient on xconst. 
In regression (7), catholic is again used instead of muslim as an instrumental 
variable for xconst, whereas all independent variables are assumed to be en-
dogenous. However, inform4 is significant at the 10 percent level. The coeffi-
cient on xconst again increases compared with regressions (1) and (3) in which 
muslim is used as an instrument, although the increase is not excessive. The 
most notable alteration occurs in the beta-coefficients table, where the coeffi-
cient on xconst increases by 0.47 standard deviations. Hence, when using catho-
lic as an instrument for formal institutions, xconst gains more importance re-
garding its effect on per capita income and compared with the other regressors, 
whereas inform4 becomes less significant. 
Regression (8) is overidentified – that is, protestant, muslim, and catholic
are used as instrumental variables. However, when muslim is incorporated, 
catholic is not significant in the first-stage regression on xconst. Instead, muslim
is negatively correlated with xconst and significant at the one percent level. 
Protestant is also significant at the one percent level in the first-stage regression 
on inform4. All regressors are significant in the second-stage regression. A one 
percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase in 
per capita income. If xconst increases by one score, income rises by 19.6 per-
cent. Regarding the beta-coefficients, the coefficient on xconst decreases by 0.37 
standard deviations, but is still slightly higher than the coefficient on inform4. 
However, using protestant, muslim, and catholic as instrumental variables, the 
disturbing effect of catholic decreases. The coefficients on inform4 and xconst
are comparable to the ones using only protestant and muslim and, thus, the 
overidentified regression can be used as a test of robustness. If catholic has a 
significant effect that disturbs the relationship, the result would not be robust in 
comparison to the ones using protestant and muslim. Thus, the correlation be-
tween protestant, muslim, xconst, and inform4 is stable. In any case, catholic
does not seem to fit into the intuitive argument, and although Protestantism and 
Islam seem to influence institutions, this might not hold for all religions. 
To confirm the results, tests were conducted to shed light on a few issues 
concerning instrumental variable estimation. The small sample size demon-
strates a problem regarding 2SLS estimation as well as testing, but because we 
are working with country data and different data sets there is nothing we can do 
about that issue. Therefore, the tests can best be seen as an additional coverage, 
but they are not fully reliable and have to be considered with caution. Most as-
sumptions and conclusions must be considered by relying on intuition.  
A perpetual issue in empirical work is that of heteroskedasticity. Although 
heteroskedasticity does not affect the consistency of the instrumental variable 
coefficient estimate, it does affect the estimates of the standard errors. There-
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fore, the Pagan–Hall test was applied to regressions (4), (5), and (6) to detect 
possible heteroskedasticity in the 2SLS estimations. The results suggest that het-
eroskedasticity does not exist in the accordant regressions. However, caution is 
advisable concerning this outcome because the Pagan–Hall test statistic might 
not be useful when working with small sample sizes (Baum, Schaffer & Still-
man, 2003, p. 14). Therefore, additionally, the White–Koenker test statistic was 
used, even though this test is usually not applied in instrumental variable estima-
tion. However, again, the result suggests that no heteroskedasticity is prevalent. 
Concerning the validity of the instruments, the Sargan test statistic was im-
plemented, again only for the case of overidentification, since the test is not 
valid otherwise. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected and, thus, the in-
strumental variables are not correlated with the disturbance. Again, we cannot 
fully rely on the test statistic since the Sargan test might not be valid when all 
instruments share the same rationale (Murray, 2006, p. 117). Since three reli-
gious affiliation variables are used as instrumental variables, this definitely is the 
case and thereby the test only affirms our regression results but cannot be seen 
as evidence. 
In the end, the Shea statistic to test for the issue of instrumental variable ir-
relevance was applied. Again, we achieved a positive result since the instru-
ments for institutions are clearly relevant. To solve the problem of instrumental 
variable irrelevance, it is also useful to have a look at the first-stage regression 
results. The relevance is confirmed, since all instruments are highly significant 
in respect to the accordant endogenous regressors. 
Table 3.5 demonstrates several tests of robustness. Yet again, regressions 
(6)–(8) were run including further independent variables. However, panel A in-
corporates dummy variables for English and French legal origin as additional 
regressors. The original regression results are robust. Again, inform4 becomes 
insignificant when catholic is used as the sole instrumental variable for formal 
institutions. Moreover, the coefficient on malfal94 further decreases. Interest-
ingly, the coefficient on English legal origin is significant at the five percent 
level in all regressions.  
Panel B includes a measure of population density (Sachs, 2003). Again, the 
original regression results are robust in respect to the inclusion of the additional 
regressors, whereas pop100km itself is insignificant. 
In panels C, D, and E, the variables coastline, temperature, and landlocked
from the Parker (1997) data set are added as exogenous regressors. All three fac-
tors are insignificant, and the results remain robust. The variables in panels C, 
D, and E depict geography measurements. Since they are not significant in con-
trast to malfal94, panel F examines what happens when malfal94 is omitted, that 
is, when we do not control for geographical or ecological determinants. Still the 
results are robust. The main difference is depicted by openk, which is significant 
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at the five percent level in all regressions and thereby there does not seem to be 
a high correlation between malfal94 and our institutional measures. 
The empirical analysis demonstrates that Protestantism and Islam have a 
significant influence on the quality of institutions. A high Protestant affiliation 
of the population is positively correlated with inform4. Accordingly, a high pro-
portion of Protestant population accompanies growth-supporting informal insti-
tutions. Muslim, on the contrary, is negatively correlated with xconst. Therefore, 
a high proportion of Muslim population is accompanied by fewer constraints on 
the executive. 
Figure 3.4 has already demonstrated the fact that countries with a high pro-
portion of Muslim population possess less property rights. Since property rights 
are a decisive factor for economic growth, this could be one possible explana-
tion for the low-growth performances of many Muslim countries. However, it 
has already been demonstrated that institutions influence each other and are in-
fluenced by further determinants. Hence, not all Muslim countries must under-
perform economically. This is even more the case, since our measure of religion 
(the proportion of the population belonging to a certain religion) might be dis-
puted. The regression results demonstrate that countries with a high Muslim 
proportion of the population are accompanied by less constraints on the execu-
tive (measured with the variable xconst from the Polity IV data set). 
The possible connections between religious affiliation and informal institu-
tions have already been demonstrated. The hypothesis is that a certain religious 
affiliation encourages behavioral patterns that support or inhibit economic 
growth on an aggregated level. However, the regression results of the first-stage 
regressions for inform4 demonstrate that protestant – that is, the protestant pro-
portion of the population – is positively correlated with the proxy for informal 
institutions. That is to say, more Protestants in a country yield informal institu-
tions that are more growth supporting, on an aggregated level, than are informal 
institutions in a country with a high Muslim proportion of the population.39
Hence, the hypothesis that religious affiliation and institutional quality are 
somehow correlated is supported. 
However, religion and its influence on economic development is not our 
main concern and so we will not pursue this issue any longer. Different religious 
affiliations are used as instrumental variables for formal and informal institu-
tions. As the regression results show, the instruments are valid. Hence, an ex-
ogenous source of variation has been found and the endogeneity issue is solved. 
                                                
39 Again it must be mentioned that informal institutions, and thereby a society’s value system 
and its culture, are not judged on a qualitative level. Hence, it is not argued that the value sys-
tem or the culture of a Muslim society is ‘bad’, whereas the value system or the culture of a 
Protestant society is ‘good’. It is just demonstrated that a Muslim society seems to develop 
informal institutions that are less supportive of economic growth compared with the informal 
institutions that emerge within a society with a majority of Protestant citizens. 
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Emphasis is on the influence of institutions on per capita income. The re-
gressions demonstrate that the indicator of informal institutions is positively cor-
related with per capita income. Hence, informal institutions influence economic 
development. They can be growth supportive or growth inhibiting. The higher 
the levels of trust, control, and respect, and the lower the level of obedience, the 
better the economic growth. Inform4 is significant at the one percent level in re-
gression (4) and at the five percent level in regressions (6) and (8) (the regres-
sions that include catholic as a single instrument for xconst are no longer con-
sidered since catholic cannot destroy the robust relationship between protestant, 
muslim, inform4, and xconst). 
Formal institutions also have a significant impact on the level of per capita 
income. Xconst is significant at the five percent level in regressions (4), (6), and 
(8). The coefficient on xconst is somewhat difficult to interpret since xconst is 
measured on a scale from one to seven. However, an increase in xconst leads to 
a considerable rise in per capita income. Hence, constraints on the executive 
and, therefore, well-protected property rights are crucial for economic growth 
and high per capita incomes. 
The beta-coefficients demonstrate the importance of the deep determinants 
of growth relative to each other. Accordingly, assuming that all independent 
variables are endogenous, malaria risk has the highest influence on per capita 
income. This is not a surprise since disease burden is well known to play a deci-
sive role in economic development. A population suffering from malaria or 
other diseases cannot be as productive as a healthy population. However, disease 
burden is definitely an endogenous factor since a rise in per capita income al-
lows improvements in health care, such as vaccination and medicine, for large 
parts of the population. Therefore, regressions (6), (7) and (8) use an instrumen-
tal variable to control for the reverse causality between malaria risk and income. 
The beta-coefficients of regressions (6) and (8) demonstrate that informal 
and formal institutions both play a decisive role on the level of per capita in-
come. However, regression (8) obtains a slightly higher beta-coefficient for 
xconst than for inform4. The beta-coefficients on openness are the lowest in all 
regressions. 
The empirical results approve the theoretical reasoning. Both formal and in-
formal institutions have a significant impact on per capita income. Religion in-
fluences institutions through its impact on human beliefs and human behavior, 
but religion has no direct effect on income. Hence, religious affiliation provides 
an exogenous source of variation, which is necessary to run 2SLS regressions. 
Since institutions are correlated with each other, with income, and with further 
growth-relevant determinants, an instrumental variable estimation is required. 
The regression analysis tries to incorporate cultural traits into the growth 
analysis and examines whether the emergence of institutions can be traced back 
to religious origins. The assumption is that not only formal but also informal 
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institutions influence economic growth. Theoretical and empirical analysis must 
consider the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. Therefore, the trans-
mission channels between informal and formal institutions and per capita in-
come are examined. In the empirical analysis, several 2SLS regressions are run. 
The proportions of the population being Protestant or Muslim are used as in-
strumental variables. A high Protestant proportion of the population is correlated 
with growth-supporting informal institutions, whereas a high percentage of Mus-
lim citizens is correlated with growth-inhibiting formal institutions. Moreover, 
the second-stage regressions demonstrate that informal and formal institutions 
have a crucial impact on per capita income. 
The relevance of this result stems from the particular properties of informal 
institutions. In general, institutions are characterized by their stickiness, and 
thereby alterations take place slowly. Institutions that are particularly responsi-
ble for self-identification, that is, informal institutions, are even more resistant to 
change (Roland, 2005; Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008). At the same time, 
these institutions are jointly responsible for economic development and are am-
biguously correlated with formal institutions and income. Hence, an alteration in 
formal institutions that obviously hinders growth encounters several problems. 
First, formal and informal institutions are correlated and many formal institu-
tions even originate in informal institutions. Therefore, when changing formal 
institutions the ambiguous transmission channels and prevalent informal institu-
tions must be considered otherwise the change can lead to unexpected results. At 
best, the modification could worsen the situation or simply have no effect, be-
cause the prevalent culture might not match the formal transformations. Second, 
political or economic patterns, which in general are considered supportive of 
economic growth, do not do the job in countries with different societal and cul-
tural origins, and thereby some institutions cannot be exogenously modified – 
that is, the transformation of institutions is constrained. Third, no true or right 
institutional structure exists, because the quality of institutions depends on their 
societal environment. Hence, institutions that might be judged as growth inhibit-
ing in one country can be effective somewhere else. This holds for formal and 
informal institutions. 
Of course, this means that a general pattern of growth that can be applied to 
every country does not exist. Although this conclusion might be depressing be-
cause it limits the scope for development economics, it has important political 
implications in that the implementation of standard Western institutions might 
not be helpful in certain cases. Thus, in the majority of cases externally imposed 
institutions that are not rooted in the historical and cultural environment will not 
be accepted. 
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Table 3.1: regression results 
Table 3.1 
 OLS Regression: 
Dependent Vari-

































protestant  0.8527801*** 
(0.139111) 
N 73 72 72 
R-sq 0.6989 0.5417 0.6972 
adj. R-sq 0.6812 0.5143 0.6792 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 3.2: regression results 
Table 3.2 
Beta-Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Regression: 
Dependent Vari-

































protestant  0.540*** 
(0.139) 
N 73 72 72 
R-sq 0.699 0.542 0.697 
adj. R-sq 0.681 0.514 0.679 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.3: regression results 
Table 3.3 
Second-Stage Regression: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita 2000 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









































N 72 72 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.6942 0.5419 0.7479 0.7231 0.7461 
adj. R-sq 0.6760 0.5145 0.7277 0.7010 0.7258 
First-Stage Regression for inform4 



























   










   






R-sq 0.5479 0.5257 0.5421 0.5112 0.5487 
adj. R-sq 0.5209 0.4974 0.5054 0.4721 0.5027 
First-Stage Regression for xconst 



























   










   






R-sq 0.5312 0.3748 0.5268 0.3274 0.5273 
adj. R-sq 0.5032 0.3375 0.4889 0.2735 0.4790 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.3: continuation regression results 
Continuation 1 Table 3.3: 
First-Stage Regressions for malfal94 and openk 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
First-Stage Regression for malfal94 
 malfal94 malfal94 malfal94 malfal94 malfal94 














malfal94      






openk      






N     55 
R-sq   0.4954 0.4937 0.4962 
adj. R-sq   0.4550 0.4532 0.4448 
First-Stage Regression for openk 
 openk openk openk openk openk 














malfal94      






openk      






N      
R-sq   0.4151 0.3849 0.4219 
adj. R-sq   0.3683 0.3357 0.3630 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.3: continuation regression results 
Continuation 2 Table 3.3: 
Tests 




























  0.3122 0.1855 0.3229 
Pagan–Hall 
(p-value) 
  0.1592 0.1486 0.1170 
Sargan 
(p-value) 




  0.0715 0.0913 0.0640 
Table 3.4: regression results 
Table 3.4 
Beta-Coefficients 
Second-Stage Regression: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita 2000 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 









































N 72 72 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.694 0.542 0.748 0.723 0.746 
adj. R-sq 0.676 0.515 0.728 0.701 0.726 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.5.1: regression results 
Table 3.5.1 
Panel A 
 (6) (7) (8) 





































N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7418 0.6990 0.7482 
adj. R-sq 0.7095 0.6614 0.7168 
Panel B 
 (6) (7) (8) 































N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7483 0.7214 0.7466 
adj. R-sq 0.7226 0.6930 0.7207 
Panel C 
 (6) (7) (8) 































N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7483 0.7232 0.7467 
adj. R-sq 0.7227 0.6949 0.7209 
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Table 3.5.2: regression results 
Table 3.5.2 
Panel D 
 (6) (7) (8) 































N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7588 0.7403 0.7565 
adj. R-sq 0.7342 0.7138 0.7316 
Panel E 
 (6) (7) (8) 































N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7185 0.6833 0.7249 
adj. R-sq 0.6898 0.6509 0.6969 
Panel F 
 (6) (7) (8) 



















N 56 56 56 
R-sq 0.6325 0.5886 0.6319 
adj. R-sq 0.6113 0.5649 0.6106 
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Table 3.6: data definitions and sources 
control Percentage of respondents who chose a score of 7–10 in response to the 
question ‘Some people feel they have completely free choice and control 
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect 
on what happens to them. Please use this scale were 1 means “none at all” 
and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.’ Accessed at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
trust Percentage of respondents who answer that ‘Most people can be trusted’ to 
the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’ (other 
possible answers are ‘Can’t be too careful’ and ‘Don’t know’). Accessed at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
respect Percentage of respondents who mention ‘Tolerance and respect for other 
people’ when asked the following question: ‘Here is a list of child qualities 
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.’ Possible an-
swers are: ‘Independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, 
tolerance and respect for other people, thrift, saving money and things, de-
termination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience.’ 
Accessed at www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
obedience Percentage of respondents who mention ‘Obedience’ when asked the fol-
lowing question: ‘Here is a list of child qualities that children can be en-
couraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five.’ Possible answers are: ‘Independence, 
hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for 
other people, thrift, saving money and things, determination and persever-
ance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience.’ Accessed at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
inform4  Sum of trust, respect and control minus obedience.
xconst Extent of institutionalized constraints on the executive. The variable ranges 
from a score of (1) ‘Unlimited authority’ to (7) ‘Executive parity or subor-
dination’. Source: Jaggers and Marshall (2005); accessed at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm on October 27, 2009.  
malfal94 Proportion of each country’s population that live with the risk of malaria 
transmission multiplied by an estimate of the proportion of malaria cases 
that involve Plasmodium falciparum. Source: Sachs (2003); accessed at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040 on October 27, 2009.  
openk Exports plus imports divided by rgdpl. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten 
(2006); accessed at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ on October 27, 2009.  
rgdpl Real GDP per capita (Laspeyres). Source: Heston, Summers and Aten 
(2006); accessed at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ on October 27, 2009. 
me  Instrumental variable for malaria risk. Source: Sachs (2003); accessed at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040 on October 27, 2009.  
logfrankrom Natural logarithm of the Frankel–Romer predicted trade share. Source: Hall 
and Jones (1999); accessed at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~chad/datasets.html 
on October 27, 2009.  
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
122
protestant Percentage of the population being Protestant. Source: La Porta et al. 
(1999); accessed at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
on October 27, 2009.  
muslim Percentage of the population being Muslim. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
accessed at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
on October 27, 2009. 
catholic Percentage of the population being Catholic. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
accessed at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
on October 27, 2009. 
french Dummy variable for French legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); ac-
cessed at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
on October 27, 2009. 
english Dummy variable for English legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. (1999); 
accessed at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
on October 27, 2009. 
pop100km Share of the national population living within 100 km of the coast. Source: 
Sachs (2003); accessed at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040 
on October 27, 2009. 
latitude Latitude in absolute degrees. Source: Parker (1997); accessed at 
http://faculty.insead.edu/parker/resume/personal.htm on October 27, 2009. 
coastline Coastline length in kilometers. Source: Parker (1997); accessed at 
http://faculty.insead.edu/parker/resume/personal.htm on October 27, 2009. 
landlocked Dummy variable for landlocked. Source: Parker (1997); accessed at 
http://faculty.insead.edu/parker/resume/personal.htm on October 27, 2009. 
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4. Institutions and economic development in 
the MENA region 
4.1 Introduction 
The first part of this dissertation project deals with the general impact of institu-
tions on economic development. However, the second part aims to demonstrate 
the significance of the general findings with a case study on the Arab region.  
It was demonstrated empirically that informal and formal institutions influ-
ence the level of per capita income. The significance and complexity of the insti-
tutional system lead to several connections and feedbacks between institutions 
themselves and institutions and other factors, which make institutional change a 
complex and difficult task. However, to demonstrate the relevance of these re-
sults, a case study is carried out on a region that differs from the economically 
successful countries of the Western hemisphere in two respects: first, the Arab 
region exhibits a worse economic growth performance than Western industrial-
ized countries and, second, the Arab region exhibits different institutions com-
pared with Western states. Therefore, it will be examined whether the economic 
performance of Arab countries correlates with its institutional quality and, 
hence, whether the general findings of the first part of the study can be applied 
to real world developments. 
Furthermore, the institutional development of the Arab region is examined. 
It was argued that institutional emergence and development exhibit a dynamic 
process. Nevertheless, several institutions are inertial and marginal change is 
hardly observable in a human's lifetime. This means that history and path de-
pendence play important roles in institutional development. Historical events 
that occurred in ancient times can still impact the current institutional environ-
ment through several transmission channels, complementarities, institutional 
inertia, and path dependence. Therefore, it will be examined whether accidents 
in Arab history influenced institutional quality in the long run.  
In particular, those institutions characterized as being growth relevant in the 
first part will be examined concerning their implementation in the Arab world. 
Property rights, the rule of law, political participation, civil liberties, business 
regulations, and the levels of trust, control, and the concept of generalized and 
limited morality in the Arab region will be examined inter alia. However, corre-
sponding to the results of the previous empirical analysis, institutional quality in 
the Arab region should be crucial for its economic development. Hence, institu-
tions in the Arab region should be growth inhibiting rather than growth support-
ing. 
Nine years after the terror attacks of 09/11/2001, public discussion about 
differences between the Islamic world and the Western hemisphere continues. 
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However, differences can be observed in cultural and religious as well as eco-
nomic patterns. Therefore, GDP per capita and thereby living standards differ 
significantly. Thus, it is an obvious question to ask whether a connection be-
tween different cultures and the corresponding development patterns exists. 
Hence, can Arab economic backwardness be traced back to its culture and the 
corresponding institutions, and is the institutional quality of the West responsi-
ble for its economic success? 
However, first a regional definition is necessary. The above passage men-
tioned the Islamic world and the Arab region, which are not equal. Of course, 
Islam is the main religion and a determining cultural factor of the Arab region. 
However, Islam is also widespread in parts of Europe, Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Indonesia, for example, exhibits the world’s most populous Muslim ma-
jority. Islam is the state religion not only in Middle Eastern and North African 
countries, but also in Bangladesh and Malaysia, for example. Islamic states, that 
is, states in which Islam builds the ideological foundation for political and socie-
tal life in general, are, inter alia, Afghanistan, Brunei, and Pakistan. Hence, Is-
lam and ‘Arabic’ should not be equalized. However, the aim of the dissertation 
project is not to examine the effects of a particular religion on economic devel-
opment. Instead, culture as an institution is emphasized. Culture does not merely 
consist of religious features. Geographical proximity, language, traditions, and a 
shared morality are also binding determinants. In fact, the Arab language plays 
an important role in Arab culture and identity. Arabic is the language in which 
the Quran was originally written. It connects a region ranging from North-
Western Africa through West Asia. Islamic countries in Eastern Europe or 
South-East Asia can exhibit significantly different cultural influences to Arab 
countries, although they share the same religion. Relevant factors such as his-
tory, geographical proximity, language, and so forth differ decisively compared 
with Arab countries. 
However, in the current study the region that is culturally and historically 
described as ‘Arabic’ is emphasized. This region is usually called MENA, that 
is, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The corresponding coun-
tries are, in some way, connected through history, culture, language, and, of 
course, Islam. The World Bank defines MENA as Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. Iran 
is included although Arabic is not its official language. Nevertheless, other cul-
tural and historical determinants justify its inclusion. This is even more the case 
since other countries in which Arabic is the official state language are excluded 
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from in the definition.40 Particular countries can be added to an African rather 
than an Arab culture even though Arabic is one of the official state languages. 
Hence, to draw a clear borderline between the Arab region and its neighbor-
ing regions is difficult. The current study, however, adopts a more pragmatic 
approach. That is to say, the broadest definition of MENA corresponds to the 
World Bank’s definition. Since data on one or other relevant country are usually 
missing, the analysis will not always include all countries in question. An his-
torical analysis, on the contrary, emanates from a broader definition of the Arab 
region. Depending on the observed period, the ‘Arab region’ depicts the corre-
sponding area at that time. Since a culture does not stop at a certain borderline, 
behind which a new culture begins, the current study does not have a strict defi-
nition of the MENA region but incorporates countries for which an inclusion 
seems to make sense. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the countries of the MENA re-
gion are not assumed to be identical. On the contrary, Arab countries exhibit 
great heterogeneity in many respects. Even cultural determinants, and thereby 
traditions, codes of conduct, habits, and so on, might differ. Nevertheless, dif-
ferences are not as large as they are between MENA, and, for example, Western 
industrialized states. Despite its internal heterogeneity, MENA depicts one co-
hesive cultural area. Its main similarities are based on history, religion, lan-
guage, and societal organization. 
Some MENA countries vary significantly regarding their economic per-
formances. This is the case because the MENA region includes resource-poor 
countries with large indigenous populations as well as oil-rich states with small 
indigenous populations, such as the UAE, Qatar, or Bahrain. For example, 2006 
per capita income in Yemen accounted for USD 551.37, whereas per capita in-
come in the UAE amounted to USD 25,192.33.41 Thus, economically, MENA 
should not be treated as a homogeneous group, even though many dependencies 
and complementarities inhibit a clear separation. According to the World Bank 
classification, the MENA countries can be separated into three groups: 
• RPLA (resource-poor, labor-abundant economies): Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza; 
• RRLA (resource-rich, labor-abundant economies): Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Yemen; 
• RRLI (resource-rich, labor-importing countries): Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE. 
                                                
40 These countries are Chad, Comoros, Eritrea, Israel, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. Some 
of these countries possess two or more official state languages. 
41 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars; data retrieved July 2, 2009, from the World 
Bank WDI database. 
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4.2 Arab economic performance 
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the per capita income development of the MENA re-
gion compared with high-income country groups since 1965.42 The high-income 
country groups exhibit constant growth in GDP per capita over the whole pe-
riod. By comparison, per capita income in the MENA region has on average 
stagnated since 1965. Hence, per capita income divergence is observable be-
tween the MENA region and high-income country groups. Neither the conver-
gence of per capita income levels nor the convergence of the per capita income 
growth rates occurs. The predictions of the neoclassical growth model, however, 
seem not to apply to the Arab countries on average. MENA countries, although 
poor compared with high-income countries, do not benefit from their potential to 
catch up. On the contrary, they are falling further behind high-income countries 
in per capita income levels. 
Figure 4.1: GDP per capita for MENA and high income country groups. Source: own illus-
tration. Data accessed July 2, 2009, from the World Bank WDI database. 
Figure 4.2 compares the GDP per capita levels of the MENA countries with 
world regions. The average per capita income of the MENA countries increased 
until 1976. Between 1977 and 1995, GDP per capita stagnated with moderate 
decreases and increases in between. After 1995, a slight increase is observable. 
Since 2000, income divergence is also observable between MENA and Europe 
and Central Asia. East Asia, however, started at a significantly lower income 
level than MENA in 1965, but its GDP per capita has increased constantly and 
will probably catch up to the MENA countries in the near future. Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia have considerably lower per capita income levels than the 
                                                
42 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars; data retrieved July 2, 2009, from the World 
Bank WDI database. The World Bank classification of the country groups can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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MENA region during the whole period. However, since GDP per capita stag-
nated in Sub-Saharan Africa for more than 40 years, South Asia at least realized 
moderate growth. 




























































Figure 4.2: GDP per capita for MENA and world regions. Source: own illustration. Data 
accessed July 2, 2009, from the WDI database.










































Figure 4.3: GDP per capita for the MENA subgroups. Source: own illustration. Data ac-
cessed July 2, 2009, from the WDI database. 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars for 
MENA and its three subgroups in the period between 1965 and 2007. However, 
data are not available for every country at all points in time. Therefore, at any 
point in time, the available GDP per capita data were added and divided by the 
corresponding number of countries. For example in 1965, data on eight coun-
tries were available. Between 1999 and 2005, data on 18 countries were avail-
able, and so on. Hence, at some points in time, average GDP per capita is calcu-
lated for only a few countries, whereas at others it is calculated for almost all 
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MENA countries. Of course, this method is unusual and distorts the results. 
However, it is the only way to achieve a long run data series for the MENA sub-
groups. Some highs and lows might, therefore, be exaggerated since the data 
points might depend only on a few countries that experienced extreme values at 
that time. 
The oil boom at the beginning of the 1960s led to a sharp increase in aver-
age per capita incomes in the RRLI countries and, hence, in the region on aver-
age. Further increases occurred in 1973 and 1974. This reflects the fact that 
MENA’s, and especially the Arab oil producers’, income levels depend mainly 
on developments on international oil markets. However, since the mid-1970s 
GDP per capita in the MENA region declined dramatically, which can be attrib-
uted to the even more dramatic decline in the RRLI countries and the almost 
stagnant development in the RRLA and RPLA countries. The RRLA countries 
realized a moderate increase in GDP per capita between 1965 and 1977. After-
wards, per capita income remained stagnant. The average per capita income of 
the RPLA countries remains at very low levels during the whole period. How-
ever, despite a short decline at the end of the 1980s, income steadily increased 
from 539.37 US dollars in 1960 to 2389.95 US dollars in 2007. Nevertheless, 
since we are observing a time span of almost 50 years, the increase in per capita 
income of the RPLA countries is moderate indeed. Since the 2000s, MENA’s 
GDP per capita has increased slightly. The decline after 2005 must be consid-
ered carefully since data on several high- and middle income countries were not 
available for 2006 and 2007.43 However, although income has increased since 
the mid-1990s, it has never reached the high levels of the oil boom period. 
Figure 4.4: MENA average GDP per capita growth rates. Source: own illustration. Data ac-
cessed July 2, 2009, from the WDI database. 
                                                
43 Bahrain (2006 & 2007), Kuwait (2007), Oman (2007), Qatar (2006 & 2007), the UAE 
(2007). 
MENA: average GDP per capita growth rates
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Figure 4.4 demonstrates the development of per capita income growth rates 
from 1961 to 2007. GDP per capita growth rates are highly volatile because of 
the region's dependence on oil prices.44 However, MENA average growth rates 
peaked in 1972. In the 1980s, growth rates deteriorated and became negative on 
average. In the 1990s, a marginal recovery occurred. However, growth rates re-
mained volatile and reached an average level of 3.05 percent in 2007. 
MENA belongs to the group of world regions that has been unable to catch 
up to industrialized countries in recent decades. While the industrialized world 
has exhibited constant growth over the past 50 years, MENA has nearly stag-
nated, at least since 1980. The higher growth rates at the beginning of the 2000s 
can almost completely be traced back to high energy prices on world markets. 
Compared with less developed regions, MENA’s growth performance might 
look less alarming at the first glance. However, MENA’s moderate growth de-
picts a severe problem, since almost no progress has been observable for dec-
ades. Although the region of East Asia and the Pacific started from a signifi-
cantly lower level of per capita income in the 1960s, it now exhibits higher 
growth rates and will overhaul the MENA average income levels soon. Apart 
from that, only Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia perform worse than MENA. 
However, MENA will face enormous social and economic problems if its 
growth performance does not improve dramatically in the near future (Cornelius 
& Schwab, 2003; Sala-i-Martin & Artadi, 2003; Yousef, 2004). 
4.3 Economic development in the second half of the 
20th century 
After the Great Depression of the 1930s and the consequent breakdown of the 
international economic order the role of the state was expanded, not only in 
MENA countries, but on a worldwide level. The development model, which was 
enforced in the MENA countries from the 1940s until the 1970s, involved state 
planning, import substitution, agrarian reform programs, the nationalization of 
                                                
44 The enormous growth rates of the RRLI countries at the end of the 1960s are down to 
Oman, which exhibited growth rates of 61.58 percent and 76.56 percent in 1967 and 1968, 
respectively. However, even without Oman the RRLI countries’ growth rates accounted for 
2.38 percent in 1967, 9.36 percent in 1968, 4.39 percent in 1969, and 7.61 percent in 1970. 
The sharp decline in 1989 as well as the increase in growth rates in 1990 in the RPLA coun-
tries can be traced back to developments in Lebanon, where 15 years of civil war came to an 
end in 1990. The data record for Lebanon starts in 1989, where the GDP per capita growth 
rate is quoted as –42.88 percent. Lebanese growth rates then increased to 24.27 percent in 
1990 and 34.62 percent in 1991. Data retrieved July 2, 2009, from the World Bank WDI data-
base. 
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private and foreign assets, the state provision of education, housing, and health 
care, food subsidies, centralized trade unions, and the establishment of authori-
tarian political regimes (Yousef, 2004, p. 92). Emphasis was placed on physical 
capital accumulation. Infrastructure was expanded through large public invest-
ments and health and social security systems were implemented. Many social 
indicators were notably improved. For example, infant mortality declined, life 
expectancy increased, school enrolment levels improved, and literacy rates in-
creased. Workers were provided with lifelong job guarantees in the public sector 
or in state-owned firms. This development strategy relied on a strong public sec-
tor and physical capital accumulation. The private sector as well as human capi-
tal was not equally promoted. Nevertheless, in the 1960s the MENA region ex-
hibited an average growth rate of GDP per worker of six percent, which ac-
counted for some of the highest growth rates worldwide (Yousef, 2004). 
However, in MENA the general trend to centralize economic planning met 
the problematic phase of nation building, which occurred after the colonial pow-
ers had withdrawn. All that remained were nation states whose borders had been 
drawn arbitrarily and which were suddenly reigned by the weak governments 
appointed by the colonial powers. This opened space for political insecurity and 
instability, which, in turn, led to the implementation of elaborate control and se-
curity apparatuses. Political, intellectual, and labor movements were monitored 
and opposition in one form or another was oppressed. In many Arab states, the 
military was strongly involved in politics, which was justified by the permanent 
threat of political insecurity.  
A further decisive factor that shaped the development of the MENA region 
in the second half of the 20th century was the large-scale exploration of oil after 
the Second World War. The oil revenues afforded the particular development of 
the Arab countries, even if they were not endowed with natural resources them-
selves.  
Oil revenues were crucial in several ways: 
1) Oil revenues were distributed among Arab countries, even among the non-oil 
countries, through a complex system of rents and workers’ remittances. 
Hence, resource-poor countries also benefited from oil exploitation. Workers 
of the RPLA countries were employed in the oil industries of resource-rich 
economies and sent home significant amounts of remittances. Jordan, for ex-
ample, received workers' remittances and the compensation of employees 
amounting to 25 percent of GDP in 1976 and 22 percent of GDP on average 
between 1976 and 1986. Remittances still play an important role for the 
RPLA and RRLA countries. Yemen, for example, obtained an average of 21 
percent of its GDP as workers’ remittances between 1990 and 2000. West 
Bank and Gaza received an average of 18 percent of GDP between 1994 and 
2005, and Lebanon received an average of 19 percent of GDP in the period 
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between 2000 and 2007. Jordan also received high workers’ remittances be-
tween 1995 and 2007, an average of 22 percent of GDP. Egypt obtained 
workers’ remittances amounting to an average of 11 percent of GDP between 
1978 and 1994. Afterwards, Egyptian remittances declined to an average of 
four percent of GDP between 1995 and 2007.45
2) The redistribution of oil revenues to MENA citizens occurred via public sec-
tor employment and subsidies (for example, subsidies for fuel, electricity, 
food, health, and education). Hence, oil revenues made an efficient private 
sector unnecessary. The incomes permitted the state to finance social security 
systems and employ its citizens. According to Yousef (2004, p. 96): “The 
welfare gains also helped to cement an “authoritarian bargain,” with citizens 
of the Middle East effectively trading restrictions on political participation in 
exchange for economic security and the public provision of social services 
and welfare”. That is to say, the people of the MENA region sold their politi-
cal rights in exchange for jobs and subsidies. Oil revenues enabled the per-
petuation of authoritarian governments and additionally, large security and 
military apparatuses could be financed (Askari, 2006). Furthermore, stable 
revenues from oil exploration enabled income distribution, the allocation of 
social security, further governmental services, and public goods without the 
establishment of a system of income taxation. Hence, most MENA countries 
do not have an efficient tax system. 
The deployment of oil revenues and the interventionist-redistributive develop-
ment system led to growth rates of approximately six percent per worker per 
year in the 1960s (Yousef, 2004). However, although the one-dimensional 
growth strategy that relied on physical capital accumulation, oil revenues, and 
foreign aid ensured temporary economic success, it had serious consequences in 
the long run. 
In the 1980s, declining oil prices and increasing international competition 
revealed the weaknesses of the development strategy. The economic perform-
ance of the oil exporting economies largely depends on developments in interna-
tional oil markets. Hence, the decrease in energy prices at the beginning of the 
1980s led to a decline in demand for migrant labor. The falling oil prices also 
affected resource-poor states, whose balances of payments depended on work-
ers’ remittances employed in oil-rich states. Declining oil prices and decreasing 
remittances meant that the states had trouble financing public sector wages and 
subsidies. Hence, public debts increased strongly and macroeconomic balances 
eroded in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the highly regulated business environment in MENA coun-
tries, the well-protected state-owned enterprises, and the large bureaucratic sec-
tor inhibited private and foreign investment and prevented the development of 
                                                
45 Data retrieved July 2, 2009, from the World Bank WDI database. 
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competitive, export-oriented industries. As a result, physical capital accumula-
tion fell by 75 percent per worker in the 1980s (Yousef, 2004). The RRLI coun-
tries exhibited an average growth rate of GDP per capita of –2.7 percent be-
tween 1980 and 1989. Growth in the RRLA economies also became negative (–
1.6 percent on average). The RPLA countries only grew by 0.8 percent per year 
during the 1980s.46 Furthermore, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the 
region declined and became negative (Sala-i-Martin & Artadi, 2003; Yousef, 
2004). Decreasing growth rates met an increasing working age population and, 
therefore, yielded high unemployment rates. MENA experienced one of the 
worst growth performances worldwide in the 1980s. 
In the mid-1980s, most MENA countries undertook policy reforms to stabi-
lize their economies. Therefore, subsidies and public expenditures were reduced 
and exchange rate regimes were reformed. In fact, in the early 1990s, debt levels 
had decreased, inflation was under control, and economic performance had been 
stabilized in most MENA countries. However, despite macroeconomic successes 
reform efforts were insufficient and not qualified to solve the structural defi-
ciencies. Additionally, external factors such as volatilities in oil prices and agri-
cultural production led to a weak economic performance of the MENA countries 
in the 1990s in general with average GDP growth rates of 4.44 percent (RRLA), 
4.40 percent (RPLA), and 5.10 percent (RRLI).47
Although the 1990s brought a slight recovery, the general trend of GDP per 
capita in the period between 1975 and 2000 was downwards. In the 2000s, espe-
cially the RRLI countries, exhibited increasing growth rates, mainly after 
2003/2004. Although some countries further conducted economic reform efforts, 
for example Saudi Arabia, the improved growth rates of the oil exporters can 
again be traced back to developments on the energy markets. The RPLA coun-
tries further achieved moderate but constant growth rates in the 2000s. Data for 
2008/2009 and thereby for the period of the worldwide financial crisis are not 
yet available. 
4.4 Total factor productivity 
One of MENA’s most significant problems, however, is the general inefficiency 
of its economy. Despite high investment in physical capital accumulation in the 
1960s and 1970s, TFP growth in the region declined steadily. According to Sala-
i-Martin and Artadi (2003, p. 29), average TFP growth between 1975 and 2000 
                                                
46 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars. Data retrieved July 2, 2009, from the World 
Bank WDI database. 
47 GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars. Data retrieved July 2, 2009, from the World 
Bank WDI database. The RRLA country group excludes Iraq and the RPLA country group 
excludes West Bank and Gaza. 
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was negative for Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Egypt, Oman, Syria, and Tunisia realized positive 
TFP growth during the period, although the average TFP growth rates per year 
were below two percent. Yousef (2004, p. 97) demonstrates average TFP growth 
per laborer in the MENA region between 1960 and 2000. Accordingly, the re-
gion exhibited an average TFP growth of 3.4 percent in the 1960s, –1 percent in 
the 1970s, –1.5 percent in the 1980s, and –0.2 percent in the 1990s. Only Sub-
Saharan Africa performed equally bad. South Asia, Latin America and the Car-
ibbean, and the OECD countries exhibited only one decade of negative TFP 
growth during this period, and East Asia and the Pacific showed positive TFP 
growth rates throughout (Yousef, 2004). 
Hakura (2004) calculates TFP growth for some MENA countries using the 
growth accounting method. She finds that TFP growth in the observed MENA 
countries declined by an average of one percent per year between 1980 and 
2000. The decline of the non-oil countries in her study (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia) accounts for –0.15 percent, whereas the decline in oil countries 
(Algeria, Iran, Kuwait) is –1.86 percent per year. 
The Arab Human Development Report 2002 calculates the labor productiv-
ity of the MENA region as a percentage of the North American level in constant 
1985 US dollars. Accordingly, industrial labor productivity per worker in the 
MENA region deteriorated from 32 percent of the North American level in 1970 
to 25 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1990 (p. 87f.). Therefore, the MENA 
region must improve its general economic efficiency to generate growth and 
employ its increasing working age population (Dyer & Yousef, 2007; Yousef, 
2004). 
4.5 Investment 
Because of its disappointing growth performance, one would expect investment 
rates in the MENA region to be low. However, this is not true. The gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP is higher than in most other observed 
regions in the 2000s, apart from East Asia and Pacific and South Asia. Never-
theless, table 4.1 shows that gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP declined from 30.48 in 1983 to 21.92 in 2000. Since 2001 a slight recovery 
is observable. 
Public expenditures account for a large part of general investment. Private 
indigenous investment as well as foreign direct investment (FDI) is hampered by 
the regulatory environment, inefficient bureaucracies, and political instability 
and insecurity. FDI inflows are not only desirable because of the potential in-
crease in physical capital, FDI also implies a transfer of knowledge, skills, and 
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technology. Hence, regulations restricting FDI flows limit a country’s possibility 
to accumulate capital as well as technology and knowledge. 
Table 4.1: gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. Source: own illustration. 
Data accessed July 2, 2009, from the WDI database. 
Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP 
 1980s 1990s 2000–2007 
East Asia and Pacific 28.27 31.86 34.08 
Euro area 21.87 20.90 20.59 
OECD 22.34 21.15 20.42 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
20.15 18.93 18.49 
MENA 26.93 23.27 22.94 
South Asia 19.63 21.90 26.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.12 17.03 17.86 
The investment environment in the MENA region can be depicted with data 
on Investment Freedom from the Index of Economic Freedom 2009 (figures 4.5
and 4.6). This variable measures a country’s investment climate regarding for-
eign and internal capital flows. Hence, it can be examined whether a special 
code exists that determines laws and procedures on FDI, how far the govern-
ment encourages FDI, whether restrictions on access to foreign exchange exist, 
whether foreign and domestic firms are treated equally, whether capital transac-
tions are restricted, and whether FDI is allowed in all industries (Miller & 
Holmes, 2009, p. 446). 
Except for Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, all MENA countries exhibit 
scores equal to or below 50. Although the investment climate in Bahrain, Ku-
wait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen improved between 1999 
and 2009, it deteriorated in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, and Tunisia and 
stagnated in the remaining countries. The average level of Investment Freedom
in MENA countries amounted to 42 in 1999 and 43 in 2009. Hence, almost no 
improvement is observable on average in the region. The selected advanced 
economies exhibited an average level of Investment Freedom of 64 in 1999 and 
72 in 2009. 
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Figure 4.5: investment freedom in the MENA region. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 































































Selected advanced economies: investment freedom
1999
2009
Figure 4.6: investment freedom in advanced economies. Source: own illustration. Data ac-
cessed March 10, 2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom 2009. 
Figure 4.7 demonstrates average FDI inflows in millions of US dollars at 
current prices. MENA FDI inflows have almost stagnated at a low level since 
1973. However, after 2003 all MENA countries, but especially the RRLI and 
RPLA countries, have exhibited an increase in FDI inflows. Nevertheless, the 
development of FDI inflows is disappointing compared with the selected ad-
vanced economies, which exhibited averages of 1,952 million US dollars be-
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tween 1973 and 1979, 6,705 million US dollars in the 1980s, 18,745 million US 
dollars in the 1990s, and 48,908 million US dollars between 2000 and 2007.48
Figure 4.7: MENA average FDI inflows. Source: own illustration. Data accessed July 2, 
2009, from the WDI database. 
4.6 Public sector 
The public sector plays a dominant role in MENA countries. Public investment 
is high, the state owns most of the firms and thereby is the main employer. Fig-
ure 4.8 presents the government share of the RGDPL of the MENA countries 
and advanced economies between 1979 and 2003.49 As can be seen, the MENA 
country groups exhibit higher government shares of real GDP per capita com-
pared with the advanced economies (except for RRLI in the 1970s). The RRLA 
countries realized their highest government shares between 1980 and 1995. 
Even after 1995, the share remained at over 27 percent of real GDP per capita. 
The RRLI countries possessed a moderate government share until 1980. Then, 
the government share increased and culminated in 1991 with 32 percent of GDP 
per capita. After 1991, the RRLI government share declined significantly to un-
der 20 percent. Unfortunately, the data do not cover the years after 2003. The 
government share of real GDP per capita of the RPLA countries has been above 
25 percent since 1970. Development has been relatively constant compared with 
other MENA country groups. Only in 1991 was a sharp increase observable, 
which can be traced back to events in Lebanon. However, after 1994 the gov-
                                                
48 US dollars in current prices. 
49 RGDPL is real GDP per capita generated by using the Laspeyres method. The data are 
taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers & Aten (2006); accessed at 















































Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
137
ernment share of RPLA countries decreased and remained slightly above 20 
percent. 
Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2003) show that the private-to-public investment 
ratio in the 1980s and 1990s was significantly lower in the MENA region com-
pared with OECD countries and East Asia. The Arab oil countries, however, ex-
hibited the worst ratios with 1.4 in the 1980s and 1.7 in the 1990s. The Arab 
non-oil economies realized a ratio of private-to-public investment of 1.8 in the 
1980s and 3.0 in the 1990s. By comparison, the ratio of the OECD countries ac-
counted for 5.7 in the 1980s and 6.6 in the 1990s. In East Asia, the ratio rose 
from 4.8 in the 1980s to 5.1 in the 1990s. Hence, although improvements in the 
ratio of private-to-public investment are observable over time, the MENA coun-
tries perform worse than the OECD economies and East Asia, which, by the 
way, also improved their ratios between the 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, Yousef (2004, p. 103) demonstrates that, in the 1990s, gov-
ernment employment as a percentage of total employment was highest in the 
MENA region with just below 18 percent compared with the OECD economies, 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. 
Of course, government wages as a percentage of GDP were also highest in the 
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Figure 4.8: government share of RGDPL. Source: own illustration. Data accessed October, 
2009, [online] from the Penn World Tables 6.2. 
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4.7 Demography and education 
A decisive development factor is MENA’s demography. In 2007, the total popu-
lation of the MENA region accounted for 319,586,985 people compared to 

























































































Figure 4.9: population growth. Source: own illustration. Data accessed July 2, 2009, from the 
World Bank WDI database. 
Figure 4.9 demonstrates the average population growth rates from 1960 to 
2007. Between 1960 and 1979, MENA exhibited an average population growth 
rate of 4.4 percent per year and thereby obtained the highest population growth 
rates worldwide. Although population growth has declined since 1980, MENA 
still lies above other world regions and the world average. Only Sub-Saharan 
Africa has exhibited higher population growth rates since 1994. Given that 
MENA realized its highest population growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
that growth rates have remained above two percent since then, the MENA labor 
markets are under enormous pressure. The percentage of the working age popu-
lation (aged 15–64) in the MENA region increased from 52.5 in the 1960s to 
63.9 in the 2000s. Thirty-one percent of the population in the MENA region 
were aged 0–14 in 2007 and this group will gradually join the working age 
population in the forthcoming years. According to the Arab World Competitive-
ness Report 2002–2003, the total population of the MENA region will amount to 
470 million in 2025 and 654 million in 2050 (UNFPA, 2003, p. 36).52 Yousef 
(2004) calculates that to meet the present and forthcoming labor supply, the 
2004 level of employment must double within two decades or that, within the 
next 15 years, as many new jobs must be created as was done in the past 50 
years (p. 102). 
                                                
50 The calculation for 2007 excludes Iraq because of data unavailability. 
51 The calculation for 1960 excludes West Bank & Gaza because of data unavailability. 
52 The definition of the MENA region might vary slightly in this report compared with the 
definition of the current study. 
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However, economic decline and increasing public debt in the 1980s hit the 
public sector as the main employer. Furthermore, the disappointing economic 
performance of the 1980s and 1990s led to a decrease in labor exports to the 
Gulf states. Hence, unemployment in the labor-abundant countries grew and, at 
the same time, workers’ remittances declined. Therefore, the public sectors were 
unable to employ the workers that usually would have worked in the Gulf states 
and sent home parts of their wages. More and more educated first-time job-
seekers became unemployed, since the public sector could no longer absorb the 
enormous quantity of labor supply. Furthermore, the development of the private 
sector as an alternative employment strategy had been oppressed systematically 
since the 1950s. Hence, unemployment in the MENA region has increased sig-
nificantly since 1980. 
Although the education systems of the MENA countries improved in the 
second half of the 20th century, it could not keep up with educational progress 
in other developing regions. Nevertheless, literacy rates improved from 58 per-
cent of the adults in 1990 to 73 percent in 2007. Secondary net school enrolment 
accounted for 60 percent in 2000 and 67 percent in 2005.  
However, despite progress in enrolment rates the main problem of the 
MENA education system is its quality. MENA education systems do not provide 
pupils and students for the relevant labor markets. It has focused on training 
young people for public sector jobs instead of encouraging other skills. Hence, a 
significant mismatch between labor markets and educational output exists. 
Therefore, reforms in the MENA education system will play a crucial role re-
garding the challenge of demographic development and unemployment. To deal 
with the worsening job crisis, the MENA countries have to extend their private 
sectors. The public sector has not been able to absorb the increasing labor force 
in the past and will be even less able to create the necessary amount of new jobs 
in the future. However, such an encouragement of the private sector must be ac-
companied by severe improvements in the quality of education. A strong private 
sector can only emerge if an appropriately educated labor supply is available 
(UNDP, 2002, pp. 51–63; UNDP, 2003, pp. 51–68; Yousef, 2004).  
Private sector enlargement must also be accompanied by several other im-
provements: the quality of education has to be improved; business regulations 
have to be reduced; FDI must be attracted; the financial sectors must be devel-
oped and the banking system must be reformed; red tape and corruption have to 
be combated; investments in R&D must increase to improve TFP growth and the 
general efficiency of the economies; trade barriers have to be abolished; and di-
versification must be pursued to end the oil dependence. 
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Figure 4.10: literacy rates (adults). Source: own illustration. Data accessed July 2, 2009, 
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Figure 4.11: secondary school enrolment. Source: own illustration. Data accessed July 2, 
2009, from the World Bank WDI database. 
4.8 Business environment 
Business regulations belong to the institutional environment of a state. The re-
strictions present formal constraints humans impose on themselves to regulate 
their interactions. As already explained in the general part on institutions, these 
restrictions might not be efficient. They can be shaped by the interests of certain 
groups and are influenced by a set of institutional and non-institutional factors. 
Hence, a country’s business environment can be growth supporting or growth 
inhibiting. In general, more regulations disturb market forces and result in less 
efficiency. However, some regulations are necessary to constrain the actions of 
individuals in favor of general freedom. Nevertheless, too many and inefficient 
constraints prevent market participants from investing and resources from being 
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efficiently allocated. Therefore, a free business environment with as few as pos-
sible restrictions is supposed to foster growth. According to the hypothesis of 
growth-inhibiting institutions in the Arab region, the business regulations in the 
MENA region should be many and more inefficient compared with regulations 
in the advanced economies. 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 demonstrate the business freedom index from the 
2009 Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation. The index incor-
porates data on starting a business (number of procedures, time in days, costs as 
a percentage of per capita income, minimum capital as a percentage of per capita 
income); data on obtaining a license (number of procedures, time in days, costs 
as a percentage of per capita income); and data on closing a business (time in 
years, costs as a percentage of estate, recovery rate in cents in the dollar).53
A score of 100 depicts the freest business environment, whereas zero de-
scribes the least free and most regulated business environment. 
Arab countries, especially Djibouti and Libya, perform poorly with a busi-
ness freedom index in 2009 of 20 and 38, respectively. However, the MENA 
countries in general have lower scores than the advanced economies. The 
MENA average is 66 in 2000 and 65 in 2009, compared with an average of 76 in 
2000 and 88 in 2009 in the advanced countries. Furthermore, the advanced 
countries’ average business freedom index improved in the period from 2000 to 
2009, whereas the business environment in several MENA countries deterio-
rated. Hence, the business environment in the MENA region is more regulated 
and less supportive of growth than the business environment in the advanced 
economies. 
Table 4.2 uses data from the World Bank’s WDI database to analyze busi-
ness regulations in more detail. It demonstrates the time required to start up a 
business in days in 2008, the time in days required to register property in 2008, 
and the time required to enforce a contract in days in 2008. Again, the available 
data for the MENA region are compared with a set of advanced economies. On 
average, it takes 23 days to start up a business in the MENA region and 12 days 
on average in the advanced economies. However, not all Arab countries perform 
poorly concerning this index. In Bahrain, Egypt, and Qatar it takes less than 10 
days to start up a business. However, Algeria (24 days), Djibouti (37 days), Iran 
(47 days), Iraq (77 days), Kuwait (35 days), and West Bank and Gaza (49 days) 
exhibit the worst results. 
                                                
53 A detailed description of the derivation of the index can be found on the Heritage Founda-
tion’s homepage at http://www.heritage.org/index/Business-Freedom.aspx [accessed at 10 
March 2010]. 
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Figure 4.12: MENA business freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed March 10, 

























































Selected advanced economies: business freedom 
1999
2009
Figure 4.13: advanced economies business freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 
March 10, 2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Economic 
Freedom 2009. 
Concerning the time required to register property, the performance of the 
Arab countries is mixed. For example, the registration of property takes eight 
days in Iraq, two days in Saudi Arabia, and six days in the UAE. However, one 
should also consider the data on the existence and security of property rights in 
these countries. Furthermore, even though the registration of property might take 
little time, not every citizen in the country might be able to register property or, 
even if registered, property might not be secure. Since the methodology applied 
to generate the data is untraceable, the numbers should be considered carefully. 
Nevertheless, in 2008 it took 32 days on average to register property in the 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
143
MENA region, according to the WDI data. The results for the advanced econo-
mies are somewhat biased by the data score of France. However, including 
France, it took an average of 28 days to register property in the advanced 
economies in 2008. Excluding France, the average was 17 days.  
Some MENA outliers can be detected concerning contact enforcement. 
These are Djibouti (1225 days), Egypt (1010 days), and Syria (872 days). The 
advanced economies also exhibit an outlier, Italy, with 1210 days. On average, it 
takes 678 days to enforce a contract in MENA compared with 422 days in the 
advanced economies (312 days without Italy). Concerning business regulation, 
the MENA region performs worse than the advanced economies, at least regard-
ing the data and variables considered. 
4.9 Financial sector 
The development of the financial sectors in MENA countries varies. Neverthe-
less, financial sectors still underperform and are not able to support sustainable 
economic growth. The banking sectors in the MENA region are still dominated 
by public ownership and low access to banking services. This is even true for 
the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries where severe regulations hinder 
intra-GCC and international investments in the banking sector. For example, the 
state and other GCC countries own 65 percent of the banking system in Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi. Nevertheless, new financial centers have been implemented in 
the Gulf states, such as the Dubai Financial International Center. However, these 
centers are special financial zones, within which special regimes are applied. 
The financial zones are thought to attract Western and Asian financial institu-
tions and are not connected to the indigenous banking system (World Bank, 
2008, p. 59). 
However, improvements of the banking sector have been observable in 
countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco. This is 
because privatization in the banking sector has been enforced, banks are opening 
branches in neighboring countries, and GCC countries are investing in the coun-
tries’ banking sectors. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, bank deposits, the M2-to-GDP ratio, and 
bank credits to the private sector have increased (World Bank, 2008, p. 58). 
Nevertheless, access to banking services is still restricted and small-to-medium 
private enterprises find it difficult to obtain credit. Access to financing was men-
tioned as one of the most problematic factors for doing business in the MENA
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Table 4.2: MENA business regulations. Source: own illustration. Data accessed July 2, 2009, 
from the World Bank WDI database. 
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region in the 2007 Arab World Competitiveness Report.54 The report uses sur-
vey data from the World Bank’s Opinion Survey, which is conducted for the 
yearly Global Competitiveness Report. Foreign and indigenous enterprises oper-
ating in the MENA countries are asked for their particular business environ-
ments. In eight of the 12 MENA countries, access to financing is described as 
the first or second most problematic factor for doing business.55 In the remaining 
four MENA countries, access to financing is rated as the sixth or seventh most 
problematic factor.56
The development of stock markets in the MENA region has improved over 
the past decade. Stock markets exist in nearly all MENA countries and espe-
cially the Gulf states invest in other Arab countries’ stock markets, such as Jor-
dan or Egypt. For example. MENA market capitalization increased from ap-
proximately 73,000 million US dollars in 1994 to approximately 883,000 mil-
lion US dollars in 2006. During the same time span, the value traded increased 
from circa 10,500 million US dollars to 1,684,000 million US dollars, and the 
number of listed firms grew from 1089 in 1994 to 1571 in 2006 (World Bank, 
2008, p. 62f.). Although change is apparent, obscure legal restrictions, con-
straints on capital accounts, and restraints on capital outflows and foreign capital 
inflows inhibit further capital market integration. However, more reform efforts 
can be expected, since all MENA countries want to benefit from the high exist-
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Figure 4.14: MENA financial freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed March 10, 
2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Economic Freedom 2009. 
                                                
54 See the country profiles of the 2007 Arab World Competitiveness Report (Drzeniek Ha-
nouz, El Diwany & Yousef, 2007, p. 150 ff.). 
55 Algeria (1), Egypt (1), Morocco (1), Tunisia (1), Jordan (2), Libya (2), Qatar (2), Syria (2). 
56 Bahrain (7), Kuwait (6), Oman (6), UAE (6). 
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Figure 4.15: advanced economies financial freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 
March 10, 2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Economic 
Freedom 2009. 
Figure 4.14 depicts financial freedom in the MENA countries, a measure 
taken from the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom. The variable incorporates 
“the extent of government regulation of financial services; the extent of state 
intervention in banks and other financial services; the difficulty of opening and 
operating financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals); 
and government influence on the allocation of credit” (Miller & Holmes, 2009, 
p. 447). Financial freedom is measured on a scale from 0–100, with 0 indicating 
no financial freedom and 100 indicating full financial freedom. Accordingly, it 
varies widely between MENA countries. Nevertheless, only Bahrain exhibits a 
score greater 60 (more particularly, 80) in 2009. Apart from Djibouti, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Oman, who exhibit scores of 60, the remaining countries obtain 
50 or less. Furthermore, on average no improvements are observable in the pe-
riod between 1999 and 2009. In both years, the MENA countries realized an av-
erage level of 44. By contrast, selected advanced economies realized an average 
score of 68 in 1999 and 72 in 2009. 
In general, the financial sectors of the MENA countries are unfit to promote 
the necessary support for persistent economic growth. However, Creane et al. 
(2007) find that the MENA region in general must improve its institutional qual-
ity and foster non-bank financial development to achieve higher financial sector 
efficiency. Accordingly, in particular, government interventions must be re-
duced and the quality of the legal system improved.
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Tariffs have significantly reduced over the past decade in most MENA coun-
tries. Nevertheless, substantial differences between MENA countries remain. 
MFN tariffs are a severe problem, since they benefit less efficient partner coun-
tries.57 Furthermore, intraregional trade is partly hampered by trade complemen-
tarities. Although intraregional trade has expanded, it remains low compared 
with all other world regions except for South Asia. Although improvements in 
official tariff rates have occurred in recent years, non-tariff barriers remain a key 
obstacle. Quantity restrictions, regulatory restrictions, and customs restrictions 
are widespread in the region. Figure 4.16 demonstrates the levels of trade free-
dom in the MENA countries. The variable trade freedom is taken from the Index 
of Economic Freedom. It is a “composite measure of the absence of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services” and it is 
based on “the trade-weighted average tariff rate and non-tariff barriers” (Miller 
& Holmes, 2009, p. 442). It can be seen that trade freedom in many MENA 
countries has improved significantly since 1999. The average trade freedom 
changed from a scale of 57 in 1999 to 71 in 2009. However, selected advanced 
economies exhibited an average of 79 in 1999 and of 85 in 2009. Hence, large 






















































































Figure 4.16: MENA trade freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed March 10, 2010, 
from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Economic Freedom 2009. 
                                                
57 MFN tariff: most favored nation tariff. 
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Figure 4.17: advanced economies trade freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 
March 10, 2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Economic 
Freedom 2009. 
4.11 Corruption and red tape 
In corruptive regimes, efficient economic activity is inhibited. Foreign and in-
digenous investment and thereby growth are negatively hit by high levels of cor-
ruption (Asiedu & Freeman, 2008; Mauro, 1995). Furthermore, corruption and 
red tape are interdependent and have to be jointly considered (Guriev, 2004). 
Although theories of efficient corruption exist, corruption is always a second 
best solution, since the best strategy would be to abolish the distortions and inef-
ficiencies themselves (Aidt, 2003). 
The concentration of political power, lack of governmental and bureaucratic 
transparency, a large public sector, and a weak rule of law constitute an envi-
ronment favorable for corruption.
Freedom from corruption in the MENA region is demonstrated in figure 
4.18. The variable is also taken from the 2009 Index of Economic Freedom and 
is measured on a scale from 0–100, with zero indicating very corrupt govern-
ments and 100 indicating very little corruption. The score is derived from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007 (Miller & 
Holmes, 2009, p. 450). 
Corruption depicts a severe problem in the MENA region. The average 
score deteriorated between 1999 and 2009, from 45 to 37. Only two countries, 
Qatar and the UAE, achieved a score higher than 50. Still both countries exhibit 
relatively low scores with 60 in the case of Qatar and 57 in the case of the UAE. 
The selected advanced economies exhibited an average score of 78 in both 1999 
and 2009. 
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Hence, improvements in combating corruption could generate significant ef-
ficiency gains in the MENA region. However, as already indicated, corruption is 
usually accompanied by red tape and thereby large, inefficient bureaucracies, 
authoritarian regimes, and by a weak rule of law. Hence, the abolishment of cor-
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Figure 4.18: MENA freedom from corruption. Source: own illustration. Data accessed March 
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Figure 4.19: advanced economies freedom from corruption. Source: own illustration. Data 
accessed March 10, 2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom 2009. 
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4.12 Political and legal Institutions  
Political and legal institutions mark the main direction of a country’s economic 
performance. These constraints have a direct effect on investment in physical 
and human capital and on production and, therefore, directly influence produc-
tivity and growth. A growth-inhibiting formal institutional environment makes 
economic success impossible. Whether an institution supports or inhibits growth 
depends on several factors and the interplay with other institutions. Neverthe-
less, some institutions can be described as growth supportive since without them 
efficient factor allocation is impossible. One growth-supportive formal institu-
tion is the implementation of property rights. Property rights ensure optimal in-
dividual utility maximization. Clearly defined ownership offers incentives to 
invest and allows the owner of an asset to charge the optimal price. Furthermore, 
with property rights an asset can be used as collateral, create new capital and 
thereby can be optimally applied (De Soto, 2000). The institution of property 
rights involves the implementation of further institutions. Property rights can 
only be enforced if the rule of law is implemented and if an independent judici-
ary exists otherwise the government or private interest groups are able to expro-
priate the owner of an asset. That is to say, the implementation of secure prop-
erty rights needs some kind of separation of powers. However, the division of 
powers usually incorporates a form of political participation, which restrains 
governmental authority and prevents the enforcement of interests required by a 
certain interest group or minority. Furthermore, political freedom and civil liber-
ties must be implemented to optimize growth. Both institutions allow for the op-
timal use of an asset. Human and physical capital can only then be optimally 
applied when the owner is in complete control and has the freedom to use his 
asset in a way that maximizes his utility. 
Therefore, property rights, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, politi-
cal freedom and participation, and civil liberties are supposed to be growth sup-
portive. Nevertheless, even these institutions underlie institutional complemen-
tarities and dependencies. Missing traditions of property rights and the rule of 
law can inhibit their formal implementation. Hence, it is possible that the infor-
mal institutional environment does not match the mentioned formal institutions 
and thereby their implementation does not result in optimal growth. That is to 
say, without property rights, an independent judiciary, and political participation 
and freedom the growth rate cannot be maximized. Countries that nevertheless 
realize high growth rates might still underperform compared with a situation in 
which the particular institutions are implemented. Hence, if the enforcement of 
property rights, an independent judiciary, and political freedom is not possible 
because of the complementarities and dependencies of the institutional system, 
the country is stuck in an institutional trap. External institutional change might 
not help either for the reasons analyzed in chapters two and three. Therefore, the 
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political and legal institutional environment can be responsible for economic 
backwardness. Economic institutions that hinder growth usually arise from cer-
tain political and legal institutions. 
4.12.1 Property rights 
 The protection of property rights is measured with data from the 2009 Index of 
Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation (Miller & Holmes, 2009). The 
corresponding property rights index (freedom eight) measures “the degree to 
which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which 
its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private 
property will be expropriated and analyses the independence of the judiciary, the 
existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and 
businesses to enforce contracts” (Miller & Holmes, 2009, p. 449). A score of 
100 depicts perfectly protected property rights, whereas a score of zero describes 
a situation in which property rights are missing and all property is owned by the 
state. 
Figure 4.20 demonstrates the property rights index scores for the available 
MENA countries in 1999 and 2009, and Figure 4.21 displays the index for cer-
tain advanced economies. The MENA countries exhibit considerably lower lev-
els of property rights. Property rights are nearly missing in Iran and Libya, and 
Bahrain and Jordan are the only countries exhibiting a property rights score 
marginally greater than 50 in 2009. Furthermore, the level of the index deterio-
rated in Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, and the UAE in the period from 1999 to 2009. The average score for the 
10 MENA countries accounted for 52 in 1999 and 38 in 2009. The advanced 
economies, on the contrary, exhibited an average score of 86 in 1999 and 82 in 
2009. Hence, in the MENA countries the legal systems are highly inefficient and 
influenced by governmental interest groups, corruption is extensive, ownership 
is weakly protected, and expropriation is common (Miller & Holmes, 2009, p. 
449). The bad scores that MENA countries exhibit in the property rights index 
already indicates one of the region's serious growth issues. Without improve-
ments in the implementation and protection of property rights, growth rates will 
not approach their optimal level. 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8

























































































Figure 4.20: MENA property rights. Source: own illustration. Data accessed March 10, 2010, 
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Figure 4.21: advanced economies property rights. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 
March 10, 2010, from the Heritage Foundation [online], Index of Economic 
Freedom 2009. 
4.12.2 Constraints on the executive and democracy 
Political and legal institutions are first examined using Polity IV data.58 In the 
general empirical analysis in section one, xconst was used as a proxy for prop-
erty rights and the accordant political and legal institutions that must accompany 
                                                
58 Data available online at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [accessed 2 July 
2009]. 
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secure ownership. Therefore, we will examine which levels of xconst for MENA 
countries.  
Xconst reflects “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectives” (Mar-
shall & Jaggers, 2007, p. 23). The variable is measured on a score from (1) 
‘Unlimited Authority’ to (7) ‘Executive Parity or Subordination’. In (1), the au-
thority is unconstrained and no independent judiciary exists, whereas (7) depicts 
a state of separation of powers; accountability groups have equal or more au-
thority than the executive. 
However, public and private actors must be constrained to implement prop-
erty rights, political freedom, and civil rights otherwise the government or pri-
vate interest groups might expropriate the owner of an asset and restrain her or 
his freedom. Hence, an independent judiciary, which cannot be influenced by 
political powers or other public or private interest groups, must exist. By meas-
uring the constraints on the executive, we also measure whether expropriation is 
possible or not and whether separation of powers and an independent judiciary 
are implemented. Xconst concentrates on constraints on the executive; thus, pri-
vate expropriation is not reflected. Nevertheless, xconst incorporates whether 
checks and balances and an independent judiciary are realized. If these institu-
tions exist in a state, they also regulate relationships between private actors. 
Hence, governmental and private constraints regarding expropriation are at least 
indirectly included. 
Furthermore, the forms of government in the MENA countries are exam-
ined. However, the official notations of political systems in the MENA region 
do not necessarily reflect reality in the countries. For example, in the CIA World 
Factbook, some MENA countries are described as republics.59 This might be 
true regarding their official descriptions, but these countries are far from realiz-
ing political freedom, political participation, civil liberties, division of powers, 
and so on. Corruption, oppression, nepotism, and authoritative governance are 
still prevalent in many states, although the official denotation might promise 
something else. Therefore, a measure from the Polity IV data set is used to ex-
amine the character of the MENA countries’ political systems. Polity IV con-
tains a measure of democracy (democ) and a measure of autocracy (autoc). De-
mocracy is defined as a mixture of three elements: “the presence of institutions 
and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. […] the existence of institutionalized constraints 
on the exercise of power by the executive. […] the guarantee of civil liberties to 
                                                
59 The CIA World Factbook, online available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/ [accessed 10 September 2010]. Examples: People's Democratic Republic of 
Algeria; Arab Republic of Egypt; Republic of Iraq; Lebanese Republic; Syrian Arab Repub-
lic; Tunisian Republic; Republic of Yemen. 
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all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall & 
Jaggers, 2007, p. 13). The indicator is derived from certain coded variables – 
“Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment”, “Openness of Executive Recruit-
ment”, “Constraint of Chief Executive”, and “Competitiveness of Political Par-
ticipation” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2007, p. 14) – and is scaled from 0–10, with 
zero indicating no democracy and 10 indicating strong democracy.  
Autocracies “sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. 
Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the 
political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional con-
straints” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2007, p. 14). The autocracy indicator is derived 
from codings of the variables “Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment”, 
“Openness of Executive Recruitment”, “Constraints of Chief Executive”, 
“Regulation of Participation”, and “Competitiveness of Participation” (Marshall 
& Jaggers, 2007, p. 15). Autoc is also scaled from 0–10 with zero indicating no 
autocracy and 10 indicating strong autocracy. 
The variable polity2 now combines the democracy and autocracy indicators 
into one score. It is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the de-
mocracy score and enables the classification of countries on a scale from 
strongly democratic (+10) to strongly autocratic (–10).  
Table 4.3 demonstrates the average xconst and polity2 scores for the MENA 
countries between 1990 and 2007.60 Table 4.4 depicts the xconst and polity2
scores for 2007, the last year for which data are available. All countries exhibit 
low levels of xconst, with a region average of 2.31. None of the MENA coun-
tries realizes a score of four or higher. This implicates that substantial limita-
tions on the executive do not exist in any the MENA countries. The authority is 
either unlimited (1) or a moderate limitation including an independent judiciary 
exists (3). (2) is defined as an intermediate category. However, the fact that in 
(3) an independent judiciary exists does not indicate that a Western standard rule 
of law or constitution is implemented. The standards towards which the judici-
ary is oriented can differ completely from Western standards.  
The average polity2 scores are negative for all MENA countries, indicating 
that the states are closer to autocracy than to democracy. Of course, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia exhibit –10, since both countries are hereditary monarchies.61
However, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Syria, and the UAE are also close to 
the categorization of being strongly autocratic with average scores of –7 and 
less. Nevertheless, the 2007 scores show improvements compared with the aver-
ages, at least for Algeria and Djibouti and, slightly, for Bahrain, Egypt, and 
                                                
60 Iraq and Lebanon are excluded because of data unavailability. The average polity2 score for 
Kuwait is calculated from 1991–2007, and the average polity2 score for Yemen is calculated 
for 1993–2007. 
61 In the case of Qatar the correct notation is ‘Emirate’. 
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Syria. On the contrary, the score for Iran worsened significantly compared with 
the average. 
The implementation of political rights and civil liberties in MENA countries 
is further analyzed with data from the Freedom in the World 2009 Survey by 
Freedom House. Table 4.5 reveals the scores for political rights and civil liber-
ties, as well as the categorization in free (F), partly free (PF), and not free (NF) 
MENA countries for 1980 and 2008 compared with selected advanced econo-
mies in Table 4.6. Political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) are rated on a 
scale from 1–7, with one indicating the most possible freedom and seven indi-
cating the least possible freedom. 
None of the MENA countries is categorized as free. Eleven countries are 
rated not free in 2008, and seven countries are rated partly free.  
Table 4.3: MENA average xconst and polity2, 1990–2007. Source: own illustration. Data 
accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from the Polity IV project. 
Average 1990–2007 
Country xconst polity2 
Algeria 3.11 –2.44 
Bahrain 1.83 –8.44 
Djibouti 2.50 –2.44 
Egypt 3.00 –5.50 
Iran 3.17 –2.50 
Jordan 3.00 –2.28 
Kuwait (1991–2007) 2.88 –7.12 
Libya 1.00 –7.00 
Morocco 2.89 –6.56 
Oman 1.94 –8.72 
Qatar 1.00 –10.00 
Saudi Arabia 1.00 –10.00 
Syria 1.89 –8.11 
Tunisia 2.67 –3.67 
UAE 3.00 –8.00 
Yemen (1993–2007) 2.00 –2.33 
Average 2.31 –5.94 
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Table 4.4: MENA xconst and polity2, 2007. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 27 Octo-
ber, 2009, [online] from the Polity IV project. 
2007 
Country xconst polity2 
Algeria 5 2 
Bahrain 2 –7 
Djibouti 3 2 
Egypt 3 –3 
Iran 2 –6 
Jordan 3 –3 
Kuwait 3 –7 
Libya 1 –7 
Morocco 3 –6 
Oman 2 –8 
Qatar 1 –10 
Saudi Arabia 1 –10 
Syria 3 –7 
Tunisia 2 –4 
UAE 3 –8 
Yemen 2 –2 
  
Table 4.5: MENA political freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 21 March, 2010, 
[online] from Freedom House, Freedom in the World Comparative and Histori-
cal Data 2009. 
1980 2008 
Country PR CL  Status PR CL  Status 
Algeria 6 6 NF 6 5 NF 
Bahrain 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 
Djibouti 3 4 PF 5 5 PF 
Egypt 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 
Iran 5 5 PF 6 6 NF 
Iraq 6 7 NF 6 6 NF 
Jordan 6 6 NF 5 5 PF 
Kuwait 6 4 PF 4 4 PF 
Lebanon 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 
Libya 6 7 NF 7 7 NF 
Morocco 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 
Oman 6 6 NF 6 5 NF 
Qatar 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 
Saudi Arabia 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 
Syria 5 7 NF 7 6 NF 
Tunisia 6 5 PF 7 5 NF 
UAE 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 
Yemen    5 5 PF 
Yemen, N. 6 5 NF    
Yemen, S. 6 7 NF    
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Table 4.6: Advanced economies political freedom. Source: own illustration. Data accessed 21 
March, 2010, [online] from Freedom House, Freedom in the World Comparative 
and Historical Data 2009. 
1980 2008
Country PR CL  Status PR CL  Status 
Australia 1 1 F 1 1 F 
Canada 1 1 F 1 1 F 
France 1 2 F 1 1 F 
Germany    1 1 F 
Germany, E.  7 7 NF       
Germany, W. 1 2 F       
Italy 1 2 F 1 2 F 
Japan 1 1 F 1 2 F 
Norway 1 1 F 1 1 F 
Switzerland 1 1 F 1 1 F 
UK 1 1 F 1 1 F 
US 1 1 F 1 1 F 
4.12.3 Good governance 
Individuals are able to optimize their utility when they are free to live their lives 
according to their own desires. Hence, freedom is an important factor for utility 
maximization. Therefore, freedom should only be constrained to prevent indi-
viduals from violating others. Hence, some form of societal organization – that 
is, some form of governance – must exist otherwise individuals harm each oth-
ers’ freedoms. Good governance, therefore, depicts a form of governance that 
ensures the highest possible individual freedom, which only hinders the viola-
tion of other individuals and their properties. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2009) define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised” (p. 5). According to the Arab Human Development 
Report 2002, “governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises 
the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and 
mediate their differences” (p. 105). Good governance is characterized through 
policies that offer the most possible individual freedom in a society and thereby 
enable optimal economic growth. Therefore, good governance promotes politi-
cal freedom, civil liberties, and the rule of law. It is participatory, transparent, 
accountable, and effective. Regulations are enacted when individual freedom 
harms others. 
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Hence, political and legal institutions are determinants of governance. Al-
most every study that deals with Arab economic growth performance mentions 
governance, and thereby formal institutions, as the main obstacle for economic 
growth. The Arab Human Development Report 2004, for example, solely deals 
with freedom, governance, and its components in the Arab world. This section 
examines determinants of good governance, and thereby political and legal insti-
tutions, in the MENA region. According to this study’s hypothesis, institutions 
are the main determinants of economic growth. Hence, we would expect Arab 
formal institutions to be less growth supportive than the institutions in more ad-
vanced economies. As we will see, the hypothesis proves to be right. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) measure six worldwide government 
indicators (WGI). These are calculated using 441 individual variables taken 
from 35 varying sources by 33 different organizations. All variables are based 
on survey data.62 Governance is measured on a scale between –2.5 and 2.5 with 



















































































MENA: voice and accountability
1998
2008
Figure 4.22: MENA: voice and accountability. Source: own illustration. 
                                                
62 A detailed description of the methodology and data sources can be found in Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009, pp. 5–25. 
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Advanced economies: regulatory quality
1998
2008
Figure 4.25: advanced economies: regulatory quality. Source: own illustration. 
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MENA: political stability and absence of violence/terrorism
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Figure 4.28: MENA: political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. Source: own illus-
tration. 
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Figure 4.29: advanced economies: political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. 
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Figure 4.31: advanced economies: rule of law. Source: own illustration. 
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Figure 4.33: advanced economies: control of corruption. Source: own illustration. 
Figures 4.22–4.33 compare the WGI for the incorporated MENA countries 
with the selected advanced economies.63 The MENA countries perform signifi-
cantly worse than the selected advanced economies. Concerning Voice and Ac-
countability, all MENA countries exhibit negative values; the average in 2008 
amounts to –1.10. Hence, political participation, freedom of expression, and 
freedom of association are almost not given and the press is not free. On the 
contrary, all of the selected advanced economies exhibit values greater 0.9, with 
an average score of 1.27 in 2008. Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and the 
UAE are the only Arab states who realized positive values for Political Stability 
                                                
63 Worldwide Government Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009), data accessed 
at 8 August, 2009, [online] from Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Govern-
ance Indicators 1996-2008. 
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& Absence of Violence/Terrorism in 2008, although none of them achieved a 
score greater than one. Iraq received the lowest score.64 The averages for the 
MENA countries are –0.47 in 1998 and –0.49 in 2008. Improvements took place 
in Algeria, Djibouti, and Libya. However, the situation of political stability is 
still poor in these countries. In general, political instability, violence, and terror-
ism show significant threats to the region. The advanced economies achieve av-
erages of 1.13 in 1998 and 0.88 in 2008. Of course, the increasing threat of ter-
rorism since 9/11/2001 led to a deterioration in the index in the advanced 
economies in general. Concerning Government Effectiveness, MENA countries 
perform significantly worse than the selected advanced economies. The averages 
account for –0.32 in 1998 and –0.29 in 2008 in MENA and 1.65 in 1998 and 
1.63 in 2008 in the advanced countries. Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Tunisia, and the UAE at least achieve positive scores in 2008, but all countries 
remain below a score of one. Hence, the quality of public services and govern-
ment commitment are low in MENA countries and political pressure is preva-
lent. The same is true for Regulatory Quality on which MENA countries achieve 
an average of –0.27 in 2008. However, a slight improvement from an average of 
–0.50 in 1998 is observable. Nevertheless, private sector development is inhib-
ited by the regulatory quality and the inability of governments to implement 
sound policies. The advanced economies achieve averages of 1.32 in 1998 and 
1.47 in 2008. MENA countries perform equally bad regarding Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption. However, the implementation of the rule of law is an in-
dispensable step to greater economic growth. The rule of law clarifies that every 
entity in a state has to abide to the laws, even the political power. Hence, it must 
be implemented to establish property rights. Only then can laws protecting prop-
erty rights be applied to inhibit private as well as governmental expropriation. 
Furthermore, the rule of law is necessary to enforce political freedom and civil 
liberties, which can only be protected if every entity, even the state itself, ac-
cepts them. Of course, an independent judiciary is necessary to enforce the laws 
against private and governmental violators. MENA countries perform poorly on 
the Rule of Law indicator, although great variations exist within the region. The 
average amounts to –1.08 in 1998 and –0.93 in 2008; hence, very slight im-
provement is observable over the decade. The averages of the selected advanced 
economies account for 1.64 in 1998 and 1.57 in 2008. On Control of Corrup-
tion, MENA countries exhibit an average of –0.15 in 1998 and –0.22 in 2008 
compared with an average of the advanced economies of 1.76 in 1998 and 1.60 
in 2008. Corruption inhibits efficient economic activity. Hence, it must be as-
sumed that the economic performance of the MENA countries is significantly 
hampered by the high levels of corruption. 
                                                
64 Iraq, however, achieved a score of –2.69. It is not traceable how this value is achieved since 
the lower bound is defined to be –2.5. 
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However, the improvements or deteriorations in the levels of the WGI be-
tween 1998 and 2008 have to be considered cautiously. In 1998, significantly 
fewer data sources were used to create the WGI. Hence, although the same data 
sources were used for the 1998 and 2008 indicators, additional data sources 
were applied in 2008. Therefore, comparability is restricted. This might partly 
explain the deteriorations in many indicators in the MENA countries over the 
decade. Nevertheless, several indicators in the MENA countries might in fact 
have worsened. 
It is conspicuous that even though all MENA countries perform relatively 
poorly on the WDI, large variations within the region exist. Bahrain, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia exhibit relatively good 
governance compared with the rest of the region. However, the ‘best’ MENA 
countries still perform poorly regarding the quality of governance compared 
with the advanced economies. 
Of course, data analysis must always be critically considered. Although all the 
mentioned studies measure institutions in one way or another, data sets are com-
posed in different ways and various methods are applied. The outcome depends 
on the data sources, previous definitions, codings, weightings, and so forth. 
Therefore, the analyses of data sets might differ even though they are supposed 
to measure similar institutions. Hence, the judgment concerning a certain coun-
try might differ according to whether Polity IV, Freedom House, the 2009 Index 
of Economic Freedom, or the WGI by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) 
was applied. This is the case since the definitions of, for example, democracy 
and autocracy differ or since constraints on the executive, the regulatory envi-
ronment, the rule of law, the quality of bureaucracy, and governmental effi-
ciency are measured differently according to varying criteria. Furthermore, the 
construction of the indicators and categorizations can often not be completely 
reconstructed. Objectivity is not always assured; therefore, the data sets might 
be influenced by the opinions of the preparing entities and sponsors. The con-
clusions drawn in this study refer merely to the particular definitions and data 
sets. Nevertheless, although the detail of a particular country analysis might dif-
fer in some cases, the general implications are universal. Hence, authorities in 
MENA countries are not constrained. Often small elites are in power and politi-
cal participation is restricted. Several chief executives are not assigned via popu-
lar vote, but within small circles of the political elite or by hereditary right. This 
might be the case even if officially a popular vote is run. Often, no independent 
judiciary exists and no Western standard rule of law. Governments are generally 
inefficient, private sector development is inhibited, and large bureaucracies and 
red tape are prevalent. Corruption, bribery, and nepotism are widespread. Prop-
erty rights are not secure and, hence, efficient economic activity is inhibited. 
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Furthermore, the MENA region exhibits some of the worst indicators of political 
freedom and civil rights worldwide. None of the countries are categorized as 
free. That is to say, political and legal institutions are not implemented in a way 
that supports growth. 
4.13 Informal institutions 
The first part of this dissertation project also emphasized informal institutions – 
that is, beliefs, attitudes, morals, norms, habits, codes of conduct, conventions, 
and culture in general. The hypothesis was that informal institutions differ be-
tween societies since cultures vary. Informal institutions determine an individ-
ual’s behavior. If certain cultural features hold for the whole society, almost 
every individual acts accordingly and thereby the informal institutions influence 
aggregated societal behavior. However, nearly all human behavioral patterns 
have an impact on an individual’s economic life. Therefore, informal institutions 
that are implemented in society affect its aggregated economic performance. 
One example is the attitude towards the female labor force in traditional, hierar-
chical societies (limited morality). Some individuals are convinced that women 
should not participate in the job market, but instead raise children and maintain 
the house. Since this is the majority’s opinion, the female labor force is also 
sparse on an aggregated level. Hence, the economies abdicate one half of their 
workforce and thereby one half of their human capital. 
In chapter three of the dissertation project, the variables trust, control, re-
spect, and obedience were analyzed and it was demonstrated that these informal 
institutions influence the level of per capita income. These particular variables 
will now be examined for the MENA countries. Again, a regression analysis is 
not possible because of data limitations. Thus, descriptive statistics will be ap-
plied. Since the societal structure is decisive for economic development, further 
variables that allow inference on societal organization are observed. The exami-
nation of the informal institutions of the MENA region is considered to provide 
the weakest evidence because of the issues already mentioned; measurement er-
ror and data limitations. 
4.13.1 Trust 
WVS question text: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Possible an-
swers: 1) Most people can be trusted; 2) Can't be too careful; 3) Don’t know. 
The variable trust is defined as the percentage of the respondents of a par-
ticular country answering that most people can be trusted. Figure 4.34 demon-
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strates the results for the available MENA countries and selected advanced 
economies. The connection between trust and per capita income in the particular 
countries is depicted.65 Trust varies greatly between the MENA countries, with 
Algeria exhibiting a level of trust of only 10.80 percent compared with Saudi 
Arabia, which realizes a level of trust of 50.50 percent. In the advanced econo-
mies, trust varies between 21.40 percent in France and 41.00 percent in Switzer-
land, with Norway being an outlier (64.80 percent). The average level of trust in 
the MENA countries is 34.39 percent and the average level of trust in the ad-
vanced economies is 37.63 percent. Hence, the country averages do not vary and 
no general trend can be singled out. However, concerning the explanatory con-
tent of trust, no pattern between the MENA countries and the advanced econo-
mies helps explain the differences in economic development. Hence, no conclu-
sions on trust and its impact on economic development in the MENA region can 
be drawn. 
4.13.2 Control 
WVS question text: “Some people feel they have completely free choice and 
control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real ef-
fect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" 
and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control 
you feel you have over the way your life turns out”. 
Control is measured by adding the percentages of scores 7–10 for each 
country. Figure 4.35 demonstrates the results for control. The available MENA 
countries realize an average level of control of 51.84 percent. The selected ad-
vanced economies exhibit an average of 65.30 percent. Thus, the advanced 
economies exhibit higher scores of control, with only France, Italy, and Japan 
possessing levels comparable to the MENA countries. Hence, six of the nine ad-
vanced economies exhibit higher levels of control than the MENA countries. 
The results for the MENA countries vary, with Egypt exhibiting a level of con-
trol of 42.80 percent and Jordan 65.10 percent. 
                                                
65 GDP per capita is measured in constant 2000 US dollars. GDP data were accessed July 2, 
2009, from the World Bank WDI database. The WVS was conducted between 1995 and 2003. 
Therefore, per capita incomes do not date from the same year. For example, Algeria’s per 
capita income dates from 2002, Australia’s per capita income dates from 1995, etc. Hence, the 
levels of per capita income cannot be directly compared. Instead, only the connection between 
per capita income and the level of trust in the particular country is demonstrated. Furthermore, 
the levels of trust can be compared, since it is assumed that informal institutions change only 
marginally over time. Iraq is omitted since no data on per capita income is available for the 
particular year. Great Britain is also omitted because the WDI provide data for the United 
Kingdom, while the WVS data correspond to Great Britain. This note applies to all WVS in-
dicators in this section. 
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The results are not clear, but a pattern is more recognizable than in the case 
of trust. The attitude concerning control over one’s own life varies between 
MENA countries. Nevertheless, most advanced economies exhibit higher levels 
of control than MENA countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that people in 
MENA countries, Italy, France, and Japan are rather persuaded by predetermina-
tion. Per capita incomes in France, Italy, and Japan are higher than in MENA 
countries. However, this observation does not disturb our hypothesis since per 
capita incomes are not solely determined by one’s attitude concerning destiny. It 
could be the case that the people of MENA countries invest less than people in 
selected advanced economies because of their attitude concerning predestina-
tion. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, this reveals nothing regarding causal-
ity. Both per capita income and control influence each other, but the result is not 
convincing. 
4.13.3 Respect and obedience 
WVS question text: “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to 
learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please 
choose up to five". 
Respect is defined as the percentage of the population of a country that con-
siders "tolerance and respect for other people" to be important. Obedience is the 
percentage of the population of a country that considers “obedience” to be im-
portant. 
Figures 4.36 and 4.37 show the results. On average, 63.43 percent of the 
population in the MENA countries state that "tolerance and respect for other 
people" is especially important compared with 77.29 percent in the advanced 
economies. Apart from Norway (65.90 percent), the advanced economies exhibit 
significantly higher levels of respect than the MENA countries do. 
The same pattern is observable for obedience. In the MENA countries, more 
than 40 percent of the population chose obedience to be an important child qual-
ity. Regarding the advanced economies, France realizes the highest score with 
35.60 percent. On average, 55.70 percent of the MENA population regards obe-
dience as an important child quality compared with an average of 27.14 percent 
in the advanced economies. 
In terms of respect and obedience, a difference between MENA countries 
and advanced economies is observable. In chapter three, respect and obedience
were used as proxies for the general structure of the society. Hence, the two 
variables were used as proxies for generalized and limited morality, or rather 
modern and traditional societies. It was argued that high levels of respect depict 
a society in which emphasis is placed on the individual and trust and respect are 
shown to anybody, independent of group affiliation and hierarchy. On the con-
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trary, high levels of obedience indicate a traditional, conservative society in 
which hierarchy and authority are considered important. Independence, logical 
reasoning, rationality, and the challenging of orders are undesirable. Conse-
quently, collectivism is superior to individualism.  
Therefore, it seems that MENA countries correspond to more traditional, 
conservative societies, where limited morality is prevalent. Hence, the societal 
structures of MENA countries are less growth supportive compared with the ad-
vanced economies that exhibit high levels of respect and low levels of obedi-
ence. 
In addition, other properties exist that suggest the structure of the society. 
Respect and obedience are merely proxy variables. Since no regression analysis 
is run because of data limitations, the analysis might not be evidence enough to 
demonstrate that the MENA countries belong to traditional, conservative socie-
ties. Therefore, further indicators from the WVS will be considered. 
Traditional societies and limited morality are inter alia characterized through 
the importance of the family, clan, or tribe as well as through more conservative 
attitudes towards the labor market participation of women, children and familial 
cohabitation, and gender equality in general. Usually, traditional societies ex-
hibit low rates of women labor force participation and high birth rates. Often, 
families – that is, children, parents, grandparents, and eventually further rela-
tives – live together in one house or at least close to each other. Furthermore, 
women are not treated the same as men; they receive less education; become 
married young; raise children; run the household; work on the fields; and so on 
but do not participate in the labor market or in political life. 
Therefore, several questions from the WVS are analyzed, which deal with 
topics such as gender equality, the labor market participation of women, and fa-
milial structures. Thus, conclusions can be drawn regarding the structure of the 
society. The results are demonstrated in Figures 4.38–4.44. On average, 40.94 
percent of the respondents from MENA countries live with their parents com-
pared to an average of 14.49 percent in selected advanced economies. This sug-
gests a traditional societal structure in the MENA countries where close relatives 
live together. In modern societies, familial structures are fractured and parents 
and their adult children live apart from each other. 
An average of 89.90 percent of respondents from the MENA countries think 
that women should not have children without having a stable relationship with a 
man. In the selected advanced economies, 39.52 percent on average disapprove 
of women being single mothers. Furthermore, on average, 76.27 percent of the 
population in MENA countries hold that a woman needs to have children to be 
fulfilled compared with 33.70 percent on average in the advanced economies. 
According to an average of 50.86 percent of the MENA respondents, divorce is 
hardly ever justifiable. In the advanced economies, only 18.19 percent on aver-
age think that divorce is hardly ever justifiable. 
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Hence, it seems that in MENA countries family bonds are stronger than in 
advanced economies and that a more conservative attitude concerning the role of 
women is prevalent. This is proved by the fact that on average 40.89 percent of 
the respondents from the MENA countries agree that university education is 
more important for boys than for girls compared with 11.34 percent in the ad-
vanced economies. In addition, an average of 77.79 percent of the respondents 
in MENA countries holds that men make better political leaders than women 
compared with 25.48 percent in the advanced economies. Furthermore, on aver-
age, 79.78 percent of MENA respondents agree that politicians who do not be-
lieve in God are unfit for public office. In the selected advanced economies, 
only 15.64 percent share this opinion. 
However, apart from trust, all variables show differences between the 
MENA countries and the selected advanced economies. In particular, the vari-
ables indicating the societal structure vary between MENA and advanced states. 
This indicates that society in MENA countries is more conservative and tradi-
tional and thereby exhibits limited morality. Chapters two and three examined 
the correlation between generalized and limited morality and economic growth. 
It was concluded that a traditional societal structure and limited morality inhibit 
economic growth. Hence, the form of societal organization of the MENA coun-
tries is one factor that is responsible for its disappointing economic performance. 
Women are discriminated concerning education and labor market participation. 
Hence, half of the region’s workforce, and thereby half of its human capital, lies 
idle. Furthermore, a conservative belief and value system fosters collectivism 
and limited morality. 
Hence, the MENA region’s societal organization differs from most Western 
industrialized economies. Its institutional environment is less growth supportive. 
According to the equilibrium view of institutions, the Arab region’s form of so-
cietal organization and its belief and value systems can be contingent on its his-
tory and environment. However, the transition from a traditional to a modern 
society is a process which every economy passes through at a certain point in 
time. The problem with societal transition is that it implies informal institutional 
change and that the form of change cannot be predicted. Hence, some institu-
tions never change, whereas some institutions change slowly. However, mod-
ernization does not intend that the Arab region develop in similar ways to West-
ern states. Although modernization might take place, its pace and form might 
differ significantly from the West. Hence, little can be done to predict and foster 
the process of informal institutional change and modernization in the MENA 
region. The only successful instrument might be economic development itself. 
However, economic growth is at least partly inhibited by the institutional envi-
ronment. 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
170
Concerning formal institutions, however, more concrete statements are pos-
sible. The MENA region is characterized by bad governance. The formal institu-
tional factors that are growth supporting are generally missing. Hence, property 
rights are poorly secured, the judiciaries are not independent, and no Western-
style rule of law exists in that the governments are authoritarian, bureaucracies 
are too large and inefficient, political participation is restricted, and political 
freedoms and civil liberties are not sufficiently implemented. These political and 
legal deficiencies impact on the implementation of economic institutions. 
Hence, the dominant public sector inhibits the development of a sound private 
sector, financial sectors and banking systems are underdeveloped, and business 
regulations and restrictions on foreign trade are manifold and inefficient. Red 
tape and corruption pervade the political, legal, and economic sectors. However, 
oil-richness, rents, and foreign aid enable the perpetuation of bad governance 
and inefficient states. 
Why did institutions in the MENA region develop in this way? Why did 
they not develop similar, for example, to Western European institutions? Institu-
tional development is path-dependent because it depends on historical accidents, 
which appear at random and shape a society or a region’s development signifi-
cantly. Therefore, institutions are non-ergodic. To understand their shapes we 
must possess knowledge about their pasts. Historical accidents, however, can 
cause a deviation from the hitherto existing development path. The new path 
might yield immediate or later changes, which might not have occurred if the 
society had remained on the former path. Whether the former or the current path 
would have led to more efficient outcomes in the long run is unknown. Path-
dependent changes cannot be reversed, and it cannot be detected whether an al-
ternative path should have been preferred. These considerations are 'off the path 
of play' anyway and do not make sense. The particular path cannot be con-
sciously chosen since historical accidents happen at random, without conscious 
human assistance. Random events and reverse causalities between institutions 
themselves and other factors render the valuation of a certain path or its alterna-
tives impossible. Hence, to examine why institutions developed in a certain way, 
we have to consult a society or a region’s history. A logical, efficiency-based 
theoretical explanation is not possible. Institutions are path-dependent and 
thereby their development depends on random events and cannot be theoreti-
cally explained. 
The Arab region’s history has to be consulted to reconstruct its institutional 
development. However, historical accidents are manifold and not every single 
one of them can be identified. Actually, historical accidents happen all the time, 
permanently. A region’s development path is explained by its whole history, in-
cluding every single detail, and not by a few obvious events. Furthermore, past 
and current institutions were and are influenced by a myriad factors, many of 
which will remain unknown. Therefore, Arab institutional development cannot 
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be presented as a whole. Nevertheless, a few events that had severe impacts on 
further institutional development are now going to be depicted.  
However, to really explain the current institutional status quo of the MENA 
region one should consult a book on the entire Arab history. This is not possible 
within the current study and it is also not its objective. The next chapter’s objec-
tive is to focus on the starting point of institutional differences. Hence, path de-
pendence devotes attention to the earliest events. Differences at the very begin-
ning of certain development paths can be responsible for a permanent separation 
and unequal evolutions. That is to say, the decisive events that led the MENA 
region on its irreversible and unique development path date back a long time. Of 
course, since then many other events have influenced the region’s institutions 
and changed the direction of its development path. However, the current study 
emphasizes the fact that the Western and the Arab paths were never unique but 
differed right from their respective starting points. This work concentrates on the 
early events that indicate why developments in both regions could never be the 
same. It emphasizes the period between the seventh and 15th centuries. Of 
course, determining events occurred after the 15th century, but the institutional 
lock-in and the irreversible separation happened much earlier. 
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Figure 4.34: trust in MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustration. Data ac-
cessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI.
Figure 4.35: control in MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustration. Data ac-
cessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI.
Figure 4.36: respect in MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustration. Data ac-
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Figure 4.37: obedience in MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustration. Data 
accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
Figure 4.38: live with parents, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustration. 
Data accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
Figure 4.39: women as single parents, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustra-
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Figure 4.40: women have to have children, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own 
illustration. Data accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
Figure 4.41: divorce not justifiable, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustra-
tion. Data accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
Figure 4.42: university important, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustration. 
Data accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
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Figure 4.43: men better politicians, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illustra-
tion. Data accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
Figure 4.44: politicians’ beliefs in God, MENA and advanced economies. Source: own illus-
tration. Data accessed 27 October, 2009, [online] from WVS and WDI. 
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5. Differences in early institutional 
development 
5.1 Introduction 
As we have seen, the institutional environments in the MENA region differ 
widely from those in Western Europe. Since institutional quality significantly 
impacts economic development, it is not surprising that we observe divergent 
economic performances. However, since Western European institutional struc-
tures seem to be more conducive to economic growth, why did institutions not 
emerge equally in the Arab region? Different starting points, historical acci-
dents, cultural developments, and path dependence turn a society and its institu-
tions into what they are. Hence, to understand the state of MENA’s institutions, 
looking at the history of the region is unavoidable. Of course, historical explana-
tions cannot directly help improve MENA’s current economic situation. How-
ever, a historical investigation into the origins of the differences in institutional 
developments between the Arab region and Western Europe might induce a bet-
ter understanding of the MENA region per se. This would in turn improve the 
understanding of the institutional structure and, hence, more useful approaches 
for exogenous institutional change can be expected. In general, it might be pos-
sible to judge whether exogenous institutional change could be helpful at all. 
Furthermore, a better historical understanding helps detect growth-inhibiting 
institutional structures in detail. Hence, exogenous interference might be suc-
cessful, since the inefficiency might be placed at a less obvious and unexpected 
point in the institutional system, which can only be detected via a profound his-
torical knowledge of the respective region. 
To examine the Arab institutional development right from its state of emer-
gence, with respect to institutional consequences for the region's long-term eco-
nomic development path, Western European institutional history must also be 
observed otherwise the differences would not become obvious. Nevertheless, 
this section does not emphasize Western Europe’s development. Western Euro-
pean history is exhibited when necessary for a comparison with the Arab region. 
But a description of Western institutional development is not provided in detail. 
The MENA region is the focus and events in Western Europe are depicted and 
analyzed regarding their institutional relevance if necessary. This is even more 
the case since we must not only ask why regions such as MENA lagged behind 
in their economic development, but also why Europe developed so differently.  
At a certain point in time, the Arab region was the most advanced region in 
the world and by far outperformed Western Europe. Between the ninth and 15th 
centuries the Arab region was far superior in scientific, intellectual, and eco-
nomic matters. This makes it the more surprising that fortune became com-
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pletely reversed. One could have expected that the Arabs benefitted from their 
advances and that what happened in Europe from the 16th and 17th centuries 
onwards should have happened in the MENA region several centuries before. 
On the contrary, the Arab countries underwent a period of scientific, intellectual, 
and economic decline. They were overhauled by Western Europe and have been 
unable to re-attain their glorious times of around the turn of the first millennium. 
Since history and path dependence are crucial for institutional development, 
the turning point in Arab history is an interesting object of study. The institu-
tional environment was supportive of societal and economic progress until a cer-
tain point in time. Afterwards, decline, at least in relation to Western Europe, 
and stagnation characterized the region for centuries. Compared with Western 
industrialized states, the divergence in living standards has lasted until today. 
Hence, certain key events must have altered the institutional system. Since insti-
tutions are inertial and complementary, the reversal might have initiated the in-
stitutional modifications and developments that have endured until today. Fur-
ther institutional alterations and developments built on the changes that must 
have occurred. Therefore, this part of the study concentrates on certain historical 
events that strongly modified the institutional structure. Since emphasis is on the 
turning point, the consulted events occurred a long time ago. It will be examined 
why Arabic supremacy came to an end. Therefore, history after 1500 will be re-
garded to a lesser extent, although the historical events of the past 500 years 
have still influenced Arabic institutions. However, the starting point of institu-
tional divergence between the MENA region and Western Europe will be exam-
ined. 
This also means that certain developments in Western Europe shaped the 
prevalent institutional environment in a way that supported the Industrial Revo-
lution and the unique growth performance observed since. Several authors trace 
Western Europe’s unique development path, which cumulated in the Industrial 
Revolution and the emergence of sustained economic growth, back to events 
taking place hundreds and even thousands of years ago. Accordingly, the Indus-
trial Revolution was based on a particular worldview that emphasized Newto-
nian mechanics and infiltrated Western societies in the 18th and 19th centuries.66
In turn, the development of Newtonian mechanics required the emergence of 
modern sciences in the 16th and 17th centuries, which, again, depended on the 
acceptance of naturalism and, therefore, of human reason and rationality during 
the Middle Ages. The comeback of Greek philosophy since the 12th and 13th 
centuries, and thereby a natural philosophy based on natural laws and reason, 
permitted the emergence of a social value system that supported the detection of 
nature as an autonomous entity. Of course, naturalism faced several challenges 
                                                
66 See, for example, Grant (1996); Huff (2003); Jacob (1997); Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar 
(2005). 
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in Europe as it did in other societies. However, historical accidents made the 
unique development possible. Therefore, Western Europe’s political pluralism 
was a decisive development factor. The many countries with their changing bor-
ders and powerful city states, as well as ecclesiastical and terrestrial power 
struggles, made the overall oppression of naturalism impossible. The acceptance 
or rejection of naturalism often depended on political strategies; hence, rulers 
formed alliances and supported or rejected the natural worldview. 
Western European societies were, to varying degrees, infused with a value 
system and a worldview based on naturalism. This allowed the mechanical in-
novations that were necessary for the Industrial Revolution and thereby sus-
tained economic growth. Modern sciences afforded the knowledge as well as, 
even more importantly, the mental attitude necessary for the discovery of nature 
and the universe. It is exactly this relationship between worldview and sciences 
and technology that differed in other parts of the world. The story of Western 
Europe’s economic success can inter alia be ascribed to its handling of natural 
philosophy and human reason and, in the end, with the emergence of modern 
sciences. The acceptance of a naturalistic worldview happened accidentally. 
Western Europeans did not consciously decide to accept naturalism because they 
knew this would lead to a unique process of economic growth centuries later. 
Hence, Western Europe’s whole scientific and economic history can be traced 
back to accidental events that pushed the region onto a certain development 
path. Further historical accidents were necessary for Western Europe to end up 
in the Industrial Revolution. The Arab region, or China, for example, acciden-
tally took other paths and ended up in different situations. 
First, the build-up of the state and the early relationship between state and 
religion was a decisive factor for the different developments in the Arab region 
and Western Europe. Then, as already indicated, the varying worldviews based 
on the acceptance of naturalism or Islamic occasionalism, respectively were 
formed. It might seem abstract from a modern educated economist’s perspective 
that a society’s worldview is described as a significant factor for economic de-
velopment. Nevertheless, worldview and metaphysical beliefs have been a cen-
tral part of economic thought. Only in recent decades has the enthusiasm regard-
ing these philosophically touched subjects as part of economic theory been lost. 
In any case, they did not lose their significance for economic matters. 
The particular system of law also plays a decisive role in shaping societies. 
In addition, the emergence of corporate bodies in the West had a crucial impact 
on economic and societal progress, which was missing in the MENA region. 
The education systems and the degree of independence of the universities dif-
fered between the regions. Western Europe’s political pluralism, the Arab waqf
system, and Arab hereditary law as well as further historical differences were 
significant factors that influenced the directions of the development paths. 
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5.2 The emergence of state and religion 
Although differences in religious thought are not emphasized in this work, the 
formative influence of religion cannot be denied in both Western Europe and the 
Arab world. Western Europe is shaped by Christendom. Its history is governed 
by events that can be ascribed to religious matters in one way or another. How-
ever, the differences in the emergence of the religion and the state, as well as the 
relationship between religion and state-run structures are conspicuous in both 
regions (Lewis, 2002). 
After emerging in Judea Christianity spread westward, overcoming many 
cultural and societal borders. However, compared with Islam, Christianity 
spread slowly. It took nearly 400 years until Christendom became an official 
state religion. Christianity had to compete with the culturally and intellectually 
advanced societies of the Roman Empire. On its way westward, it was forced to 
adjust to the surrounding world and was affected by external influences. In addi-
tion, early Christians were not endued with military forces. Hence, they could 
not conquer the Roman Empire and impose their rules and structures on it. 
Christians had to diffuse their beliefs by conversion and, at least for some time, 
against the power of the state (Grant, 1996, p. 182; Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 
2005, p. 225). Furthermore, conversion had to take place within the prevalent 
governmental and societal structures. That is to say, Christianity was born into 
the pre-existing structures of the Roman Empire. Therefore, formal institutions 
such as the judiciary, political system, and commercial structures already existed 
before the emergence of the religion. Thus, Christianity had to accept the pre-
existing structure of institutions. Since its adherents had lived within these struc-
tures before becoming Christians, they did not refuse all of the prevalent institu-
tions. Of course, Christians tried to reform institutions according to their vision. 
But right from the start, Christianity developed within an existing and function-
ing state. Its adherents were influenced by the structures and institutions of the 
Roman Empire and did not abandon all of those structures. They rather diffused 
their beliefs within the structures of the state and retained the system where pos-
sible following their conviction. In the end, Christianity became the state relig-
ion.  
Although attempts were made to establish ecclesiastical supremacy, the tar-
get was not to establish a theocracy. The dominance of church and state might 
have changed several times; however, they have always been regarded as two 
independent entities.67
                                                
67 Christendom’s secular tradition and the acceptance of a terrestrial power is confirmed in 
several passages in the Bible, the most popular being Matthew 22.21: “Render therefore unto 
Cesar the things which are Cesar’s; and unto God the things which are God’s”.
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Therefore, Christianity has a kind of secular tradition. Since the time of its 
emergence, Christianity has never been equal to the state. Despite tendencies to 
unite state and religion as one entity, Christians are used to being subordinated 
to both a terrestrial and an ecclesiastical power. That is to say, since its emer-
gence, Christianity practically had to accept two kinds of jurisdiction: a terres-
trial and an ecclesiastical one (Grant, 1996, p. 7ff.). The fact that Christianity 
met different cultures and societies on its way westwards, and that it grew up in 
the already developed structures of a state, led to its pluralistic tradition, which 
became important for its further development as will be seen. 
Events were different in the Arab region. Islam emerged within a stateless 
environment. Muhammad established a state on the Arab peninsula where there 
had been none before. Prior to the Arab state, social structures had been solely 
ruled by bloodline, clanship, and familial and tribal affiliation. Of course, social 
affiliation remained important. But, decisively, no general state-run structures, 
no formal institutions, no legislature, no overall legitimate power, and no citi-
zenship subsisted. The first structures of a state were founded simultaneously 
with the emergence of Islam. During the time of revelation (610–632), Muham-
mad formed the religious community and simultaneously created the first state 
structures. Hence, the Arab state originated in religious revelation. Religious 
doctrines and then prevalent social norms and structures were the basis for the 
build-up of the Arab state. Therefore, religion and state were equivalent right 
from the start. No difference between a terrestrial and an ecclesiastical side ex-
isted. State and religion were one entity. Islam never had to adjust to any kind of 
pre-existing institutions, apart from the customs at that time, which, of course, 
entered the Scripture. Islam by itself created the institutions. That is to say, only 
one instance existed, which explains the theocratic tradition of the Arab region 
(Lewis, 2002). 
During Muhammad’s lifetime (570–632) the first structures of a state were 
created. These comprised a kind of judiciary – the sharia was written down later 
– the emergence of a bureaucracy, and a system of taxation (Halm, 2006, p. 26). 
After Muhammad’s death, almost the entire Arab peninsula belonged to the new 
Arab state. The locals converted to Islam and, by that, subordinated themselves 
to the religious and statist doctrines. 
In the following centuries, the expansion of the Arab Empire continued and 
reached its peak in the second half of the ninth century. At that time, the Empire 
stretched from the Pyrenees to Central Asia and comprised nine to 10 million 
km2 and between 35 and 40 million people (around the 10th century) (Issawi, 
1995, p. 39). Even before the emergence of the Arab Empire, the MENA re-
gion’s geographic location made it a main trade centre. All goods traded be-
tween Western Europe, Byzantium, India, and China had to cross the Middle 
East, North Africa, or the Arab peninsula (Issawi, 1995, Ch. 2, p. 31–55). 
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The conquests of the Arabs, however, occurred within a relatively short pe-
riod of time and stretched over a large area. Therefore, the Empire suddenly in-
cluded many different social groups and cultures. The conquered regions were 
not forced to convert to Islam. Instead, the inhabitants received the status of pro-
tégés and were relatively free to pursue their own religious and cultural tradi-
tions. The protégés were guaranteed protection of body and life, of property and 
religious freedom. Service in return was a poll tax the non-Muslims had to pay. 
This tax was an important source of income for the Empire and its military 
forces. However, the Arabs were not interested in the religious and cultural af-
fairs of their protégés. 
Religious freedom and the acceptance of other cultures and traditions within 
the Arab Empire meant that Muslims were not forced to critically assess the 
alien as well as their own cultural and religious doctrines. Critically assessing a 
strange subject usually leads to a critical view on your own. Since medieval 
Arab religious leaders were not interested in the alien religions and traditions 
within their Empire, they did not critically deal with the foreign or their own re-
ligious and social doctrines. 
The disinterest incorporated the worldviews and the work of foreign scien-
tists that, since the beginning of the ninth century, travelled to the Arab scien-
tific centers such as Baghdad, Damascus, and later Cordoba. Non-Muslim scien-
tists and philosophers, whether from within or from outside the Empire, were 
allowed to practice their religions and follow their own convictions. Further-
more, Islamic religious leaders were not even interested in the alien religions 
and worldviews. According to Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005), this ignorance 
with regard to non-Muslims hindered Islamic religious leaders from becoming 
natural philosophers compared with Christian clerics. “Also, since no attempt 
was made to persuade a sophisticated public to convert, the religion’s leaders 
did not need to engage them in intellectual debate on their own terms. Thus, al-
though many of the conquered areas contained highly sophisticated societies 
with many scholars who were well versed in all branches of philosophy, includ-
ing natural philosophy, the religious leaders themselves did not develop a seri-
ous knowledge of philosophy” (Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005, p. 269). Grant 
(1996) also considers the fact that Islamic theologians (at least those that came 
after the Mutazilites, an early rational theological school) and religious leaders 
were not natural philosophers, which could have been decisive for the decline of 
Arab sciences after the 15th century. 
In Western Europe, prospective theologians were required to have a master 
of arts and, hence, be educated in natural philosophy (Grant, 1996, p. 174f.). 
Christian theologians, even the conservatives, utilized natural philosophy, al-
though it might have been considered suspect in parts. However, in Islam natural 
philosophy was always forced onto the defensive. It was not officially taught at 
the madrasas or universities, but privately at the scholar’s home. Religious lead-
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ers and Islamic theologians of the 11th century and later were not educated in 
natural philosophy. The philosophers and scientists, on the contrary, were influ-
enced and embedded by orthodox Islamic thought since they also had to fulfill 
their public and religious duties. 
Regarding the emergence of state and religion, two points must be recorded. 
First, the foundation of the state and religion and the interrelationship between 
them differ greatly between Western Europe and the MENA region. Right from 
the start, both regions were situated on different development paths. That is to 
say, both regions fall back on different starting points and, hence, the different 
development paths the regions took are a logical result. We cannot use the same 
standards to judge the developments in the two regions since the bases differ. 
Nobody can judge medieval Muslims for their theocratic traditions or for their 
recognition of sharia as the only valid law. Furthermore, if religious structures 
are the foundations of the state, it is easier for religious conservatives to exert 
influence and oppress opposing views. 
5.3 The acceptance of Islamic occasionalism and the 
role of foreign sciences 
It might seem strange that a certain worldview should have a significant impact 
on a region’s economic development. ‘Worldview’ itself is not a typical eco-
nomical variable and educated mainstream economists might find it difficult to 
establish a connection between a former value system and contemporary growth. 
This might be all the more the case since the observed period dates back almost 
a millennium. In any case, the distinct origins on which both societies were built 
will be elucidated and their significance for economic progress will become ob-
vious. 
The crucial differences are in the realm of metaphysics and relate to the idea 
of man and nature. The Christian belief states that God endowed man with rea-
son and free will. God created the world and, therefore, everything that is cre-
ated has a cause, even the world and God. Nature was created by God as an in-
dependent, autonomous entity and, therefore, nature can exist independently 
without God intervening. This is the case since natural laws exist that follow 
from causality. Occurrences without a cause are called miracles. But it is not 
God who lets the Earth circulate around the sun or who is responsible for rainfall 
or droughts. He does not make plants grow, the sun shine, and so on. These are 
things nature does by itself based on natural laws and, hence, on causality. God 
wanted man to be capable of understanding and, therefore, examining the natu-
ral world. Man should be reasonable and able to judge his actions and, hence, 
should be able to assess the trueness of moral values. Man can consider and de-
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cide independently which morals and values are right and which are wrong. Fur-
thermore, man is allowed and capable to examine the world, God, and the Scrip-
ture, which, therefore, is open to interpretation (Grant, 1996; Huff, 2003, p. 89–
117; Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005, p. 232–235). 
The orthodox Islamic theory, on the contrary, states that God is above or 
without reason. God and everything concerning His existence is situated in a 
sphere or dimension that man is incapable of understanding. Therefore, man 
cannot know which values are right and, hence, he is not endowed with reason 
and free will. Even the interpretations of the terms ‘reason’ and ‘free will’ are 
manmade and not God-made or God-given. God is the only creator. Man does 
not know which values are right and which are wrong, since he cannot judge 
whether something is logical, rational, and reasonable. He cannot know because 
he is incapable of understanding. Therefore, the only thing man can do is obey. 
Because man has no reason and cannot understand, God gave him the revelation, 
the Quran, which was not created but is perpetual. Everything man needs to 
know is written down in the Scripture. He shall not consider by himself. All he 
has to do is follow the rules. The Quran is not meant to be full of bans but in-
stead is a guide to help man live his life in a way that leads to salvation. This 
guidance is not open to interpretation, since man is not able to interpret. The 
Quran is given once and for all by God; at the time of the revelation it was per-
fect, complete, and unchangeable. Hence, the Quran was given to man in a final 
version. 
The orthodox Islamic doctrine rejects causality since God is the only cause. 
The Earth, for example, circulates around the sun because God wants it to. If He 
wanted to, He could stop the Earth circulating immediately. If a person is thirsty, 
drinks some water, and is no longer thirsty, this is not because of the water he 
drank. Drinking the water is not the reason for not being thirsty anymore. It is 
just the way God wants it to be in this moment. Hence, causality and, therefore, 
natural laws do not exist, because God is the only creator. This doctrine is called 
Islamic occasionalism and was accepted at the disadvantage of naturalism, 
which asserted itself in Western Europe (El-Affendi, 1998; Fakhry, 1998; Hye, 
2004; Sheikh, 1982).  
However, modern science is based on causality and natural laws. Hence, the 
rejection of causality and rationality inhibited the necessary developments for 
the emergence of modern science, which, in turn, enabled the mechanistic 
worldview required for the Industrial Revolution.68 Since Islamic occasionalism 
rejected causality, natural philosophy per se came to an end in the Arab region. 
Hence, the implementation of Islamic occasionalism and of orthodox Islam was 
                                                
68 See, for example, Grant (1996); Huff (2003); Jacob (1997); Lindberg (1992); Lipsey, Car-
law & Bekar (2005). 
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a watershed in Arabic scientific history. The emergence of modern sciences had 
become impossible. 
The body of natural sciences can be traced back to the Greeks and the Hel-
lenistic doctrine. In Europe, after the end of the Roman Empire, Greek learning 
was lost for hundreds of years and was brought back by the Arabs in Spain. 
Mainly in Cordoba, the works of the Greek philosophers and scholars were 
translated from Arabic into Latin and entered Middle Europe via the Pyrenees in 
the 12th and 13th centuries. The Arabs had earlier been influenced by Greek 
learning. Under the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258), which brought the capital of 
the Arab Empire from Damascus to Baghdad, great scientific efforts were made 
and science flourished in many places, especially in Baghdad and, about two 
centuries later, in Cordoba. At the beginning of the ninth century, systematic 
translation efforts from Greek into Arabic were conducted and soon all impor-
tant works were available in the new language of science: Arabic.69 From the 
ninth century until the end of the 15th century, the Arab region had the most ad-
vanced sciences worldwide. As Huff writes, “Considered altogether, in mathe-
matics, astronomy, optics, physics and medicine, Arabic science was the most 
advanced in the world” (Huff, 2003, p. 52). Arab mathematicians in the 11th and 
12th centuries achieved mathematical innovations that were not accomplished 
by Europeans until the 15th and 16th centuries (Huff, 2003, p. 51). Scholars 
from all over the world met in Baghdad, where they brought their knowledge 
together and created new ideas. This means that it were not necessarily Arabs 
who forced scientific thought and research. Iranians, Christians, Jews, and peo-
ple from other parts of the world were involved. Greek science and the thoughts 
of rationality and reason affected the work and the worldview of the philoso-
phers, scientists and, therefore, urban society in general, as it did in Western 
Europe hundreds of years later. 
Between the 12th and 14th centuries, many popular Arab astronomers tried 
to overcome and reform the Ptolemaic planetary system or geocentric model, in 
which the Earth is seen as the centre of the universe with all other planets, in-
cluding the sun, circulating around it. In Western Europe, this evolution took 
place in the 16th and 17th centuries. The Arab astronomer Ibn al-Shatir (d. 
1375) developed planetary systems that were identical to those of Copernicus 
(1473–1543) except for some parameters (Huff, 2003, p. 55ff.). Mathematically 
these models were equivalent to later European models. But, for some reason, 
the Arabs did not take the last step to the heliocentric worldview, the starting 
point for modern science. As Huff writes: “To the degree that the planetary 
models of Ibn al-Shatir and those of Copernicus are virtually identical with only 
minor differences in some parameters, the problem was not one of mathematical 
                                                
69 Most Greek works were already available in Aramaic and just had to be translated further 
into Arabic by Aramaic-speaking Christians in the Fertile Crescent (Halm, 2006, p. 43). 
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modelling, but one of conceptual or metaphysical innovation or both” (Huff, 
2003, p. 61). 
Hence, early Islamic philosophers and scholars were not reluctant to Greek 
learning. On the contrary, Greek philosophy had a significant influence on me-
dieval Arabic sciences and even on Islamic theology. However, science in early 
Islam consisted of the mathematical sciences, (natural) philosophy, theology 
(kalam), and Islamic law (fiqh). Mathematical sciences “primarily comprised the 
quadrivium of late antiquity: namely, arithmetic (…), geometry, astronomy and 
musical theory, and their applications in fields such as optics and mechanics” 
(Sabra, 1994, p. 1f.). Philosophy was closely related to science and theology. It 
“always explicitly or implicitly signified a body of doctrine and a style of 
thought that was dominated by a Neoplatonized Aristotelianism carried over 
from Aristotle’s late Greek commentators” (Sabra, 1994, p. 3). Hence, Greek 
ideas were well received in Islamic philosophy between the 9th and 14th centu-
ries. Greek philosophy was further developed in Arab scientific centers, and 
many popular philosophers at that time were Arabs or foreign scholars carrying 
out research in popular Arab cities (Huff, 2003, p. 68). Nevertheless, in medie-
val Islam philosophy was called the foreign science. It had already existed be-
fore Islam came into the world and was imported into Arabic culture from the 
Greeks. Although the Arabs were the leading scientists and philosophers for 
several centuries, their subject was considered foreign, since it had not emerged 
within Arabic culture and society (Huff, 2003; Sabra, 1994). Therefore, natural 
sciences and philosophy were the least respected sciences. The efforts of schol-
ars and philosophers were appreciated, for example, regarding their medical ser-
vices. However, most of them held an official job such as physician, teacher, or 
court-appointed official. Their profession as a natural scientist or free-thinker 
was, in general, not popular. Especially after the Islamic doctrine was almost 
fully developed after the 11th century, the work of natural scientists and phi-
losophers was regarded as disrespectful to Islam and was dismissed as blasphe-
mous. 
However, Islamic theology or kalam depicts a specific form of theology 
based on reason and rationality (Huff, 2003, p. 47ff.; Sabra, 1994). According to 
Sabra (1994, p. 11), “kalam was an argumentative approach to religion which 
sought, through discussion and discursive thought, to interpret and transform the 
content of the Islamic revelation into a rationally-based doctrine.” The theologi-
ans were called mutakallinum in Arabic. The fact that reason and rationality 
were discussed within the theological context already indicates the controversy 
regarding the traditional orthodox Islamic doctrine. 
The traditional view held that man did not possess reason and conscience, 
since he was not able to understand. Accordingly, God is the only creator, cau-
sality does not exist, life is predetermined, and, since man can neither conceive 
God, nor the Scripture or human life per se, he must obey and take the Quran 
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literally. To study (not to interpret!) the Quran and the sunna was the subject of 
Islamic law or fiqh, which, therefore, was the most reputable science. Theology 
and philosophy were less accepted since both subjects tried to examine God and 
nature. However, such an approach was blasphemous, since God and nature did 
not need to be examined. Everything necessary to human life was given by the 
Quran. The Quran was perfect and complete. It should not be interpreted, 
changed, or adjusted. Hence, to deal with theology or philosophy was just not 
necessary or even forbidden from a religious point of view. It was more honor-
able to study the Quran, without intending to interpret it. Hence, the fuqaha, or 
jurisconsults, were not allowed to use their reason, conscience, and intellect to 
create statutes. Everything concerning human behavior, all rules and required 
punishments, were written down once and for all in the Quran. Man was not al-
lowed to interpret, change, or enlarge these documents. What was written down 
had to be taken literally. 
Several theological schools, rational and orthodox, emerged since the early 
beginnings of Islam. Kalam, which means ‘speech’, ‘word’, or ‘discussion’, 
however, became associated with the school of the Mutazila. The Mutazilites 
held that reason was the basic truth of everything, even religion. Hence, their 
system of theology was purely rational (Sheikh, 1982, p. 14). The Mutazilites 
were persuaded by the creation of the Quran, man’s free will, and indicated the 
grave sinner as being neither a Muslim nor a nonbeliever, but an intermediate 
person (El-Affendi, 1998). The biggest controversy compared with orthodox 
theology and, hence, fiqh involved the creation of the Quran. Although the Mu-
tazila insisted on the creation of the Quran, the traditionalists held the view that 
the Quran was perpetual. Furthermore, the Mutazila conceded reason, con-
science, and free will to man. Hence, human life was not predetermined. Man 
was able to understand and interpret the created Scripture. He could differentiate 
between good and evil and, hence, make moral judgments. They allowed man 
intellectual activity and developed a remarkable theory of knowledge in Islamic 
intellectual history (Sabra, 1994). The Mutazilites were able to further develop 
and foster their ideas of reason and rationality through the influence of Greek 
philosophy and were politically supported by the caliphs at the time. For its ad-
herents religion meant no more than superstition (Huff, 2003; Lipsey, Carlaw & 
Bekar, 2005). However, under the Mutazilite predominance, opponents of their 
view could be punished and imprisoned. 
The Mutazilite school dominated Islamic theological thought for 100–150 
years. Things began to change under the rule of Caliph Ja’afar al-Mutawakkil 
(847–861). The caliph himself was not an adherent of the Mutazilite school. In-
stead, under his rule the Asharite school (al-Ashari, d. 935) gained momentum. 
The Asharites did not totally reject rationalism. Nevertheless, the Asharite 
school was persuaded by the perpetuity of the Quran; hence, according to them, 
the Quran was not created but existed in eternity. Furthermore, the Asharites dif-
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fered from the Mutazilites regarding man’s free will and reason. Accordingly, 
God is the only creator and every action is created by Him. For example, if one 
wants to write something on a piece of paper, “God creates in his mind the will 
to write and at the same time He grants him the power to write” (Sheikh, 1982, 
p. 19). Hence, the Asharites take a path in between free will and complete de-
terminism, since God creates the will to write, but does not accomplish the ac-
tion by Himself (Sheikh, 1982, pp. 15–20). Further differences between Mu-
tazilites and Asharites existed, for example, regarding God’s attributes, beatific 
vision, and the legitimacy of political power (Sheikh, 1982, p. 14f.). 
However, al-Ashari (873–935) can be described as the finisher of the idea of 
Islamic occasionalism, which was modified and further distributed by al-
Ghazzali (1058–1111) and established itself as a main doctrine in Islamic theol-
ogy (Halm, 2006, p. 37; Sabra, 1994, p. 26). Hence, although rationalism and 
reason played a decisive role in Islamic theology, the orthodox Islamic doctrines 
could at least prevail. 
The discipline of kalam, however, was not able to resist the orthodox ten-
dencies. From the 11th century onwards, kalam declined rapidly. This was be-
cause of the pro-traditionalist tendencies within kalam itself, which broke with 
its original basis of rationality and reason; but the decline was also rooted in 
kalam’s failure to develop a complete philosophical system (El-Affendi, 1998). 
The dialectic theologians (mutakallinum) who succeeded the Mutazilites –the 
Asharites – at least rejected causality and natural law and accepted Islamic occa-
sionalism. For them, God was the only creator. They could not tolerate the idea 
of the creation of the Quran and of man being able to interpret the Scripture. 
Hence, the Quran was never subjected to the kind of criticism to which the Bible 
was exposed in the West. Kalam became mingled with Islamic philosophy and, 
therefore, was defeated by orthodox Islam, as were natural philosophy and sci-
ences per se. 
Two theses exist to try to explain the decline of natural sciences in medieval 
Islam, the discipline for which medieval Arabs were so well known. The mar-
ginality thesis states that natural sciences never played more than a marginal role 
in Arab society (Huff, 2003). The so-called foreign sciences never belonged to 
the body of Islamic society and culture. Therefore, the marginality thesis affirms 
that natural sciences finally played a minor role, even in the lives of Arabic sci-
entists. Huff explains that “people are always located in multiple roles and 
statuses. Consequently, the attitudes, interests, and capacities of one situation are 
often extended to another. This means that all social organizations and institu-
tions are interdependent” (Huff, 2003, p. 64). Huff states that Arab natural scien-
tists and philosophers were not merely scientists, but also participated in further 
societal spheres. Therefore, they became influenced by orthodox Islam, and after 
generations of scholars had grown up in an Islamic orthodox environment they 
at least accepted the orthodox doctrines. At least the scholars of the 13th and 
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later centuries, despite their professions, accepted orthodox positions on the 
most central issues. As an example, Huff cites the famous Arab astronomer Ibn 
al-Shatir of the 14th century. Ibn al-Shatir’s profession was not only astronomy; 
he was also the timekeeper of a mosque in Damascus. Hence, on one hand, he 
was a strictly religious official and, on the other, he was a scientist. Furthermore, 
Averroes (Ibn Rushd, d. 1198), although a scientist (natural philosopher), 
worked as a qadi, that is, a judge specialized in religious law (Huff, 2003, p. 
64f.). 
Sabra (1994), however, rejects the marginality thesis, arguing that natural 
sciences did not play a marginal but a grave role in medieval Islamic society. 
Therefore, the term “naturalization” is central, which “refers to the domesticat-
ing of the foreign and ancient sciences, thereby incorporating them into an in-
digenous cultural and philosophical system” (Huff, 2003, p. 65f.). It depicts the 
full acceptance of the foreign sciences in every dimension of society. When 
naturalized, the foreign sciences are a part of Arab institutions and Arab culture. 
According to Sabra (1994), this is what happened to sciences and natural phi-
losophy in the Arab region. Hence, in the course of naturalization natural sci-
ences should have become institutionalized and thereby gained autonomy and 
independence. However, although natural sciences and philosophy did become 
institutionalized, they never obtained an autonomous space. Instead they were 
completely interfused with Islamic philosophy and theology and, therefore, lost 
their independence. Hence, the critical doctrines that did not fit with orthodox 
Islam could be deleted over time. From Sabra’s point of view, the penetration 
and mixture of natural sciences and orthodox Islam was the crux. The inconsis-
tency of both views forced one to make large compromises. Therefore, natural 
philosophy more and more adapted to the orthodox Islamic doctrine and was lost 
on the way. 
Western Europe, however, experienced a renaissance in the 12th and 13th 
centuries that was grounded in the legal revolution. This intellectual transition 
can be traced back to the influence of Plato’s Timaeus. Of course, Plato was also 
known by the Arabs; however, his effect differed widely between both civiliza-
tions. Decisively, the European Platonism of the 12th century led to the idea of 
the atomic world and to the intention of examining everything to find a cause 
and effect (Huff, 2003, p. 100). The new Aristotelian translations that arrived in 
Western Europe in the 12th and 13th centuries caused severe alterations to the 
Platonist view, but it had laid the groundwork for the Western European idea of 
the physical nature of the world.70
                                                
70 Of course, Western Europe’s rationalism also faced severe counterattacks by the conserva-
tive forces of the church and society, especially in the second half of the 13th century. How-
ever, European naturalism succeeded because the Christian church did not condemn Greek 
philosophy in general. Instead, it tried to connect religious and rationalist ideas where it 
seemed to fit and, therefore, adopted naturalistic views. Furthermore, European pluralism and 
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In Western Europe, science in the Middle Ages was split up into medicine, 
exact sciences (mathematics, astronomy, statistics, optics), and natural philoso-
phy. What Aristotle called physics is approximately similar to what is under-
stood by natural philosophy or natural science. Hence, natural philosophy dealt 
with “the study of the first causes of nature, change and motion in general, the 
motion of celestial bodies, the motions of transformation of the elements, gen-
eration and corruption, the phenomena in the upper region of the atmosphere 
right below the lunar sphere, and the study of animals and plants” (Grant, 1996, 
p. 136). However, during medieval times and even later, these topics were not 
examined from a purely naturalistic point of view, but rather from a theological 
and philosophical one. 
The transitions between the sciences were smooth; mathematics, for exam-
ple, was sometimes included in natural philosophy. Philosophers used mathe-
matical tools and both sciences examined the same bodies in different aspects. 
However, natural philosophy or natural science was not similar to modern sci-
ence or to what is currently understood as natural science. Medieval science in-
cluded mathematical, physical, and chemical tools as well as philosophy and 
theology. The emergence of modern sciences in the 16th and 17th centuries 
added a mechanical component and, hence, by 1850, natural philosophy was di-
vided into “mechanics, hydrostatics, hydrodynamics, hydraulics, pneumatics, 
acoustics, optics, astronomy, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, and chromatics” 
(Grant, 1996, p. 193, referring to Guralnik, 1975, p. 61). Even the already me-
chanical sciences of the 18th century must be understood as “dark thread en-
twined in a tapestry of many colors, a whole cloth made up of religious and 
secular values crisscrossed with scientific learning. […] We separate science 
from religion, science from technology, theories from practice. They did not” 
(Jacob, 1997, p. 104). Hence, it is important to differentiate between medieval 
natural philosophy and medieval natural sciences; modern sciences; and con-
temporary natural sciences.  
In any case, the rationalist and mechanical worldview established in West-
ern Europe from the 16th century onwards caused the emergence of modern sci-
ences, which enabled the required technological progress and the particular state 
of mind to create the necessary kind of knowledge. Huff (2003) explains that 
“the modern scientific worldview is a unique metaphysical structure. This means 
                                                                                                                                                        
the establishment of the university as a corporate body made a general rejection impossible 
(Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar 2005, p. 234). However, it should not be concealed that the success 
of naturalism in Western Europe and, therefore, the implementation of a mechanistic world-
view were also down to luck. Several historical accidents, most of them too negligible to at-
tract attention, might have played a significant role. Nevertheless, the acceptance of natural-
ism and especially of modern sciences varied between countries in Europe. Southern Europe, 
for example, fell far behind Northern Europe regarding progress in modern sciences (Lipsey, 
Carlaw & Bekar 2005, p. 237).
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that the modern scientific worldview rests on certain assumptions about the 
regularity and lawfulness of the natural world and the presumption that man is 
capable of grasping that underlying structure” (p. 67). Hence, it was the atomic, 
rationalist, and later mechanical worldview that permitted Western Europe’s 
unique development path, which resulted in the Industrial Revolution and sus-
tained economic growth. Orthodox Islamic theologians rejected the regularities 
and the laws of nature as well as the assumption that man is able to understand 
the world and its sense inherently. Hence, the worldview necessary for the de-
velopment of modern sciences and the one predominant in medieval Islam could 
not be combined. Differences in the fundamental issues were too large. 
Of course, kalam, natural philosophy, and medieval sciences per se did not 
disappear straight away in the Arab world. The attitude regarding rationalism 
and Greek philosophy was not universal in the whole Empire. Since Islam has 
no central authority and, therefore, has no organized structure like the Christian 
church, it was not possible to generally dictate certain orthodox doctrines. 
Hence, discussions concerning naturalism and philosophy continued. Neverthe-
less, by the end of the 14th century orthodox Islam at last established itself as 
the only doctrine. Although rational ideas kept on circulating within particular 
groups, a general denial of natural philosophy had at least been implemented. 
Both the diffusion of rationalism since the eighth century and the spread of 
Islamic occasionalism since the 11th century were supported by the fact that Is-
lam was a religion of the cities. Islam emerged in a vital and popular commer-
cial town, Mecca, and further developed in another city, Medina. Its different 
schools and forms always emerged in cities, such as Basra, Kufa, Damascus, 
Baghdad, Buchara, and Samarkand (Huff, 2003, p. 18). The nomads in the de-
serts converted to Islam, mainly for economic reasons, but kept their own cus-
toms and traditions. However, the vital trade routes and the scientific exchange 
between the intellectual Arab centers made possible the fast diffusion of new 
ideas and doctrines. Hence, Greek philosophical thought and conservative Is-
lamic doctrines were diffused apace among and within the cities. 
5.4 Law 
The unique development and application of Islamic law demonstrates the sig-
nificance of the system of law for society in general. The Islamic law, the sharia, 
is directly grounded in God’s word. It is based on the Quran and the sunna (the 
traditions of the Prophet). Thus, it is a religious law that is given to mankind di-
rectly from God. Most importantly, it was given to mankind in an already com-
plete, perfect, and unchangeable state (Huff, 2003, p. 91). Trying to add, adjust, 
or change the law was blasphemous. Therefore, the continual development and 
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adjustment of law that occurred in Western Europe was inconceivable in the 
Arab world. 
The Quran was written down first by Caliph ‘Uthmân (644–656), who com-
piled a complete collection of the records of the revelation (Halm, 2006, p. 13f.). 
However, a second source of Islamic law, which Halm (2006, p. 41) describes as 
being even more important than the Quran for a Muslim’s everyday life, is the 
hadîth – that is, Muhammad’s direct quotations and records. Using the hadîth, 
Muslims try to get to know and record the customs and traditions of the Prophet 
and his associates, that is, the sunna. The Quran and hadîth build the principles 
of the sharia, which is Arabic for path or street. The sharia comprises all areas of 
life and is thought to help realize the unity of belief and an individual’s actions 
and, hence, attain salvation (Fischer, 1992, p. 26). This already demonstrates the 
crucial difference compared with Western law. The sharia is not a Western-style 
collection of laws. Instead, it is a guide that incorporates all human affairs in 
everyday life and, by obeying this guidance, a Muslim is situated on the right 
path to salvation. Since the Quran and the hadîth regulate an individual’s every-
day life in detail, and describe how a Muslim should conduct their public and 
private affairs, the whole Arab region is characterized by a unique lifestyle, even 
though Arabic customs and traditions vary by region (Fischer, 1992, p. 27). 
Islamic law is based on four sources: the Quran, the sunna (and hence, the 
hadîth), analogical reasoning (qiyas), and the consensus of the Islamic commu-
nity (ijma’) (Huff, 2003, p. 92; Halm, 2006, p. 45).71 Since the revelation was 
given once and for all, and since it was already complete, no adjustments or ad-
ditions were allowed. However, the Quran and the sunna do not contain a com-
prehensive legal code. On the contrary, they contain “a collection of piecemeal 
rulings on particular issues scattered over a wide variety of different topics; far 
from representing a substantial corpus juris, […] [the legal material] hardly 
comprises the bare skeleton of a legal system” (Huff, 2003, p. 92). Therefore, 
Islamic jurists continually had to deal with new situations that were not appro-
priately written down in the Quran or the hadîth. Thus, an intellectual struggle 
(ijtihad) was indispensable to understand the sharia and deal with the problems 
that confronted the judges (qadis) and jurists. Since the Quran and the hadîth 
were complete and unchangeable, an intellectual struggle was only possible in 
the form of conclusion by analogy. Hence, it was examined whether the case in 
question was in accordance with a situation described in the Quran or the hadîth. 
If this was not the case, the situation with the nearest similarity had to be con-
                                                
71 The method of consensus (ijma’) might not seem to fit into the theory since agreeing on 
something incorporates different opinions that exist before the consensus is found. However, 
personal reasoning and opinion was ruled out in Islamic legal thought. The argumentation 
concerning this seeming conflict is that God would not allow the whole Islamic community 
(umma) to make a mistake. Hence, a scholarly consensus on Islamic legal issues cannot be 
wrong, since God would avoid an error made by the umma. 
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sulted. Therefore, Islamic legal theory was based on strict analogy (qiyas) and 
the avoidance of personal opinion and personal discretion. The theory of Mu-
hammad ibn Idrîs al-Shafi’i (767–820), who is known as the founder of Islamic 
legal theory, reduced ijtihad to qiyas and thereby reason had to be completely 
subordinated to divine law (Huff, 2003, p. 92f.). The fact that no adjustments, 
modifications, and additions were possible led to the static character of Islamic 
law. Although Roman law was known to the medieval Muslims, they never con-
sidered it an additional source of legal principles, since God’s revelation was 
complete already. Furthermore, the ruler of the Muslim community was the law 
enforcer. Since human life in general was not differentiated in secular and sa-
cred spheres, the ruler was the divine and the earthly head of state. According to 
Huff (2003, p. 94), this explains why “legal personalities and institutions such as 
corporations do not exist, why the idea of personal liability and the concept of 
negligence are unknown to Islamic law, why the rules of evidence are hardly 
developed at all, and why Islamic penal law, as well as Islamic codes of public 
administration, are completely inadequate for a modern state”. This is also why 
modernizing Arab states in the 20th century had to adopt Western legal codes 
and retained the principles of the sharia merely regarding family affairs and in-
heritance law. 
The sharia is based on the Quran and the sunna since these sources incorpo-
rate the Prophet’s volitions and actions. However, it is not a finished code of law 
that is written out and available in book form. On the contrary, the construction 
and handling of the sharia depend on regional legal customs and on the results 
achieved through consensus and analogy in the particular region or in the par-
ticular case. Furthermore, Islamic law is not uniform, but differentiated into four 
major schools: the Shafi’i, the Hanafi, the Hanbali, and the Maliki (Halm, 2006, 
p. 43ff.; Huff, 2003, p. 96). Additionally, the differentiation between Sunnites 
and Shiites is important since Shiites exhibit their own sunna, which results in 
different constructions of the sharia (Halm, 2006, p. 75). 
However, this is not meant to say that the sharia is a uniform code of law 
applied in the same way in the whole of the Islamic world. On the contrary, Is-
lamic law can vary greatly depending on the particular region and school. The 
crucial difference to Western Europe is the totally different character of law, 
which pervades all Islamic schools of law and all regional customs. First, Is-
lamic law is not just a legal code, but a guide that leads to salvation. Separation 
in sacred and secular does not exist. Second, Islamic law was given to mankind 
in an already complete, perfect, and unchangeable state. Therefore, no legal 
principles can be changed or added. 
Together with the development of modern sciences, the modifications made 
in the system of law in the 12th and 13th centuries were probably the most im-
portant factor necessary to initiate the unique development that took place in 
Western Europe. Compared with Islamic law, the development paths varied 
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greatly right from the start. Western European law is composed of several 
sources. Legal principles taken from the Old and the New Testament, customary 
law, Hellenistic sources, and Roman law were known, discussed, and applied or 
combined. Furthermore, Germanic tribes had already disposed of a kind of ju-
risprudence by codifying their customs, which left a mark on the respective 
Western regions of the Roman Empire (Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 2005, p. 227). 
Hence, from its origins Christianity had to respect a secular law; it emerged 
within the legal code of the Roman Empire and adapted to it. The conflict be-
tween the sacred and the secular can be traced back to Christ’s lifetime and since 
then has shaped the development of the ecclesiastical and the terrestrial sphere. 
The main difference with the Islamic world is that there has been a conflict in 
Western Europe.  
However, the major changes were introduced during the legal revolution of 
the 12th and 13th centuries. Within the papal revolution (ca. 1072–1122) the 
Christian church cut itself off from worldly powers, especially regarding the ap-
pointment of the clergy. Prior to that, terrestrial rulers labeled themselves as the 
sources of law and the custodians of the religious realm (Huff, 2003, p. 120). 
The re-created canon law constrained the secular authorities and established a 
separate and autonomous system of law, which amounted to a radical and revo-
lutionary transformation, depicting the church as the first corporate body. Be-
sides the principles of church law and customary law, canon law was deeply 
rooted in Roman principles; therefore, the church was also the bearer of Roman 
law. With the introduction of canon law, the church separated from the secular 
rulers and began to govern its own affairs. It established its own jurisdiction and 
the first separation between the degrees of jurisdiction was made. 
However, the pure separation between the ecclesiastical and the terrestrial 
sphere was not the only innovation of the Western European legal revolution. 
The justification of the separation was based on reason and logic. It tried to es-
tablish a harmony among divine, secular, and natural law, which could be de-
duced from logic. The Benedictine monk Gratian and others worked on the es-
tablishment of a legal hierarchy, which ended up in the subordination of secular 
and ecclesiastical law, and the superiority of natural law. A standard was estab-
lished, by which ecclesiastical and terrestrial law, and thereby worldly and reli-
gious authorities, could be judged regarding their fittingness of natural law 
(Huff, 2003, p. 126). Hence, the principle of reason was superior to worldly and 
religious authority, and even to the Scripture. This amounted to an intellectual 
revolution not possible in the Islamic world. It became officially recognized that 
man had the intellectual capabilities to discover the world, to add new princi-
ples, and, hence, that man possessed reason and conscience. 
The most important innovation of the legal revolution was the establishment 
of the corporation, and, therefore, of different degrees of jurisdiction. The im-
plementation of the concept of the corporation could be traced back to the appli-
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
194
cation of reason and logic to the concept of law. However, canon law broke the 
first ground for the idea of the corporation. Economic, educational, professional, 
and communal corporations followed. A corporation, however, required a le-
gitimate representation. Hence, the idea of the corporation not only led to the 
establishment of the principle of different degrees of jurisdiction, but also to the 
system of elected representatives; usually one person who was elected by major-
ity vote and represented the corporate body in court or opposite the terrestrial 
rulers. According to Huff (2003, p. 135), the idea of group representation was 
the beginning of the constitutional government. Cities and municipalities 
adopted the idea of the corporation, implemented their own jurisdictions, and 
partly became represented in parliaments by elected officials. This was the case, 
for example, in England in the 13th century. 
The Western European legal revolution of the 12th and 13th century and the 
emergence of the concept of the corporate body created new social actors, influ-
enced the distribution of power, implemented reason and logic into the legal sys-
tem, established different degrees of jurisdiction, and, at least, innovated the in-
stitutional system and the principles of society.  
Of course, the new ideas and concepts were not immediately implemented. 
On the contrary, political revolutions and uprisings as well as oppression and 
abolition continued for centuries. In many states, the political structures to bring 
worldly rulers to justice did not exist. The introduction of the concepts of reason 
and rationality into the body of law, and the embodiment of the corporation and 
of autonomous jurisdictions, continued and it took several centuries until the 
principles were installed. Furthermore, developments varied between countries 
and were influenced by differing historical accidents. Nevertheless, the basic 
principles of jurisdiction, reason, pluralism, constitutional government, and the 
rule of law were laid. 
These developments could never happen in medieval Islam. The rejection of 
human reason, the different principles of law, and the unchangeability of Islamic 
law inhibited a legal revolution. The Islamic legal system remained nearly un-
changed until the 19th century, when European influence in the region necessi-
tated new legal forms. European legal codes often had to be adopted as a whole 
since a mixture or adjustment was not possible. Therefore, in many Arab states 
only family and inheritance law remained in the hands of the sharia. 
5.5 Corporate institutions 
The emergence of corporate bodies in Western Europe had three important im-
plications. First, it offered a way to treat a group of individuals as a unit and, 
therefore, as a single legal entity. Hence, even if the corporation was accused, no 
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private individual was affected. For example, individuals could not be prose-
cuted for a debt owed by the corporate body. Furthermore, a corporation did not 
end with the death of its members. Instead, it lived on, although its members 
might have changed (Tierney, 1982). Second, the creation of this abstract entity 
necessitated the establishment of different degrees of jurisdiction. Not only ter-
restrial and ecclesiastical jurisdiction had to be differentiated, but also the civil 
code and corporate law. Third, the corporate body created a free and independ-
ent space for scholars, merchants, craftsmen, and so on that allowed them a free 
exchange of ideas and opinions. Within this space, the members did not have to 
fear oppression or personal accusation. 
The concept of the corporate body was not known in the Arab region be-
cause of the relationship between the state and religion. In the West, the emer-
gence of corporate bodies can be traced back to its secular tradition and the 
separation between certain spheres. In the MENA region with its theocratic tra-
dition, these separations were unknown. Individuals rather than corporations 
were accused and punished. Furthermore, the implementation of different de-
grees of jurisdiction was not necessary. It was not possible to differentiate be-
tween jurisdictions since Islamic law was neither changeable nor interpretable. 
Therefore, individuals could not syndicate within an independent corporation. 
The absence of corporate bodies in the MENA region and their implementa-
tion in Western Europe had far-reaching consequences. Of capital importance 
was the establishment of corporations for Western universities. The possibility 
of aligning with other scholars as an independent, corporate group that imposed 
its own rules upon itself and constituted a legal entity increased scientific auton-
omy. Furthermore, universities were connected and thereby scientific subjects 
that were forbidden in one place could be further examined elsewhere. Networks 
and the legal statuses of universities made oppression much more difficult. In 
the Arab region, a university was just a sum of individuals. No general curricu-
lums or standards existed. The subjects taught had to be in accordance with the 
founders’ wishes and with Islamic doctrines. Therefore, the oppression of un-
wanted subjects and scientific efforts was easily accomplished. 
However, the absence of corporate bodies did not only affect the academic 
environment. Specific features of Islamic contract law, the Islamic inheritance 
system, and the absence of corporate law inhibited the establishment of double-
entry bookkeeping and other organizational innovations in the Arab region. 
Firms were usually small, since partnerships to pool labor and money involved 
only two partners customarily (Kuran, 2003; Kuran, 2004a,b). Around 1000, 
Arab and Western European contract law was almost similar but the latter fur-
ther developed and was modernized continually. Arab contract law, on the con-
trary, stagnated because of the inheritance system. Islamic hereditary law inhib-
ited the accumulation of capital over several generations. Accordingly, parents 
were not able to favor one child or a relative and bequest their wealth en bloc. 
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Instead, two-thirds had to be left to the children and other relatives, and females 
received half the share of males (Kuran, 2004a,b). Hence, the owner of an asset 
was not allowed to freely decide their heir, and the estate was usually allocated 
between the several heirs since many wives and all children had to be consid-
ered. Therefore, the allocated parts of the capital stock were relatively small and 
firms were closed after the death of the owner. That is to say, large Western-
style enterprises that persisted for several generations could not emerge in the 
Arab region. Around 1000, in the MENA region and in Western Europe, a 
commercial partnership ended with the death of one of the partners if he died 
before the official end of the contract. However, according to Islamic heritage 
law, the capital of the partnership was bequeathed to the remaining partners and 
the heirs of the deceased. Therefore, the contract partners usually received a 
relatively small portion of the capital. The inheritance system kept the quantity 
of commercial partners low. Fewer business partners and smaller firm sizes 
made the organizational innovations that were characteristic in Western Europe 
redundant (Kuran, 2003). In Western Europe, from the end of the medieval pe-
riod onwards, the size of enterprises and number of business partners and em-
ployees required new forms of production, organization, communication, and 
funding. Banks and stock markets emerged, contract and corporate law were 
adapted, and new accounting techniques and management practices were devel-
oped. These developments did not take place in the MENA region since no need 
existed. The small firm sizes, their short lifespan, the restricted and short com-
mercial partnerships, and the absence of corporate law made double-entry book-
keeping and other Western-style commercial innovations unnecessary. Credit, 
for example, was granted by private individuals and not by banks. Hence, while 
the West further developed its banking system, no similar development was ob-
servable in the MENA region. The same applies for stock markets. The men-
tioned contractual peculiarities, small firm sizes, and lending between private 
individuals inhibited the development of stock markets since they were not 
needed within this system (Grant, 1996; Huff, 2003; Lipsey, Carlaw & Bekar, 
2005; Kuran, 2003; Kuran, 2004a,b; Kuran, 2008). 
5.6 Education 
The medieval education systems of the MENA region and Western Europe dif-
fered strongly. A decisive factor in Arab education was the establishment of the 
madrasa. The madrasa developed as the most important institution of higher 
learning in the Arab region. However, since the madrasas were founded as 
charitable trusts, that is to say as waqfs, they were subject to the law of waqf. 
Therefore, madrasas were only allowed to teach and work within the realm of 
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Islamic teachings and statements. Natural philosophy, natural sciences, and even 
theology were not the main subjects, and further lost importance during the 
emergence of orthodox Islam since they were not thought to be in accordance 
with Islam. The madrasas were schools of law (fiqh). Hence, the subjects dealt 
with Islam per se. Despite the great Arab efforts in natural philosophy and 
mathematical sciences, the education on these subjects reduced with the emer-
gence of the madrasas. At the same time, the madrasas forced the distribution 
of the doctrines of Islamic occasionalism onto society. 
Furthermore, the Middle Eastern educational system was based on personal 
relationships between the master and his student. Prominent scientists and phi-
losophers lived in different places, not connected with each other. Eventually, 
they did not teach their students at university, but at home. Students interested in 
a particular subject had to seek out their favorite scholar and were taught at his 
home. Because of a missing subordinate organization, curriculums for certain 
subjects were not available. Hence, every teacher was responsible for his sub-
jects and set his priorities accordingly. Degrees, however, were not given to stu-
dents after passing comparable examinations. Instead, the teachers had to decide 
when a student had finished his studies successfully. “When in the eyes of the 
professor students had mastered the subjects taught in the madrasa – […] – they 
were given an ijaza, an authorization to teach these matters to others […] It 
should be stressed that this sort of education was highly personalistic; […] nei-
ther the state, the sultan, nor the caliph had any influence over the recognition of 
educational competence” (Huff, 2003, p. 78). This also meant that students’ ef-
forts were not comparable since they were not rated on a general level. Students 
travelled around, accumulating ijazas from different scholars in different places. 
The structures of the Middle Eastern educational system can be traced back 
to the missing corporate bodies. Corporate bodies were not known per se and 
thereby no corresponding judicial basis existed. This meant that Arab medieval 
universities were not independent spaces of science and research and were not 
connected with each other. Knowledge was not systematically discovered and 
distributed. Every university acted on its own and depended on the goodwill of 
its particular local ruler. No general organization or network connecting the 
Arab universities existed. This facilitated the influence and infiltration of con-
servative ideas. Freedom of education and research could not be generally en-
forced. 
Furthermore, ordinary citizens were seen as unable to understand and dis-
cuss philosophical matters. There existed a “sharp division between the knowers 
and the novices” (Huff, 2003, p. 82). “Such devices run against the grain of the 
scientific ethos, […] This Averroist view, according to which one must use one 
form of expression for the masses and another for the cognoscenti, was later 
condemned by the Christian Church as the doctrine of two truths” (Huff, 2003, 
p. 83). The personal and subjective character of the Arab educational system and 
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its missing independence from societal and ideological matters inhibited objec-
tivity and the development of a universal, naturalistic norm. 
In Western Europe, the universities that emerged from the beginning of the 
13th century in Bologna, Paris, and Oxford benefitted the most from the simul-
taneous emergence of the concept of the corporate body. These European uni-
versities were independent entities governed by their own internal rule systems. 
This made the universities a powerful force; for example, they were allowed to 
depart from the cities in which they were located if the universities’ rights were 
violated (Grant, 2008, p. 36). Furthermore, professors and students attained spe-
cial rights when they travelled (Grant, 2008, p. 36). Professors taught their stu-
dents in classes and general curriculums and degrees were established to create 
comparability between graduates and universities. In Western Europe, universi-
ties were the propagators of naturalistic teachings. Although the church occa-
sionally opposed the naturalistic view – especially in Paris, which ended up in 
the condemnation of 1277 – the autonomy of universities and political pluralism 
made general oppression impossible. 
5.7 The waqf
The waqf was a social trust that developed because the medieval Arab states 
were not interested in the provision of social services and public goods. There-
fore, education, orphanages, sanitation, mosques, water supply, soup kitchens, 
and so on were provided through waqfs. Nearly all social services and public 
goods in Arab cities were supplied by thousands of waqfs. A waqf was estab-
lished by “turning immovable private property into an endowment to support 
any social service permissible under Islamic law” (Kuran, 2004a, p. 75). Hence, 
by providing some kind of social services or public goods, a wealthy individual 
could turn his assets into a waqf. A waqf was thought to persist in its original 
form in perpetuity. That is to say, the founder assigned which social good should 
be provided by the waqf and how the trust was to be run. Afterwards, the trust 
and its mission could never be changed. Even when the founder died, the waqf
had to be run according to his wishes and, of course, according to Islamic doc-
trines. However, the founder of a waqf was bestowed with several privileges. He 
could appoint himself as manager and trustee. Therefore, the founder was al-
lowed to pay himself a considerable salary and employ family members. Fur-
thermore, the founder could circumvent Islamic inheritance law by appointing 
one child as his successor. Hence, the founder was able to avoid the fragmenta-
tion of his capital and favor one child or relative. In addition, a waqf could not 
be taxed and was safe from expropriation. Hence, the foundation of a waqf was a 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
199
way for landowners to protect their properties from statist despotism (Kuran, 
2003; Kuran, 2004a,b; Shatzmiller, 2001). 
However, the main problem with the waqf system was that it was unchange-
able in perpetuity. Hence, a modernization or an adaption to changing circum-
stances was not possible. This was less of a problem during medieval times. 
However, in the 18th and 19th centuries, when economic growth in parts of 
Western Europe started to take off, the rigidity of the waqf system was a severe 
issue. Most of the services provided by waqfs were supplied by corporations in 
Western Europe, for example, universities, municipalities, or churches. How-
ever, these institutions were able to adapt vastly and reallocate capital according 
to the particular requirements. In the MENA region, capital was fixed and could 
not be reallocated or reinvented when it was necessary to keep pace with mod-
ernization and economic growth in the West. Not all waqfs remained fixed and 
rigid, but to circumvent the severe rules a waqf’s manager had to be prepared to 
agree on certain backhand solutions. That is to say, he had to bribe the respec-
tive person in charge. These methods fostered corruption and other illegal pro-
cedures, which still pose a severe problem for the MENA region today (Kuran, 
2004a,b). However, in the 19th century Arab municipalities began to take over 
the waqfs’ missions. Nevertheless, fast adaption was not possible since tradi-
tional task sharing had existed for hundreds of years. 
Furthermore, the waqf system had an indirect but decisive effect on society 
in general, since it inhibited the emergence of a civil society. On the one hand, a 
waqf provided some kind of associational freedom. On the other hand, it hin-
dered the development of self-governed entities such as corporations and mu-
nicipalities. These kinds of self-contained corporate bodies were responsible for 
operating economically to avoid coming into conflict with the law and to estab-
lish their own rules. A similar kind of self-governance was missing in the 
MENA region (Kuran, 2004a,b; Kuran, 2008; Shatzmiller, 2001). 
5.8 Foreign rule and historical accidents 
An important reason why Western Europe stepped into modern science despite 
conservative religious forces was the multitude of independent nation states and 
cities. The suppression of natural science might have been possible in some re-
gional parts of a country or even a whole state. But in the neighboring countries 
other powers were at work and a unique ban was thereby impossible. When 
something was forbidden in one country it flourished in another. Different heads 
of state had different opinions on natural sciences. Some supported it, others 
fought against it. Some acted in a tactical manner because they wanted to sup-
port or harm the church or other rulers. Additionally, universities were con-
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nected and organized and this made suppression difficult. To suppress the whole 
corporate body in every country was impossible. So at last science could gain 
acceptance. 
The Arab Empire, however, was not a united state. On the contrary, the 
power of the caliphate soon deteriorated. By the beginning of the Abbasid ca-
liphate, which existed between 750 and 1258, the political power started to fall 
into the hands of provincial governors. Since the caliph was obliged to equip the 
governors with the required military, it became practice to appoint military 
commanders as provincial governors, who de facto acted independent of the ca-
liph and his court (Lewis, 1970, p. 103). 
Furthermore, it became difficult to control the peripheral areas over time. 
Before the turn of the millennium, independent states emerged in al-Andalus and 
Morocco, and de facto independent provinces arose in Egypt, Tunisia, Eastern 
Iran, and Central Asia. At the beginning of the 10th century, a second caliphate 
was established in Qairawan and, later, a third caliphate in Cordoba, meaning 
that at least three caliphs challenged for the legitimate succession to the Prophet 
(Halm, 2006, p. 37f.). 
In 932, Baghdad fell under the protectorate of the Buwaihids, a Persian dy-
nasty who degraded the caliphs to mere puppets (Lewis, 1970, p. 102). The Bu-
waihids were detached by the Seljuqs, a Turkish dynasty who conquered Persia 
and, later, Syria and Palestine, as well as large parts of Anatolia. 
Another source of foreign rule were the Mamluks, originally Turkish slaves 
from Central Asia who had been used as soldiers by the Baghdad caliphate since 
the ninth century. Since slaves in Islam relished a certain legal status and could 
even be released, the freed Mamluks worked their ways up to high military posi-
tions and even became provincial governors. They held enough power to decide 
on the position of the caliph and, in 1250, established the Mamluk Sultanate, 
which incorporated Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the holy sites (Halm, 2006, p. 
56ff.). 
In 1258, the Mongol conquest finally brought an end to the Baghdad caliph-
ate. The Mongol invasion had dramatic consequences for Iraq, especially Bagh-
dad, which did not recover until the 19th century. The irrigation systems, which 
were indispensable for the country, were destroyed and the civil government 
broke down. Furthermore, the Mongols established Persia as the centre of their 
newly conquered empire, degrading Iraq to a peripheral area, which no longer 
channeled the rich East–West trade. Centuries of decline and stagnation were the 
consequence (Lewis, 1970, p. 111). 
The Middle Eastern region and Egypt suffered from the strategy of appoint-
ing provincial governors who transformed the economic structure from a mone-
tary to a feudal economy. Before the emergence of Islam, the Arab economy 
was based on foreign and transit trade and was characterized by commercial and 
monetary structures. The introduction of provincial governors and other self-
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appointed patrons, who were endowed with a certain quantity of land and col-
lected taxes in their sovereign territory, reversed the original economic struc-
tures. Fiscal policies were directed to increase the patron’s or the ruling dy-
nasty’s wealth – the lifestyles at the courts were quite extravagant – and to sat-
isfy the urban population. The centre, on the contrary, lacked organization and 
bureaucracies were bloated. A feudal economic structure based on subsistence 
agriculture was established (Lewis, 1970, p. 103ff.). 
In Egypt, trade with Europe and the transit trade between Europe and the Far 
East were of great significance for the Mamluk sultanate’s finances. At the be-
ginning of the 15th century, however, the Mamluk state was hit by several 
blows, for example, Mongol troops captured Syria, the plague sprawl within the 
region, and Bedouin raids occurred, which led to a severe economic decline. The 
Mamluk rulers first decided to increase their revenues from trade by higher tar-
iffs. Monopolies on trade, for example sugar and other commodities, were estab-
lished so that the state could absorb the complete gains achieved. The strategy 
resulted in a complete collapse of the economy and a subsequent currency de-
preciation as well as severe taxation. In 1498, however, Vasco da Gama discov-
ered a new sea route to India that was safer and cheaper than the one through 
Egypt. Trade, and thereby the government’s revenues, declined and the end of 
the Mamluk state was heralded (Lewis, 1970, p. 111ff.).  
By the end of the 15th century, Arab supremacy had ended. The scientific 
and intellectual decline was accompanied by the transformation into a society 
based on agricultural production and feudal structures. Mediterranean trade has 
become redirected to the Europeans. Arab trade routes were outflanked by new 
sea routes. For centuries, MENA’s trade structure had been characterized by the 
import of primary products and the export of manufactured goods (as well as 
transit trade). However, between 1000 and 1500, this was reversed.  
The lack of interest in Europeans on the part of the Arabs yielded a distorted 
picture of Western European progress. For centuries, the only field in which Ar-
abs recognized Western superiority was the military. Intellectual, scientific, and 
technological progress as well as the economic development of Western Europe 
remained unnoticed by the Arabs for a long time. Only when European strength 
could no longer be ignored at the beginning of the 19th century did the Arabs 
realize the technological and economic progress made there. However, by that 
time, the MENA region lagged too far behind to catch up rapidly (Lewis, 1970, 
p. 119). 
Since the objective of the current work is to demonstrate the origins of the 
divergent developments between the MENA region and Western Europe, the 
investigation ends here. However, the emergence of the Ottoman Empire and, 
later, the appearance of European colonial powers, the impact of the two World 
Wars, the foundations of independent Arab nation states, and, of course, of the 
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state of Israel depict further historical incidences that have impacted economic 
development. Nevertheless, the origins for the divergent development paths – 
which were different right from the start – lay much further back in time. 
After the acceptance of Islamic occasionalism and the rejection of natural-
ism, the Arab region could not pursue a development path similar to that of 
Western Europe. The metaphysical and societal orientation pointed towards a 
totally different direction. Furthermore, certain accidents, such as the build-up of 
state and religion and the theocratic tradition of the Arab state, reinforced this 
direction. Several authors assert Arab development to its disability to enforce 
modern sciences (Grant, 1996; Huff, 2003; Jacob, 1997; Kuran, 2004b; Lewis, 
2002; Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar, 2005). However, here it is argued that modern 
sciences could not emerge in the Arab region since the institutional structure 
evolved in a different way and, hence, induced different results compared with 
Western Europe. The Arab understanding of man, society, state, and religion per 
se was different. Hence, the fundamental institutions – that is, worldview, the 
idea of man, the value system, morals, norms, attitudes, and so on – differed be-
tween regions. All constitutive institutions, for example, the understanding of 
the state, the political system, the legal system, and, the economic structures, 
must then differ. Institutional differences can best be seen in the theocratic tradi-
tion of the MENA region, its legal system, and in the absence of corporate bod-
ies, since these institutions can be clearly defined and are less liable to subjec-
tive matters such as culture and worldview. State, religion, and jurisdiction are 
enmeshed with each other since a separation in several independent spheres 
never occurred in MENA. Hence, the religious target to gain salvation is not in-
dependent of politics and jurisprudence. The rejection of naturalism and, hence, 
a further examination of nature, as well as the assumption that the Quran is 
complete, perfect, and unchangeable, led to an ossification of the institutional 
structures. 
Western Europe, on the contrary, is characterized through its institutional 
dynamism. This does not mean that Western institutions are easily modified and 
less fixed in their culture. But the recognition of human reason and rationality 
and the superiority of reason above both worldly and religious power enabled 
the emergence of a dynamic institutional structure that is able to adjust and 
change. Institutional change is a complex process that can require a lot of time 
depending on the particular institution. But Western institutions were by defini-
tion allowed to change and adjust endogenously since an internal modification 
caused by alterations that can be asserted to human reason and rationality was 
possible. The incapability of man to understand God and, therefore, nature pre-
cluded the possibility of endogenous change of Arab institutions. 
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Historical accidents, however, also played a key role since random events in 
both regions had strong impacts. The development in Western Europe did not 
merely depend on institutional dynamism. For example, the fact that conserva-
tive forces were finally not able to oppress the naturalistic worldview from the 
12th century onwards must be asserted to the secular tradition and political plu-
ralism, but mere luck also played a role. Furthermore, historical events that 
might not even be known today or whose impact seemed to be only marginal at 
the time might have been crucial in reality. The many dependencies and decisive 
factors will never be known. However, the institutional structures in the MENA 
region and in Western Europe had always differed because of developments and 
historical accidents that occurred hundreds or even thousands of years ago. 
When two regions whose institutional foundations differ and whose institutional 
structures vary are compared, the levels of economic development will also dif-
fer. 
This observation might not directly help promote growth in Arab countries, 
but it deepens the understanding of the differences between the institutional 
structures in the MENA region and those in the Western industrialized world. 
Since institutions are persistent, a deeper understanding of the reasons for insti-
tutional differences between regions is all the more important for the analysis of 
economic development. 
5.9 Prohibition of interest 
A popular Islamic peculiarity omitted from this study is the prohibition of inter-
est. However, the interest ban has not been further examined since it is not con-
sidered to have played a decisive role in early institutional development. During 
medieval times, the prohibition of interest was also effective in Christian re-
gions. In any case, the end of the Christian interest ban can be related to events 
taking place since the 13th century and, therefore, with the emergence of the 
Italian city states inter alia. The prohibition of interest in the Christian West did 
not become irrelevant before the 17th century (Schumann, 2007, p. 198f.). 
Hence, institutional developments played a role in the abolishment of the Chris-
tian interest ban, and the stagnation of Islam has probably been decisive for its 
maintenance in the Arab region. The Islamic prohibition of interest might be a 
reason for lower investment in the region; nevertheless, it is not considered a 
decisive determinant of institution building and of the accidental events between 
the seventh and 15th centuries that sent the region on a specific development 
path. This path was the beginning of economic backwardness and stagnation. 
The maintenance of the interest ban can rather be seen as a result of the institu-
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tional lock-in and the historical events. Hence, its perpetuation is a result of the 
development path, as is the region's economic performance in general. 
The Islamic prohibition of interest, or rather riba, has its roots in the Quran. 
Therefore, it is difficult to debate and, according to conservative Islamic think-
ers, cannot be changed. However, the discussion about which kind of business 
the interest ban refers to is ongoing. The ban does not forbid all forms of inter-
est; for example, it does not necessarily prohibit interest resulting from an in-
crease in value through investment or from the profits of a business transaction. 
Riba describes interest from a loan or rather the interest that becomes due when 
“money is made from money” (Tripp, 2006, p. 126). It is assumed that the origi-
nal ban meant to prohibit the pre-Arabic custom of doubling the borrowed 
amount in case it was not repaid on time (Schumann, 2005, p. 497; Schumann, 
2007, p. 186; Tripp, 2006, p. 127f.). Hence, the interest ban must be regarded in 
a historical context. It originates in the avoidance of injustice, since in seventh 
century Arabia most credits corresponded to consumer credits and less to com-
mercial credits. Therefore, the necessity to borrow resulted from natural disas-
ters such as droughts and the resulting crop shortfalls or from the death of the 
head of the family (Tripp, 2006, p. 128). That is to say, the borrower was in a 
worse economic situation than the lender and, therefore, to charge interest was 
considered exploitation. Furthermore, interest from money loans incorporated no 
effort by the lender and was, therefore, regarded as unjust. A fixed interest rate 
was also prohibited because it applied an unequal distribution of risk.  
The objective was to install justice by avoiding usury; therefore, consumer 
credits should not be charged interest and commercial credits were not popular 
during the time of the revelation. Influential conservative thinkers even nowa-
days consider the interest ban to be valid for all kinds of interest (Tripp, 2006, p. 
131). The prohibition of riba was the initial point of Islamic banking and also 
plays an important role in Islamic economics, neither of which, however, form 
part of this dissertation project. 
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6. Conclusion: connection between the general 
institutional analysis and the case study on 
the MENA region 
This study has examined whether formal and informal institutions separately 
influence economic growth and whether the economic performance of the 
MENA region can be traced back to its institutions. It further questioned why 
Arab institutions developed in this special way and not as, for example, Western 
European institutions. Since the illustration of the whole institutional develop-
ment path went beyond the scope of the study, emphasis has been placed on how 
early institutional development was responsible for varying development paths 
as well as formal and informal institutions. Not only political, legal, and eco-
nomic systems have been considered, but also cultural components such as value 
systems, worldviews, and the resulting morals and norms. These informal insti-
tutions determine the form of societal organization, which has a direct impact on 
economic development. 
During the analysis it was demonstrated that institutions significantly impact 
on economic development. If institutions differ between regions the economic 
performances must also differ. However, the analysis partly supports a kind of 
cultural determinism. This would indicate that Arab countries are in a hopeless 
state or an institutional trap. The hypothesis of cultural determinism was partly 
affirmed through the equilibrium view of institutions. This view leaves no space 
for institutional change and adaption besides an exogenous shock.  
However, the current study does not only depict the equilibrium view. Theo-
ries of institutional change, incorporating institutional transplantation, are also 
discussed. Since the equilibrium view depicts a model or a theory, it might not 
reflect the real world. It can be used to theoretically demonstrate and explain the 
persistence of institutions resulting from equilibrium strategies. Since institu-
tional persistence inter alia depends on deadlocked behavioral rules, the applica-
tion of the theory is justified. Traditional value systems, which determine the 
behaviors of societies, cannot be easily changed because informal institutions 
are mental constructs that provide individuals with mental stability and self-
identification. To understand the rigid character of value systems, these can be 
described as institutions resulting in equilibrium strategies that cannot be 
changed. 
However, the equilibrium view has its drawbacks. It omits further possibili-
ties of endogenous institutional change, even though Aoki’s (2001) model in-
cludes the possibility of action profiles influencing the institutional environment. 
Accordingly, institutions are exogenous to a single agent, but are endogenous 
regarding the set of technologically possible action profiles or rather society per 
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se. Hence, institutions are shaped by society, often unconsciously, but are ex-
ogenous constraints to the single individual. 
Even the equilibrium view, and classical game theory in general, must be 
described as an inadequate instrument to examine institutions in their entirety. 
Institutional dynamics cannot be examined using these tools. In any case, insti-
tutional dynamics are not the main issue in institutional analysis, since institu-
tional persistence is the bigger problem to first understand before considering 
solutions for institutional change. Game theory and the equilibrium view ema-
nate from rational agents and predetermined strategies. History plays no role and 
behavior is future-oriented. Furthermore, the equilibrium view contradicts some 
of the statements made in the first part of this study. It was emphasized that in-
stitutions are influenced by innumerable factors with a society’s history playing 
a decisive role. In addition, several drawback mechanisms between institutions 
and the level of economic development must be considered. However, it was 
also stated that the application of every theory can be justifiable; the user, how-
ever, must clearly describe his intentions and must be aware of the fact that the 
theory does not depict a world formula, but solely describes one channel that 
could be useful for understanding the bigger picture. 
To use Greif’s (2006) words, who also uses game-theoretic tools to analyze 
institutions, “Institutions are not game-theoretic equilibria, games are not the 
basic unit of institutional analysis and game theory does not provide us with a 
theory of institutions. Indeed, the key to advancing institutional analysis by us-
ing game theory is precisely to recognize the difference between game-theoretic 
equilibrium analysis and institutional analysis” (p. 19).  
Using the equilibrium view, the issue of institutional persistence and thereby 
unchanging value systems and codes of conduct is depicted. Using Greif’s 
(1994) model, it is further demonstrated that different belief systems result in 
different forms of societal organization. Since belief systems and the consequent 
behavior depict optimal strategies for society, its history, and further prerequi-
sites, these systems are rigid and can be compared with institutional equilibria to 
demonstrate the influence rigid value systems have on societal organization and 
economic development. It does not intend to define every society as an equilib-
rium state and every individual as a rational, purely future-oriented agent. 
According to the analysis, different value systems result in different forms 
of societal organization and, therefore, varying economic outcomes. It has been 
demonstrated that equilibrium wages vary between societies and that levels of 
social mobility and specialization depend on the form of societal organization. 
Accordingly, limited morality, which describes a collectivist, traditionalist soci-
ety, leads to lower wages and a horizontal social structure, whereas generalized 
morality, which is defined an individualistic, modern society, results in higher 
wages and a vertical social structure. Both outcomes are optimal for the present 
conditions. Hence, a society with relatively lower living standards and growth 
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rates cannot be described as inefficient per se. Every societal and economic out-
come is a result of the society’s history and its institutional environment (of 
course, geography plays a role but this factor is not included in this study). 
If history and institutions determine everything and cannot be changed, then 
nothing can be done regarding the low living standards of less developed socie-
ties. According to the preceding analysis of this study, this is partly true. But 
institutional change is still possible and the feedback mechanism running from 
economic development to institutions should not be underestimated. Exogenous 
institutional change in the form of institutional transplantation can work. How-
ever, there can be no general solution or set of institutions that lead to economic 
growth in every society. Instead, every case must be individually considered. 
The transplanted institutions must fit the – often informal – institutional basis. 
However, this implies that the institutions of property rights, the rule of law, po-
litical participation, and market liberalization cannot be implemented immedi-
ately because they do not match the prevalent institutional environment. Even if 
it sounds strange to Western economists, free markets and the corresponding 
political, civil, and legal rights might not lead to immediate growth in every so-
ciety. 
Increasing living standards influence peoples’ preferences. Material security 
alters utility functions and shifts the purpose of life from survival to self-
realization. Hence, economic development induces institutional change. Values 
and attitudes change with higher incomes, although the basic identifying infor-
mal institutions might persist. But this does not imply that as time goes by every 
population will develop into a Western-style, individualistic society. Instead, 
differing institutional environments and forms of societal organization will pre-
vail, implying varying economic performances. Underdevelopment should, 
therefore, not be accepted as an unchangeable matter of fact. Of course, living 
standards in poor economies must be increased. But how this can be achieved 
must be considered in every case anew, and it should be understood that socie-
ties do differ and do realize different outcomes, whether economically, politi-
cally, legally, or morally, and that some of these differences will always persist. 
The enduring character of cultural differences was shown by regression 
analysis, which indicated that religious affiliation still influences the nature of 
institutions even though the currently affected parts of the population might not 
be practicing believers. Religious affiliation measured via the percentage of a 
population belonging to a certain religion indicates the underlying religious in-
fluence that is not consciously felt and implemented by the individual. That is to 
say, a certain religious moral prevalent in a particular region might no longer be 
consciously implemented by the population. But the values and morals resulting 
from the religion have become a part of the culture and of the general value sys-
tem. Hence, people are still influenced by early religious values and morals, 
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even if they describe themselves as non-religious since the prevalent culture and 
society was shaped by a certain belief. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that countries with majority Muslim popu-
lations have significantly different formal and informal institutions compared 
with countries with majority Protestant populations. Because of data availability 
and the necessity to match several data sets, only two religious directions could 
be incorporated. However, since the present work emphasizes institutions in the 
Arab region the approach is adequate. 
Accordingly, countries with mainly Muslim populations realize informal in-
stitutions that intend a form of generalized morality, and formal institutions that 
do not assure secure property rights, a constrained executive, and an independ-
ent judiciary. Countries with a majority of Protestant citizens implement infor-
mal institutions that can be equated with generalized morality. In addition, the 
formal institutional index indicates secure property rights, a constrained execu-
tive, and the implementation of an independent judiciary. Hence, Islam and 
Protestantism seem to result in partly different institutions. Furthermore, it was 
demonstrated via the regression analysis that informal and formal institutions 
have a significant impact on the level of per capita income. 
The theoretical and empirical findings permit several conclusions regarding 
the MENA region. Institutions in Muslim countries differ to institutions in Prot-
estant countries. Furthermore, institutions influence per capita income. Hence, 
the varying institutions of mainly Muslim and mainly Protestant countries result 
in different economic outcomes. This is further exemplified by the descriptive 
empirical analysis of the MENA region. Nearly all indicators show significant 
differences between institutions in the MENA region and the Western advanced 
economies (as a matter of interest, Japan is included as an advanced economy 
although it neither belongs to MENA nor to the Western hemisphere). Accord-
ing to the first part of the study, the institutions implemented in the MENA 
countries do not correspond to the institutions that were described as being neo-
classically growth supportive. For example, insecure property rights do not al-
low optimal individual utility maximization. The same holds for a missing inde-
pendent judiciary. Furthermore, autocratic governments are predominant in 
MENA and civil liberties and political rights are not ensured. These institutions 
inhibit individual utility maximization and restrain incentives to invest. 
Regarding informal institutions, the evaluation of WVS data indicated a so-
cietal structure of limited morality in the MENA region. The results regarding 
trust and control are not that obvious; however, respect and obedience indicate a 
hierarchical society with an emphasis on collective and hierarchic structures. In 
addition, the analysis of further survey questions showed a traditional attitude 
regarding the roles of women, education, work, and family in general. 
According to institutional theory, these patterns – whether informal or for-
mal – are difficult to change. Consulting the equilibrium view of institutions to 
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understand the issue of institutional persistence in the Arab region, only an ex-
ogenous shock could alter the equilibrium strategies determined by institutions. 
That is to say, the prevalent traditional and conservative value system that em-
phasizes the collective, attributes major importance to religion, disadvantages 
women regarding education and work, and supports hierarchic structures is per-
sistent. The same holds for historically and culturally rooted formal institutions. 
The model indicated that change is not possible regarding the observed institu-
tion. However, apart from the equilibrium view model it was stated that in fact 
most institutions are dynamic entities. But marginal change can take hundreds of 
years to become obvious. This means that the institutional environment in the 
MENA region can and does change. However, a complete reversal is unlikely 
since the historical development path has pushed the region in a certain direc-
tion. Moderate modernization might take place but it will take time. 
Regarding formal institutions, exogenous change is only partly promising. 
The successful implementation of exogenous institutions into MENA countries 
– for example, the rule of law, civil liberties, democracy, and market liberaliza-
tion – depends on the distance to the prevalent institutional structure. Hence, the 
institutions might be abolished, they might be disregarded, or they might disturb 
the prevalent institutional structure and lead to destabilization; but they might 
also fit the prevalent institutions and lead to a general adjustment and thereby 
modernization, at least in the long run. 
In most countries of the MENA region, the prevalent institutions lead to 
considerably lower per capita incomes and, therefore, living standards compared 
with highly developed Western states.72 The historical analysis demonstrated 
why this is the case and showed that MENA institutions could only develop this 
way. Historical accidents and institutional and societal developments made other 
alternatives impossible. That is to say, the current institutional and economic 
situation of the MENA region is a logical consequence of its development path. 
In particular, the historical analysis showed the importance of worldview 
and a certain belief system for societal and economic development, factors cur-
rently omitted from mainstream economic analysis. However, as stated in the 
                                                
72 However, some MENA countries realize high per capita incomes and growth rates, for ex-
ample the UAE. At any rate, these are the RRLI countries and their richness can be traced 
back to special characteristics. All of the rich Arab countries are oil exporting countries, and 
thereby they owe their economic successes to resource richness and low indigenous popula-
tions. These countries are able to afford growth-inhibiting institutions since oil incomes com-
pensate for the institutional environment. However, the descriptive statistical analysis of the 
MENA region shows that the oil states do not possess significantly different institutions to the 
non-oil countries of the MENA region. Still, the current work does not go into detail regard-
ing the Arab countries with high per capita incomes. The objective of the study is not to ex-
amine how far the current structures of the MENA countries differ, but to demonstrate the 
unique institutional development and its implication on economic growth; omitting speciali-
ties resulting from resource endowment.  
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case study, Western European development depended on the acquisition and so-
ciety-wide implementation of the naturalistic worldview. This was not an easy 
process and the Christian church battled naturalism and sciences. But, as shown, 
things were different to in the MENA region. The prevalent institutions and ac-
cidental events led to the Industrial Revolution, sustainable growth, and the de-
velopment of a free civic society. The rejection of naturalism and the acceptance 
of Islamic occasionalism made a similar development in the MENA region im-
possible. Without being persuaded by cause and reason and thereby without 
natural laws, modern sciences and a physical worldview could not emerge. From 
an Islamic point of view, what happened was a logical conclusion. Assuming the 
Quran to be unchangeable and non-interpretable, and assuming God to be the 
only creator, natural laws indeed make no sense. However, for the same reason 
none of the two development paths, neither the Arab nor the Western European, 
can be described as better or worse. 
Regarding the high population growth rates and low living standards, the 
MENA region will face even more economic problems in the future. Increasing 
economic growth rates in the past few years cannot hide this fact. However, 
studying institutions and institutional development in the MENA region helps 
explain why Arabic institutions developed by this means. Hence, we now know 
why the Arab region took this particular development path and we know why 
the economic performance is worse than other regions. However, what we can-
not say is how the MENA countries should solve their problems. This is not 
possible since the analysis demonstrated that institutions, even if they are eco-
nomically inefficient, can depict a kind of optimal state regarding the particular 
society and that exogenous institutional change is hardly possible. This is a de-
pressing result for the MENA region and also for other less developed countries. 
However, it was shown that institutions are dynamic and even the institu-
tions of the MENA region can change over time. Furthermore, exogenous insti-
tutional change is possible. Hence, there is a chance for development economics 
and in- and outsiders that are interested in institutional change in the MENA 
countries. But the realization per se will be difficult. The transplanted institu-
tions must fit the prevalent institutional environment. That is to say, they do not 
necessarily belong to Western-style political, legal, and economic institutions. 
However, Western organizations of any form will find it morally debatable and 
also theoretically senseless to exogenously install non-Western institutions in a 
foreign country. Indigenous forces might find it easier to induce change. They 
will also know better which institutions fit the cultural basis. However, IEX and 
IEN institutional change might still result in region-specific outcomes. Hence, 
the institutional environment and the corresponding economic performance 
might still not match Western and mainstream economic claims. Furthermore, 
indigenously introduced change, whether endogenous or exogenous, is not pre-
dictable. Actions fostering economic productivity and growth are desirable, 
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:35:29AM
via free access
211
since increasing living standards change preferences and thereby institutions. 
However, of all things the prevalent institutions in the MENA region hinder an 
increase in productivity and growth. 
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Derivation of the equilibrium wage (pp. 51-53): 
To show: α+ucV  is not worthwhile (lifetime utility unemployed cheater + gain 
from cheating in one period). 
Agent will not cheat if: uch VV +≥ α       (2.20) 
Utility functions: 
Employed honest agent:  
( ) uhhh VVWV ξξδ +−+= 1*         (2.21) 
Unemployed agent; i=h: honest; i=c: cheater: 
( )( )uiihiui VhVhV +−+= ηδδ 1   chi ,=      (2.22) 












−=    with: ( )ξδ −−= 11    (2.23) 
From (2.22); setting i=h: 
( )( )uhhhhuh VhVhV +−+= ηδδ 1       (2.24) 
Dissolve (2.22) with i=h for uhV : 
( )( )[ ]uhhhhuh VhVhV +−+= ηδδδ
[ ]uhhhuhhhuh VhhVVhV δηδδδηδ −−++=   
Constanze Dobler - 978-3-653-00883-8










( )( ) ( )ηδδδ hhhhuh hVhhV −+=−− 111

























h PVHV +=      (2.25) 







   









  i=h;c 
Similarly; setting i=c in (2.22): 
( )( )ucchcuc VhVhV +−+= ηδδ 1   
ηδδ chc
u
c PVHV +=      (2.26) 
Equalizing (2.23) and (2.25): 
ηδδ
ξ hhh
h PVHWV +=− *   
ηξδξδ hhhh PVHWV +=−Σ
*
*WPVHV hhhh ++=Σ ηξδξδ
*WPVHV hhhh +=−Σ ηξδξδ











*      (2.27) 
Remember: 
u
ch VV +≥ α      (2.20) 
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Insert (2.26) into (2.20): 
ηδδα chch PVHV ++≥
ηδαδ chch PVHV +≥−












    (2.28) 




















































































































*     (2.30) 
  
( ) ηαηξδ ,,,,,* ch hhwW =     (2.31) 
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World Bank country group classification 
High-income OECD members: 
Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Czech Republic; Denmark; Finland; 
France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; 
Luxembourg; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak 
Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United 
States 
High-income non-OECD economies 
Andorra; Aruba; Bahamas, The; Bahrain; Barbados; Bermuda; Brunei Darussa-
lam; Cayman Islands; Channel Islands; Croatia; Cyprus; Estonia; Equatorial 
Guinea; Faeroe Islands; French Polynesia; Gibraltar; Greenland; Guam; Hong 
Kong SAR; Isle of Man; Israel; Kuwait; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Macao SAR; 
Malta; Monaco; Netherlands Antilles; New Caledonia; Northern Mariana Is-
lands; Oman; Puerto Rico; Qatar; San Marino; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Trini-
dad and Tobago; Turks and Caicos Islands; UAE; Virgin Islands (US) 
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria; Djibouti; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Iraq; Jordan; Lebanon; 
Libya; Morocco; Syrian, Arab Rep.; Tunisia; West Bank and Gaza; Yemen, 
Rep. 
Euro area
Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; 
Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain 
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East Asia and Pacific 
American Samoa; Cambodia; China; Fiji; Indonesia; Kiribati; Korea, Dem. 
Rep.; Lao PDR; Malaysia; Marshall Islands; Micronesia, Fed. Sts; Mongolia; 
Myanmar; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Samoa; Solomon Islands; 
Thailand; Timor-Leste; Tuvalu; Tonga; Vanuatu; Vietnam 
Europe and Central Asia 
Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; 
Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Lithuania; Macedonia, FYR; 
Moldova; Montenegro; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Tajikistan; Tur-
key; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan 
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; 
Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Gre-
nada; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Pa-
nama; Paraguay; Peru; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines; Suriname; Uruguay; Venezuela; RB 
South Asia
Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape Verde; 
Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Congo, Rep.; 
Côte d'Ivoire; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia, The; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mau-
ritius; Mayotte; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; São Tomé and 
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Principe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; Sudan; 
Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe
RPLA: Djibouti; Egypt; Jordan; Lebanon; Morocco; Tunisia; West Bank and 
Gaza 
RRLA: Algeria; Iran; Iraq; Syria; Yemen; 
RRLI: Bahrain; Kuwait; Libya; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; the UAE 
World Bank classification, data accessed September 20, 2010, [online] at: 
<http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups>. 
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